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ABSTRACT

Psychoanalysis and Feminist Scholarship:

Toward A Women's

Studies Curriculum in Counseling and Psychology
(September 1979 )

Bonnie Smolen, M.Ed.

,

University of Massachusetts/Amherst

Directed by:

In past

Dr.

Peter

decades we have witnessed

H.

a

Wagschal

great upsurge in the

popularity and popularization of psychotherapy and "personal growth"
experiences.

There has been

models and training sites.

a

concomitant proliferation of training

Though undergraduates are increasingly

interested in this career area, no clearly outlined course of study
exists in order to prepare students to work in the field or to go on
for

a

graduate degree.

Recent attention paid by minority groups and

social theorists to the sometimes hidden political

implications of

psychotherapy and its assimilation into American culture suggests
that an interdisciplinary curriculum would best address the needs and

concerns of the students and the social problems they ultimately may
be working to alleviate.

And yet there is no adequate theoretical base on which to build
such an interdisci pi inary program, though there have been theoretical
and practical

attempts, in the field of education and psychology, to

effect a 'synthesis' of political and psychological theory.

most prominent of these efforts

in

Perhaps

recent years is feminist therapy,

which, again has failed to adequately demarcate the interrelationships

vi

i

of psychology, counseling, and political theory.

research originally intended to provide

a

Hence while this

Women's Studies curriculum

as a prototype for an interdisciplinary program of
study in counseling,
it soon became clear that a lengthy process of
conceptual

clarification

would have to precede program development.
The aim of this dissertation is to begin to provide the theoretical

foundation for

a

Women's Studies major in counseling and psychology.

It proposes from the outset that the theory should evolve from both

political and psychological frames of reference, that is, should be

interdisci pi inary in nature.
tasks:

1)

This goal

is subsumed under two broader

to explore the relationships between, respectively, political

and psychological theory; psychological theory and therapeutic practice;

theory, therapy and political activity; and

2)

to elucidate a pedagogical

framework that is reflexively coherent with these concerns.
Chapter

I

is an in-depth exploration of the problem in two parts:

first, a concrete explication of the difficulties facing students in
the field of counselor education, and an examination of the ways in which

present educational practices fail to meet their needs.

Following

that, the same themes are explored with particular reference to feminist

concerns and Women's Studies curriculum.
a

The suggestion is offered that

program built on the principles of Freudian psychoanalytic theory

would best address the failures that currently pertain in counselor
education, and would be most amenable to an interdisciplinary focus.

Chapter

II

endeavors to determine whether feminist therapy, which

would appear the most likely choice for the basis of an interdisciplinary
Women's Studies counseling program, can address the problems regarding
vi

i i

the politics/psychology nexus which were raised
in Chapter

I,

whether the feminist therapy alternative to psychoanalysis

is truly an

and

advance, politically or psychologically, over the Freudian
theory and
method.

Chapter III sets forth the psychoanalytic theory of mind in order
to establish a standard by which to judge what any psychological
theory

has to offer to feminist political

analysis and feminist pedagogy.

Chapters IV and V represent an exploration and critique of the psycho-

analytic theory of psychosexual development, with
mind:

a

dual

first, to provide a foundation on which to base

a

purpose in

collaboration

between feminist and Freudian theories by demarcating between essential
and derivative components of the theory, and second, to demonstrate

what may be forthcoming from an application of psychoanalytic principles
to some of the most urgent research questions posed to feminist scholars
by the women's movement.

The Conclusion takes the theoretical exploration of general

psychology and psychosexual development back to the problems of
feminist counselor education.

The Conclusion also suggests some

problems left unresolved by the research, and some areas for continued
study.
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CHAPTER

I

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Part One:

Alternative Education from the
Students' Point of View

Overview
When this research was begun several years ago, even before
the focus was narrowed to Women's Studies curriculum, it
appeared that
it might be possible to start immediately with the task of
program

development.

This seemed without question an exciting project:

lay and professional

people with whom

stunned to discover that
not already exist.

a

I

most

had discussed the idea were

counseling program for undergraduates did

The impact of this realization may be staggering:

students who are interested in the "helping professions" and who,
until

now, have gone without training constitute

source of clinicians and/or social change agents.

a

vast untapped
Thus far, these

students either have been deterred from such work altogether, or
have entered the professional field with few clinical skills and an

unsophisticated political understanding of social problems and their
own role in social change.

With the increased popularity and public

acceptance of therapy, and the recent trend toward exploring the
political aspects of both institutional and individual therapeutic

experiences, the development of such
timed.
1

a

program would indeed be well-

2

The project appears all the more exciting
because on the surface
it seems a relatively easy one to put into
operation.

There is no

shortage of training models from which to draw, including
several

developed in recent years (radical therapy, feminist therapy,
microcounseling, re-evaluation counseling, and organizational development,
to name a few) which already focus on "political" aspects of
therapy.

These latter, while they are widely divergent, may be grouped together
for three reasons.

First, they are unified by the adjectives they

use to name and define themselves:

Second, they may be seen as

a

radical, humanistic, and so forth.

unit in terms of their nuclear organizing

issues; demystification of therapy and the authority relationship

through skills acquisition and peer models; attention to issues of
sex, race, and class discrimination in the social

services, etc.

They would no doubt be open for use in an undergraduate program as
they are philosophically committed to deprofessional izing the social

services and social service training.

Third, they are based on similar

underlying assumptions drawn from classical liberal philosophy and
supported by positivist methodology.
While none of these systems identifies itself specifically as

interdisciplinary, probably their proponents would see themselves as
closely allied with the goals and values of this project.

In the

manner in which interdisci pi inary organization has been recently
popularized, it can be loosely understood as calling for any integration
of psychological and political disciplines.

This is exemplified by

the over-use of phrases like "politics of therapy," wherein juxtaposing

3

politics" and "therapy" automatically
connotes interdisciplinary (or

dialectical) methodology.
If an easy alliance with the proponents
of current so-called

radical and humanistic therapies and education
were assumed, then the

tasks of this project would indeed be accomplished
easily:

a

radical

approach to the tensions between theory and therapy
would abandon psychological theory in favor of immediate therapeutic or
pol itical /social

needs, and concentrate on developing therapeutic and
social change

strategies and on disseminating skills.
are clear:

a

The implications for education

"therapeutic" classroom in which learning happens mainly

through self-exploration,

a

model which uses the students'

inner

experience as the primary text and stresses that inner experience,
combined with skills that almost anyone can learn, constitutes adequate

counselor education.

This fallacy is accompanied by a general disdain

for theory as being elitist and of little practical value.

Such

educational strategies are labeled radical largely because they

represent departures from traditional classroom (blackboard and text)
and formal

therapy (Dr. and couch) models.

The obscurity of their

theoretical roots makes it difficult to assess in what other ways

their advocates consider themselves to be radical, and, therefore to

ascertain what is meant by radical.
This theoretical obscurity makes, in fact, for

a

very uneasy

alliance (between this project and radical therapy/humanistic education
projects currently underway), if one holds to

politicizing the social services.

a

genuine hope for

Critical theorists have long since

shown the politically-motivated interdiscipl inary approach, as seen in

3

4

the proliferation of "politics of X"
slogans, to be suspect.

They are

writing about the popularization of the
dialectic in the New Left and
its heirs, and here Paul

Breines draws attention to the original

impact of the "politics of therapy" phraseology.
The meaning of the Movement's 'politics of
the unpolitical'
lay in its recognition that nothing in modern
society is
unpolitical; that every detail of daily life is saturated
with and reproduces the hegemony of the ruling system;
that
the object of critical thought and action
is 'the system'
as a totality.
.
its recognition that a coherent and
unitary critique of modern society begins with a critique
of individual existence.
Thus the Movement's 'politics
of the unpolitical' is not a matter of taste but a shift
in the 'strategy of liberation'.
.1
.

.

.

The analysis of the New Left echoes earlier writings of Marcuse
and other critical theorists who were working with contemporary uses
of the Hegelian and Marxist dialectic.

Marcuse writes

the adjustment of Reason to oppressive social

"...

since

institutions perpetuated

unfreedom, progress in freedom depends on thought becoming political."*
And again, the caution:

Today this dialectical mode of thought is alien to the
whole established universe of discourse and action.
The established reality seems promising and productive
enough to repel or absorb all alternatives. Thus acceptance-and even affirmation--of this reality principle appears to
be the only reasonable methodological principle.
Moreover,
it precludes neither criticism nor change; on the contrary,
insistence on the dynamic character of the status quo, on
its constant 'revolutions,' is one of the strongest props
for this attitude. Yet this dynamic seems to operate
endlessly within the same framework of life: streamlining
rather than abolishing the domination of man, both by man
and the products of his labor.
.

.

.

One major difficulty in making judgments about those current
radical

therapists and educators who address themselves to political

concerns, is the impossibility of discerning in what relation, if any,

5

they stand to either the New Left
or critical theory, and
therefore

what the term "political" itself
has come to mean to them.
"politics of therapy"

a

Is the

concept already absorbed into the
"daily

hegemony," and if so, to what end?

My questions apply not only to
the

ambiguity of their roots in political
theory, but also to their roots
in some psychological

theory.

Their relationship even to existentialism,

no less Neo Freudianism, ego psychology,
or Freudian analysis is, at

best, obscure.

At worst, it is denied.

In the abstract, this obscurity

pervades as well their connection with the major
philosophical traditions
in history,

particularly classical liberal thought and positivist

methodology.

Russell Jacoby writes:

Within psychology new theories and therapies replace
old ones at an accelerating rate.
In a dynamic society,
Freud is too old to be a fashion, too new to be a classic.
The ability as well as the desire to remember
atrophies. Most of the social sciences turn radically
ahistorical ; one hardly studies Hegel within philosophy,
Freud within psychology, Marx within economics, and so on.
For some, this is proof of progress and vitality.
But
dynamism can be perpetual motion without forward movement.
Within dynamism a static moment can inhere:
the structure
of society 4
.

.

.

.

The very fact that the origins of

a

slogan such as the "politics

of therapy" have been forgotten, that self-styled radical

humanists

do not know from whence their battle cries derive, vitiates the hope

that the dialectical mode is anywhere preserved in them.
not have a substantive political theory, nor
logical
will

a

If they do

substantive psycho-

theory, it is not likely that their view of relating the two

be substantive, nor that they will

generate significant implica-

tions for counselor training or undergraduate education, broadly

considered.

Actually, we might have cause for concern even before we

6

look at the specifics of their conception
of the relationship between

politics and therapy.

Jacoby states earlier, "The shift in social

attention towards psychology is no accident; it
testifies to
in the social

structure itself ."

5

a

shift

And so it is not only the uncritical

attitude towards an easy fusion of politics and therapy
(as well as
theory and therapy) to which we must take exception, but
also the

earlier error:

an uncritical

acceptance of the increasing popularity

of psychology and therapy.
In the course of searching out the possibilities of an alliance

with those currently concerned with radicalizing or politicizing

therapy and education,

I

have asserted here that it is difficult to

know how the words "radical" and "political" are being used, both

generally and in the specific contexts of therapy and education.
Before proposing some specific answers to these questions, it is

necessary to explore one more word frequently used by those who
currently consider themselves to be involved in radical therapy and
education:

"alternative."

Another value held by "radical" therapists and educators which
would have to be taken at face value in order to proceed with this
project in

a

simple manner

is the belief that what is "alternative"

in education is new and radical

(and therefore good).

This research

itself provides yet one more alternative model of higher education.

Therefore, before developing and defending

a

specific

counselor

training program for undergraduates, it is important to look more

closely at what it means to offer educational alternatives within the
notions of classical liberal arts education, and within the prevailing

7

university attitudes toward

counseling.

The essence of alternative is choice
between

possibilities.

1 i

mi ted

differing

,

Yet today there seems to be no limit to
the prolifera-

tion of alternative therapy systems and
training models, many of which

assume an automatic connection between "alternative"
and "radical"
or "humanistic."

I

do not disparage the goals behind these
alternatives,

or the motivations of their proponents; the
achievements in the fields

of humanistic education and counseling are considerable.
is with the

ultimate failure to achieve their ends.

My concern

In losing sight

of the fact that there is a limit to truthful, correct
possibilities,

we may not so much have liberated

a

vast resource of ideas as we have

allowed ourselves to become overwhelmed with

a

variety of pseudo-

answers which do little more than block the salient questions.

Clearly,

the "alternatives" we have devised cannot possibly all be different

from one another, and most certainly cannot be presenting us with

genuine choices.
History shows that educational practices are not in the vanguard
of social change but rather lag behind, reflecting changes already at

work in society.^
reverse.

Only those who ignore history can believe the

To ignore history, obviously, is to risk being manipulated

by it, and to risk changing nothing at all.

It likewise follows that

only those who are oblivious to history can claim an ipso facto

connection between the terms "alternative" and "radical"; both words
take on meaning only within specific historical contexts.

With all the

talk today about politicizing therapy, altering education, and

humanizing the social services (now often referred to as "human"

"

8

services, as if the semantic change
were

a

structural change). It is

imperative not simply to offer another
allegedly political "alternative" and compete for recognition
on terms which may already have

precluded the possibility of choice
and innovation, but rather to
question the very terms on which we
have been offering and accepting
"alternatives.
To summarize, then, the original
goal of this research had

been to develop an interdiscipl inary
counseling curriculum for under-

graduates.

At first glance, the task seemed easy.

Yet what started

as a relatively straightforward project
proved almost endlessly complex
as

I

began to critique the alternative therapy and
educational systems

available as models, and to define and historically
situate current
so-called radical therapy and pedagogy.
derives, no doubt, from

a

Some of the difficulty

multi-disciplinary approach.

However, the

complexity really begins as soon as we focus on the terms: "alternative,"
political," "radical," "dialectical."

Clearly, these terms are bandied

about far too freely— so much so that it is difficult to ascertain

what they mean at all, no less as applied to therapy and pedagogy.
In fact,

it is extremely difficult to establish what,

has in common with people all

if anything, one

too eager to become one's radical

bedfellows.

There is fairly extensive literature establishing the need, and
a

preliminary set of guidelines^ for integrating psychological theory

into political theory in order to formulate correct analyses of social

problems and devise effective strategies for political change.

However,

the literature calling for an infusion of political awareness into the

9

shaping of psychological and pedagogical theory
is less complete,
less sophisticated, and generally speaking,
less correct.

Of special

importance in this regard is the lack of attention
paid to the tension
inherent in the relationship of theory to therapy, and
the simplistic

sacrifice of therapeutic standards to political polemic or
of political
standards to the polemic of instant self-realization.

Can these

allegedly politicized therapy and training systems and their theoretical
underpinnings be evaluated by any criteria?
lectical, strictly defined?

Are they in fact dia-

Or even political?

Or even therapy ?

Is

there a theory of subjectivity adequate to address all these questions?

What will be the consequences of allying oneself with the spokespersons
of radical /humani sti c therapy and working within their confines without

determining the philosophical and theoretical strains that inform
their work?

These questions can only be answered by returning to the

basic theoretical foundations from which
as well

as of "therapy" may be drawn.

a

definition of "radical"

It is from within adequately

supported and theoretically comprehensive definitions that

a

radical

counselor training program must be built.
Where one attempts to build

a

counseling program for under-

graduates on the foundations of what exists, the foundations begin to
disappear, leaving so many questions unanswered that the very justifi-

ability of this project as an "alternative" education strategy is
called into question.

Therefore, let us turn to the original impetus
O

for beginning this program--the students --and look more concretely at

who they are, what they're doing, and what they want, in order that

program be designed which can have genuinely radical impact for them
and for society.

a

10

The Students
We, as teachers, are confronting an
undergraduate student body

that arrives on the college campus knowing
little more than that they

want "to help" people, or perhaps "work with
people," and that they
feel

unsuited for the more structured professional
possibilities in

this area, such as nursing or teaching.

Traditionally, this has been

experienced as an altruistic rather than politically-motivated
goal,
although that is changing.

In recent years, word has filtered back

from the Peace Corps, Vista, volunteer workers, victims of the
depressed
economy, that there is little cause for optimism about the chance of

doing any good (or even of getting

a job)

with merely

liberal arts education and no graduate degree.

a

traditional

Some students decide

immediately to try for graduate school in psychology or social work,
endure an irrelevant undergraduate major (statistics rather than

counseling), and don't find out until they arrive at graduate school
that even there they won't learn much about therapy.

Others begin to

search for meaningful undergraduate programs, knowing that they don't

want graduate school, or having heard that their chances of getting
in are often as

slim as one in

a

hundred.

These students discover

earlier than those who follow (and those of us who followed) the

graduate route, that there is really no place within the university
to receive clinical

training.

They find that what exists is fragmentary and incoherent at
best:

a

smattering of courses (nowhere developed into unified

curricula) in departments of psychology, sociology, education, human

development, home economics, and political science, all with vague and

11

vaguely competing theoretical orientations
and philosophical bases.
As a general rule the social
sciences avoid all clinical approaches,

and while schools of education may
embrace them, it is invariably from
a non-theoretical

vantage point.

Even trying to put together a

composite major (at this university through
BDIC, Project 10, or
Women's Studies, for example) will not succeed:
enough related courses.

there simply are not

The fact that no counseling program exists

for such students comes as a startling revelation
to them as well as
to some of us, given the enormous student
interest, the decreasing

likelihood that they'll get into graduate school, the urgent
demand
for practitioners in our increasingly social -service
oriented society.

The few of us who are attempting to respond to the demand for

undergraduate courses in this area tend to be housed in departments
of education and human development (rather than in the social sciences).
So far we have adopted mainly human relations/organizational develop-

ment, skills dissemination, or existential counseling approaches, and
the humanistic education or human relations laboratory teaching

methods that accompany these approaches.

g

We have believed that we

were responding to students' and society's needs.

We have believed

ourselves to be in the vanguard of social action, exploring the

possibility of converting social service to social change.
History cautions against assuming that we were correct.
just history:

a

And not

closer look at the issues reveals too many contra-

dictions and questions brushed aside and ignored.

It is still

why, when so many disciplines claim authority over

a

unclear

field, none has

developed it; why no set of categories has been articulated to which

12

any such program would need
address itself, nor criteria
by which it
-night be evaluated; why
no guidelines have been
set forth delimiting
the possible areas of internal
connection between the various
disciplines.
There is no consensus over
even the most basic of issues.
Is psychology
a physical or social
science? Is counseling a legitimate
sub-

discipline of psychology?
constitute

Do the scattered courses
offered now

counseling program, and if they do
not, should

a

exist at all?

program

a

With these issues in dispute it
is certainly not clear

why any of us would feel confident
to generate allegedly improved
alternatives along with theoretical
systems and pedagogical models
to complement them.

For now,

I

will leave aside the crucial question

of the relations between theory and
method, or even the order in which
one presumes they come.
Let us hold these questions in abeyance for

we follow the path of
In the face of the

a

a

moment more while

student trying to educate herself as

a

counselor.

confusion and frustration resulting from this dearth

of courses and major programs, students will often
decide to arrange

internships at nearby social service agencies, or even leave
school

entirely for

a

year to do extended counseling practica at institutions

in larger metropolitan areas.

Most of these students will already

have had whatever coursework is available at the university, possibly
a

class in personality, one in abnormal psychology, and one in theories

of counseling.

Perhaps these students will have had

a

course or two

in humanistic education, values clarification, an introduction to

humanistic counseling, microcounseling, or
group.

a

sensitivity training

Yet out in the world they feel incompetent, guilt-ridden and

13

overwhelmed.

(By and large they intern
at some of the more gruesome

institutions— in this area, Northampton
State Hospital, the Belchertown
State School, for example-and
are rarely placed at the nice,
clean,
well-staffed, well-funded agencies
that graduate students at least
might have a chance at.) There
may be some who will try out a few

humanistic counseling techniques with
Spanish-speaking welfare mothers,

chrome schizophrenics, child abusers, retarded,
violent, or autistic
children, and these students will come
back to the university feeling
enraged as well as guilty and worthless.

Until

now they have been

discouraged from viewing these feelings and
experiences critically—
their anger has been deflected or diffused,
their guilt assuaged,
their feelings of incompetence reassured away.

In large

measure, this

may be due to the enormous difficulty teachers
and clinicians have in
facing some of those same feelings.

Guilt, for instance, is only too

familiar:
This motif [masochism, self-flagellation, and often nearschizophrenia] on the part of the 'bourgeois' student
radical has always been constitutive of the life of bourgeois
intellectuals in general and radical intellectuals in
particular, as well as of the New Left.
Historically it
has been grounded in conscious or unconscious recognition
that within the division of labor in capitalist society
intellectuals are parasites on the body of the working
class, and this recognition is not without its genuine
and progressive aspects.
Such feelings of guilt are assuaged in the classroom with

humanistic reassurances
esteem.

,

efforts to bolster students' flagging self-

They might be told to stop putting themselves down, or that

they have a "pattern" of feeling over-responsible, or that we're all

human beings and we're all

in pain.

(Some students may, at this point,

14

discover and become involved

in

Re-evaluation Counseling or Trans-

actional Analysis, both of which
are heavily relied on in
humanistic

education and values clarification.)
is to

Another common teacher response

offer more instrumentalistic reassurance,
as in the counseling

laboratory method, and treat the issue
as one of quantity:

more skills,

more techniques, more counseling
approaches, larger bodies of
clientele -families, communities, networks.

Alternatively, organiza-

tional development advocates will blame
"the system":

methods are

offered for improving administrative incompetence,
always with
complaints against the bureaucracy, our common
enemy-eum-red-herring.
Some teacher/clinicians

altogether:

abjure therapy and personal liberation

it offers too little, too late, for too few.

and therapists are seen as elitist, and there is

a

call

Therapy

for what one

friend has called "downward mobility"--adopting erstwhile
blue-collar
ego models, moving out into the factory to work with "the people."

While this appears to students as most radical, it is again only
superficial reversal, not

a

a

genuine negation.

It is a false and alienated overcoming of one's own
alienation as a 'bourgeois' student, and a suppression
of the most original fact about the New Left itself:
that it is not the classical breakaway intellectual
vanguard whose role is to serve the impoverished but a
revolt against capitalist affluence itself, a critique of
capitalist abundance as an abundance of alienation. And
by denying the legitimacy of the critique of his own
existence, the student radical not only recapitulates
his alienation (his 'untrue' existence) at a new level,
but simultaneously suppresses the peculiarly explosive
total critique and demands that arise out of his own
alienated life.H

Finally we must look at the justifiability of their anger over
the inadequacies of their education, both in their trade and in providing

I
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a

framework in which to understand
social problems.

They have not

been provided with a comprehensive
and unified curriculum; one
which
would include a theoretical
foundation, carefully supervised
practicum
training, and some form of personal
exploration that would integrate

with the first two, each playing

a

specific, rather than inter-

changeable part in the educational
process.

Nor are there clear-cut

guidelines as regards what their jobs will
be, what they will need to
know in order to perform them- In short
what
than being helped to understand in

a

therapist is.

a

Rather

more complex and sophisticated

way the history, meaning, and consequences of

state-supported,

a

institutional social service system, they have been
encouraged to

strive at being better agents of that system, or if
they are unsuccessful
at learning to

negotiate the system" better, they are advised to

look for another career.
"social

Without reference to the fact that it

relations which nourish and poison human relations," 12 it is

implied that human relations training can make
social

is

system.

a

difference in the

They are caught up in, (and not challenged by us in

this regard) an age-old understanding and acceptance of things as

they are:
Yet despite this painful consciousness of the inseparability
of rationalization and the potential for domination, Weber,
and other less sophisticated social theorists have stressed
that there is no alternative and that our collective survival
depends upon the possibilities presented by the extension of
all kinds of purposive rational action systems.
This thesis
is too simplistic and one-sided.
If we accept it we are led
into a stoic acceptance of the social necessity of separating
political decision from ethics, science from values, and
social theory from the systematic analysis of utopian
possibilities.
We are all asked to see 'how much we can
stand,' and admit the 'rational necessity' of the extension
of centralized management strategies to more and more areas
of human life. 3
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The conclusion drawn from this approach
is "that social problems can
be

managed"'

1

and that anger will best serve if
placed aside while

we learn new management strategies.
will essentially be paraprofessional

managers

-

of-the-future.

This leaves undergraduates, who
s

,

at the mercy of the better-

In the meantime, we encourage students
to

learn to build community in the classroom in hopes
that someday they
will

be allowed to practice what they have learned,
when "the system"

becomes more humane. 15
In every regard,

then, teachers have been deflecting attention

away from the critical meaning of students' personal experience: their

attention is drawn towards the richness of inner experience, or away
from experience altogether and focused on outer behaviors.

These

students have been out in the world, seeing firsthand the contra-

dictions inherent in performing social service work in an unfree
society.

The most basic of these are the contradiction between what

they have been taught to do and how much there is to be done, and the

seemingly unbridgeable gap between social service and social change.
This is happening for them at

a

time when they can still return to the

university and question what they have seen and experienced, can
perhaps find

a

way to integrate their rage, despair, and helplessness,

while developing their understanding of meaningful work with
individuals (including their own personal work towards liberation),
and politically effective forms of social action.

In

this regard,

these students are unique--the proletariat of the social service field,
as it were.

Those who go on to graduate school experience the "real

world" much later on, and not always as intensely:

they have

a

thicker
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armor of counseling techniques to
protect themselves from feeling

overwhelmed or incompetent; often they see
the nicer side of
institutions; furthermore, graduate students
have gone far enough along
to be invested in their profession
in ways that these younger students,

with lower career aspirations, are not.
The end result of all these approaches is the
dissipation of the
critical and liberatory possibilities inherent
in the defiance (as well
as the naive altruism) of these young
student/workers.

The youth rebellion is manufactured but it is also real.
Here as elsewhere the hint and praxis of liberation mixes
with its denial which would alternately sell or crush it.
Youth remains more than the object it is made to be; that’
fashion [popular psychology and pop-psych pedagogy] closes in
indicates the subject is getting restless.
Youth is more than lacking in years; rather its fidelity
to the instincts of life defines the young. 16
.

As teachers, then, we have

a

.

.

responsibil ity to remain faithful

to the possibilities for liberation within the experiences that students

bring to us.

We must find ways to explore those experiences that will

not trivialize in the guise of celebrating them, but will rather

elucidate the political within the personal.
the universal and social

We must help them explore

causes for joblessness and bureaucracy, for

feelings of guilt and incompetence, for rage and despair.

responsibility includes

a

This

commitment to face the truth of their

incompetence (and our own, if need be) and to delineate the ways in
which faulty and limited education has contributed to that incompetence.
The time for arbitrary defiance, for easy reassurance and warmth,
has passed.

... a concentration upon teaching strategy, method, and
technique, however well meant, is based, first, on

,

-
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implicitly demeaning assumptions about
students; second on
certain empiri ci st and mechanistic
models of mind which lie
within the heart of classical liberal
thought; and finally,
inS
talistic and theref °re reductionists
understanding of the meaning of human thought.
e p
h °" educat i( na1 strategy which
emerges from these
?
+
d as um P^i°ns is, in the long
run, self-defeating
for the radical ^teacher who sees his
or her task as the
articulation and defense of a critical theoretical
perspective.
Instead, pop-psych pedagogy encourages.
a strained and
phoney warmth which some, in moments of bland
delusion, call
community.
The vision of human liberation which emerges
from the therapeutic classroom is not so much
social or
political as it i s i ndi vi dual istic and antisocial
although
it appears in the guise of the former. 17
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The impact of humanistic education has been more
pervasive in

counseling classes than in disciplines where content is at
least
separate from the methods used to impart content.

In

counseling courses,

content and method converge; they both devolve from certain assumptions
about human development which have implications for

learning and also

a

a

theory of

theory of social order (beginning, of course, with

the social order in the classroom).

The assumptions inherent in

humanistic teaching strategies, as in human relations laboratories,

denigrate students because they presume students' inability to work
hard, to think for themselves about content matter other than their

lives, and to learn except by the "how-to" method.
The effect of these strategies has been most insidious in regard
to the theory of social

order they assume and which

classrooms in which they are taught.

Since

a

is

inferred in the

concern with authoritarian

modes of consciousness and authority relationships is primary in

a

psychology which sees itself as political, one of the speciously
appealing aspects of humanistic classrooms and counseling
is their nonhierarchical

1

aboratories

structure and non-authoritarian style.
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However, according to an analysis
based on distinctions between

coercive and manipulative power, 19 "If
it is possible to avoid coercion
within the traditional approach,
manipulation is unavoidable within
the pop-psych model." 20

Students are manipulated into glorifying their
feelings, when
they might be provided with a framework in
which to critically evaluate

their experience, their actions, and the ways in
which they are acted
upon.

Teachers have frequently adopted 'nice-guy' attitudes,
thereby

abrogating our authority; we buy into the pejorative
understanding of
authority," and its true meaning--power derived from knowledge
and

mastery

is

lost.

We also fail

to acknowledge and work with the power

that we do, in fact, wield in the classroom, thereby continuing
to
run the risk that we will

act from our own unconscious power agendas.

Finally, we do our students

a

grave disservice if we encourage them

to hold unrealistic expectations for the future.

Their 'superiors'

elsewhere will not relate to them in the loving therapist role.
is

Neither

it safe to confuse love and acceptance with learning and work, and

they will surely find that out the hard way when it comes time to work.

Undergraduates trying to cope with the educational possibilities
at hand want to know what they have to learn in order to be eligible

for which jobs.

While it would be easy to buy them off with reassuring

answers, we really have no grounds on which to responsibly assert that
they can be politically effective counselors.

We can't even offer

encouragement that they'll find jobs, nor can we speak cogently to the
fact that there aren't any.

Surely we have no right to propose that

their incompetence can be eased with

a

few more skills and some self-
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knowledge; surely it is equally irresponsible
(and certainly reductioni-

sts)

to imply that clinical work is useless
altogether.
In

order to come to grips with students' concrete
questions and

problems, we must know precisely what clinical expectations
we have
of paraprofessionals, and, therefore, to what end we
should train them.
To establish a hierarchy of clinicians, we must begin with

definition:

a

base line

what is therapy? From this definition it is possible to

draw distinctions, as well, between problems which are, and are not,

appropriate to therapeutic rather than social/political intervention.
We must avoid such ambiguous philosophical stands as the ones now

offered which assert that therapy either can do everything, or nothing;
that anyone can be a therapist but no one ought to be.

must operate from within

Instead, we

comprehensive theory of subjectivity,

a

consisting of theoretical postulates adequate to the complexity of the
human mind and human behavior.

Within such

a

theory, the therapeutic

relationship and the therapeutic process can be materially, rather
than metaphorically, situated and defined as one agency of healing.

This theory would also generate theoretical conceptions of social

order which could speak materially to the relationship and tensions

between the individual and society, inner and outer, private and
public, formed and unformed.

Ultimately, it must address the contra-

dictions between social service and social change, in ways that are
not simplistic and reductionistic (such as asserting that society is

mad and the individual is glorious, especially on acid).

From this

foundation, we may also establish significant links between psychology
and social and pedagogical

theory.

21

Part Two:

Psychoanalysis, Feminism,
and Social Theory

Overview
The concerns of feminist theorists have
been particularly helpful

in

elucidating the subtle and complex problems which
mandate an

interdisciplinary approach to counseling curriculum.

The same problems

make it difficult to arrive at an adequate notion
of "interdiscipl inary"-one that would not merely juxtapose areas of inquiry,
i.e., be multi-

disciplinary or parallel disciplinary, nor one that would
collapse
together the disciplines rather than exploring the manner in which
they interrelate.
On one hand, wide-scale interest in therapy and personal
as means to the transformation of women's lives has encouraged

number of undergraduate women to seriously consider
helping professions.

growth
a

large

careers in the

Yet, on the other hand, critical

interpretations

of the statistics showing an already disproportionate number of women
as consumers or involuntary victims of social

services

cautions

against an overly optimistic assessment of the value of therapy for
feminist strategies.

Interdisciplinary curricula which span psychology,

history, political science, literature and the arts are required to

evaluate and develop the usefulness of counseling and psychotherapy
for the feminist movement.
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Psychology and psychotherapy may thus be seen to represent
legitimate special interest of Women's Studies.

a

Furthermore, Women's

Studies presents the advantage of already being committed to inter-

.
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disciplinary education, however ill -defined
at present, and by an
explicitly political rationale.

While feminist analysis may have

provoked recognition of the need for an
intermingling of political and
psychological disciplines, it has not provided
the theoretical links

between the realms of discourse.

Good feminism does not necessarily

equate either with good therapy or good teaching.
is

If simple analogy

not employed, little remains to guide in the working
out of

a

more intricate and substantive relationship among our
areas of concern,

Within this problem what emerges as primary is the failure
in
the first place to adequately define feminism.

This leaves the field

open to confusion and contradiction when trying to conceptualize
the

goals, tasks and limitations of Women's Studies in general, and of

'feminist psychology' in particular.

a

To speak more abstractly, it is

essential to establish the internal requirements of any given theory
for maintaining its coherence and explanatory power.

Failure to grasp

these considerations may lead to arbitrarily synthesizing different

theories; the essence of

a

make it harmonize with

system of explanation fundamentally different

from

i

a

theory has then been sacrificed in order to

ts own

A closer look at the relationship between the women's movement

and psychotherapy may shed some light on the roots of the feminist

movement's failure to define itself:
is

the inability to define feminism

in part due to the fact that one can't define it without reference

to complex psychological constructions.

While this might be asserted

of any political movement, it is inescapable in the case of feminism.
It has

long since been observed that the oppression of women is

23

characterized, if not by their consent, than at least
by their

complicity and collusion.

(This observation, coupled with citations of

the benefits that accrue to women from their second
class status, is

used in conservative camps as proof that women in fact are
not op-

pressed at all.)

By virtue of this "gentle tyranny," women come to

know, perhaps more acutely than other oppressed groups, that their

movement's viability depends on locating

a

adequate to account for their complicity.

theory of subjectivity
The secondary advantages of

women's collusion can come to be so firmly established that they
cannot be renunciated in favor of the benefits that might be reaped by
an adult woman if she were to give up her role as

'victim.'

The view of human nature sufficiently complex to grasp this

contradiction would have to be

a

cornerstone of feminist analysis.

If

one can sidestep such a building block in other political theories,
the unique psychosocial experience of woman as victim/participator

makes it impossible to do so in developing both

program for the women's movement.

a

philosophy and

a

Even those marxists (at least in

this country), who take the view that

a

theory of subjectivity is the

essential link to understanding and overcoming "false consciousness"
do not, by and large, obtain this knowledge in a concrete, immediate

way: they will not have experienced

a

breaking through of false

consciousness equal to what almost every woman who comes to feminism
goes through to get there.

This attempt at defining the terms of the research is an early

reflection of the problems

attendant upon this project.

While Women's
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Studies provides an excellent vehicle for

a

discussion of the issues,

quickly drawing them into stark relief, it must
be pointed out that the
difficulties and contradictions inherent in
establishing
program in counseling are not new:

a

feminist

they have beset every attempt to

bring together the theories or action strategies
of politics and

psychology.

Political theory attempts to answer general questions

about society as

a

whole, whereas psychology would seem to mount

theories that can answer questions only about individual persons:

history vs. autobiography, as it were.

All

attempts at synthesizing

the two approaches are doomed to failure because epistemologically

they are altogether different.

gether, the result will be
reductioni sm.

a

If one insists on bringing them to-

collapse of categories, oversimplification,

These problems have plagued even those theorists who

are aware of them. The further complication that feminism is not

a

clearly defined political movement, such as marxism, proves to be both
a

hindrance and

a

help.

The failure to arrive at

a

viable definition

helps to confirm what it is that psychology must offer to the women's

movement:

theory which can speak to both the universal and

a

particular dilemmas of women; which has an internal logic that will in
the first place draw distinctions between these two categories, and
will

show the manner of their mutual influence.
Thus

I

will aim toward conceptual clarification of the relation-

ship between feminist theory, psychology, and pedagogical strategy
(with emphasis on notions of pedagogical

responsibility).

This effort

at clarification is set within the broader context of social theory

and social action generally conceived— it is not limited to feminism
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and/or education.

It is a primary aim of this dissertation to outline

the contours of a theory of human nature which speaks to
all these

issues.
Oo

At minimum, such a theory must

human thought

.

1)

address the nature of

What is the relation between thought and action?

do we assess motives and intentions?

conscious ones?

How

Are there motives other than

What factors in development can impoverish or enhance

the capacities of thought and judgment?

mind/body relationship

offer some conception of

2)

What are the effects on mental development,

.

in particular on ego development, of identity being forged within a

physical framework?

3)

true and false needs?

provide
Is

a

catalog of human needs

.

Are there

this a question that we can or would want

to legislate, i.e., should we legitimate some needs and not others?

Can we make meaningful statements about what we owe to one another

based on what we need from each other?
between

a

person and her social world

autonomous individual?
5)

locate mental

"normal

11

society

,

.

4)

delineate the relationship

Is

there such

a

thing as the

Are there limits to personal freedom?

illness within psychologically or sociologically
and by extension, establish guidelines for the ethical

stance of students of the human mind and of mental healers in relation
to their subjects/patients and to society at large.

One can address these questions from

vantage points..

a

variety of philosophical

(It is also, of course, possible to begin with a

theory

of human nature

preferred political gameplan and create

a

which will justify it, or vice versa.)

In the classical

liberal view-
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point (characterized by an empiricist
theory of mind and presupposing
a radical mind/body split),
persons are seen as empty vessels
through
which experiences and perceptions
are filtered by the mind. Given
proper nourishment the person will
flower and develop; the potential
of the human mind, easily equated
with soul, spirit, essence, is
unlimited and benign.

In opposition, there are a
variety of mechanistic

view points, for example vulgar
marxism and behavioral ism, which
again view human beings as passive
reflectors of external phenomena,
but with

a

more pessimistic bent— persons are
totally constituted by

that which acts upon them, they will
not flower, they will simply be
as

they are made.

Neither of these approaches provides

a

persuasive

explanation of the enormous destructiveness that
pervades human relations or sometimes pervades an individual's
internal existence.

Neither mounts

a

theory of consciousness— including the relation
of

thought to action— which can sustain
ness raising."

ills.

genuine notion of "conscious-

The classical and behavioralist theories are each

unidirectional:
social

a

the environment is responsible for individual and

Psychoanalysis depicts persons as active agents who

transform as well as are transformed by their social world; as

possessing

a

consciousness governed by unconscious motivation and

conflict and therefore capable of transcending (in the
sense) its history.

Hegelian

The liberal and mechanistic points of view are to

be rejected precisely because they fail

to answer the most pressing

questions asked by social theorists; worse, their structure precludes
the asking of those questions.
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In

constructing

a

feminist therapeutic or pedagogy we must
always

be asking what is required to free women
from their internalized

oppression.

What, in the words of Abigail Rosenthal, would
lead to

breaking woman's long "silence"--a silence she defines
as "not the
absence of reactive noise, but rather the absence of

a

serious dis-

course, employing a critical method, which would work to determine
the

presuppositions and constituents of women's suppression, in order to
lift from them that suppression."

In

this context, feminist scholar-

ship must encompass a range of disciplines whose interconnections are

perceived at
silence.

a

profoundly political depth, broad enough to break

A theory of human nature and of psychic change adequate to

account for the manner in which emancipatory action occurs in the
classroom, in the therapy session, and in the streets, has thus far

eluded feminist thinkers.
Psychoanalysis,
sees the mind as

a
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which avoids these oversimplifications and

complex locus of conflicting forces, sees mental

processes and in the end personality as the result of conflict between
psychological and objective reality, sustains

a

framework in which

one can attempt to explain that which the liberal and mechanistic

viewpoints erroneously take for granted: the human subject.

It is

inherent in the content and method of psychoanalysis to frame one's

hypotheses, and to focus one's research through

a

movement from the

particular to the universal; each individual's development is seen as
shaped through the interaction of those categories.

Nowhere is that clearer than in Freud's metapsychology
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which attempts to ground the psyche
in the conditions of
material
existence; to give meaninq and substance
to the psychoanalytic premise
that conflict- the disjunction
between mental perceptions of internal
need and external reality— is central
to the development of not only
human mental capacities but also human
morality.

Psychoanalysis, the Freudian Feminists, and
Critical Theory
Presenting psychoanalysis as

a

potentially radical theory of

human nature, one amenable to revolutionary
political
a

new venture.

recent years

In

a

theory, is hardly

handful of women writers have turned

to Freud for a theory of subjectivity which
would support their feminist

social analysis.

Ann Foreman

(

Juliet Mitchell

(

Psychoanalysis and Feminism

Femininity as Alienation:

and Psychoanalysis

)

share

a

and

)

Women and the Family in Marxism

Marxist background with the critical

theorists whose work is discussed below, and their efforts are plagued
by similar problems; the usefulness of Mitchell's work for defining
the

terms of my own is further complicated by her Lacanian bias.

Dinnerstein

Dorothy

The Mermaid and the Minotaur ) and Nancy Chodorow

(

Reproduction of Mothering ) have used psychoanalytic theory as

a

(

for exploring the social and psychological

female parenting.
'correct'

Dinnerstein

's

The
basis

consequences of unilateral

work, however, ultimately attempts to

Freudian theory by supplementing it with the existential per-

/

spective of Simone de Beauvoir and the utopian vision of Norman

0.

Brown, viewpoints which are essentially incompatible with Freud's.

Chodorow, on the other hand, attempts to improve on Freud's notion of
psychosexual development through the addition of object relations theory,
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which she fails to grasp as being riddled by the same
conceptual -and
therefore political

— flaws

as other NeoFreudian approaches.

All

of

these women theorists have, in effect, succumbed to the same
weakening
of the psychoanalytic approach that was so cogently critiqued in
the

first place by Freud and later by the critical theorists.

The end

result of their work is an evisceration of the theory of the un-

conscious mind.
The most fully developed appropriation of psychoanalysis for
the purposes of social

theory was

undertaken by the critical theorists

of the Frankfurt school, as well as other

less easily categorizable

marxists such as Wilhelm Reich and Otto Fenichel 26
.

Though there

are significant differences in their work, these writers share the

heritage of dialectical analysis, as created by Hegel and modified
by Marx for the purposes of his materialist political

theory.
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They

have mounted an argument sufficiently comprehensive and articulate
that it need not be re-argued here.

I

would like merely to point out

some of the essential affinities between psychoanalysis and this
school of social

thought, as dialectical critique remains significant

within my own framework despite the serious divergences outlined below.
What psychoanalytic and dialectical methodology hold in common
is

the process of demystification.

In

contrast with positivist

methodology which works only with surface, observable data, they
describe human experience as embedded in disjunctions between varying
levels of reality which are held in relation to each other through

dynamic tension.

The ultimate task of critical thought is to arrive
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at the reality beneath appearances,
to interpret what is visible
in

terms of its deepest causative factors;
to articulate that which was

silent, to unearth hidden connections
between apparently disparate

elements.

Hegel and Freud share

a

further bond in the belief that the

search for self-knowledge must be intimately
tied to the search for

objective real i ty--indeed it is its most important
aspect.

One can

only locate truth in the objective world through
the arduous search
for the truth about oneself.

Rosenthal

ties this to feminism--by

implication to feminist therapy and feminist pedagogy--when
she states
If Hegel is right where he argues that wisdom,
philosophy's
object, may be understood to lie in human self-knowledge,
then it. will follow that love of wisdom or the philosophic
eros--will provide the radical motive for the liberation of
women that we have been seeking. Women are henceforth seen
not as exceptional cases to whom revocable favors may
occasionally be granted, but as occupying a sector of silence
within a humanity whose freedom to know itself may be
recognized wherever it extends its ability to break such
silences.
In his institutionalized repressions, man [sic]
29
becomes incomprehensible to himself.

—

.

.

Despite this affinity, however, dialectical methodology as

applied to the uses of psychology and psychotherapy has resulted in
problems and limitations which

I

am reluctant to inherit.

It would

be distracting to go into a detailed exposition of these problems at

this point;
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for now it must suffice to flag the broad categories

of error which have dead-ended this line of inquiry.

argued

It might be

that these are ultimately pitfalls of the modern theorists,

and not difficulties inherent in an application of dialectical thought
to psychological

theory.

ultimately put forth from

If so, we might expect that the hypotheses
a

"purely" psychological perspective would

in the end prove to be dialectical.

However, rescuing the dialectic
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from all of its theorists
since Hegel in order to
apply it freshly
to questions of psychological
theory would be a monumental
task, one
far beyond the scope of
this project.
What is important is to
develop

psychology which, through its own
internal logic, meets the
criteria
of the dialectical stance-whether
that theory is cast in Hegel's
or
Marx's terminology or not.
Indeed, it is a major contention
here
that psychoanalysis can stand
on its own in fulfilling
those epistemoa

logical requirements, without
being recast in the terminology-or
the

jargon--of critical theory.
The dialectic as applied by
critical theorists to psychoanalysis
has resulted in historicizing
psychological concepts which are by

definition trans-historical
of the reality principle).

(for example, Marcuse's misconstruction

,

In

other words, critical theorists have

often particularized universal aspects
of human experience in order
to make them remediable.

Not only does this remove the foundations
of

the theory thereby collapsing whole
portions of it,
the central

but also dissolves

human conflicts on which the dynamic theory
of mind rests.

If these conflicts are not universal,
then the explanation that psycho-

analysis offers for how the psyche as we know it
has come into being
is

no longer to the point.

substantive issue

— it

This is

a

methodological as well as

a

entails denying the relation of universal to

particular explanations within analytic theory.

This denial must take

place in order to make Freud harmonize with a socialist view
of society
in which there is eventual
a

freedom from material want.

To maintain such

viewpoint it is necessary to reject the immutability of current
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'reality.'

In

the process, the distinction between
external

and psychological reality is lost.

reality

Regardless of the specifics of any

social order, each human being must learn to
distinguish between an

external, objective and an internal, fantasy world.
take place only within

the

That learning can

context of his or her primary caretakers,

the most important features— in some respects the only
relevant

features— of the external world.

In

the struggle to master the

distinction between inner and outer, between self and other, to give
up the illusion that there is only self, the capacity arises for

thought and for social relatedness.
If one grasps the psychoanalytic meaning of the reality principle,

then a further set of limitations is imposed on the historical malle-

ability of objective reality:

there are facets of our external world

which, though they may not be absolutely fixed, must be seen as
universal

in that we cannot imagine them not being so and humans still

growing up human.

For example, the nuclear family in its varying

manifestations may be an historical rather than

a

universal response

to certain human needs, but the infant, due to relative neonatal

immaturity and

a

protracted maturational process, will always require

extended parenting.

It is not possible within the framework of

"dialectically orthodox" psychoanalysis to undo the fundamental internal
conflicts set before each child; there are broad categories of conflict
between the child and the world that can perhaps be meliorated, but
can not be dissolved.

who seek
that

a

a

This has often been brushed aside by theorists

somewhat more utopian vision of the future; who believe

reduction of want, whether material or sexual, can soften the

33

essentially conflictual nature of human
experience.

Psychoanalysis

asserts, depends upon, the consideration
that these conflicts are not
only inevitable, they are central building
blocks of the psyche that
we recognize as peculiarly human.

To underestimate them is to once

again underestimate the force of the psychical
qualities which can

undermine the human community.
The second major difficulty in critical theorists'
appropriation

of Freudian theory is that it includes

a

reductionistic view of the

psychoanalytic treatment process, one which enables the method
to be
seen as distinct from, and therefore dispensible to the theory.

This

distinction is drawn partly in order to jettison therapy, which,
because of its 'adaptational

1

and 'conformist' potential, is viewed

as something of an embarrassment.

Yet psychoanalysis is defined simultaneously as

neurosis,

a

cure for

a

research methodology into unconscious processes, and

set of hypotheses regarding mental functioning.

a

Once the significance

of the link between theory and therapy is apprehended, it becomes

clear that if the theory is in any sense revolutionary

,

then its

method must reflect some aspect of this radical nature.

The link

implied here has nothing to do with Third Force psychology's tendency
to equate individual

with general, social improvement, nor with the

Neoanalytic tendency to deny the conformism that can lurk
cultural or environmentalist interpretations
to

.

I

am alluding, rather,

the psychoanalytic move toward uncovered communication:

of silence described above by Rosenthal.

behind

the breaking

The relation between theory

and therapy is neither simple identity nor is it utter disjunction;

"
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critical theory's reduction ism-which
must amount in the end to

revisionism— is not preferable to that which
it critiques.
Two interrelated problems result
from this erroneous assessment

of the theory/therapy matrix.

First, it is assumed that therapy
is

completely apolitical, and second, that
therefore, the varieties of
therapeutic experience are, for the purposes of
social theory and
social action, more or less interchangeable.

Yet because that which is

political in psychoanalysis is embedded in its
method, there is indeed
a political

"moment" in the analytic process, and it is one that
does

not inhere in other forms of treatment.
Russell Jacoby has stated that while psychological theory
may

have important implications for political activity, therapy
is

apolitical.

The conclusion he draws, therefore, is that it is

irrelevant what form of therapy one chooses.

"Individual therapy must

necessarily forget the whole so as to aid its victim; how exactly it
does that is, in part

,

irrelevant
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Elsewhere
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Jacoby draws an

analogy between the political aspects of medical practice and those
of psychotherapy.
the victim of

apolitical.

a

He states that a doctor would, of necessity, treat

car accident, and that the treatment would be

One would not suggest that the doctor ignore the victim's

wound and instead urge him or her to go demonstrate against the American
automotive, oil, highway construction, and alcoholic beverage industries.
However, Jacoby's analogy is simplistic, for medical treatment and

psychotherapy are hardly parallel processes.

Since analysis works with

changes in consciousness, as well as with the relationship of

consciousness to action, its accomplishments go far deeper than merely
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curing physical symptoms.

Moreover, the relationship of therapist

to patient is much more complex than
that of medical

doctor to patient.

The doctor could give the patient some
literature on the social factors

involved in destruction on the roads, in addition
to setting
limb if he or she chose to.

Though

a

a

broken

patient might, in the course of

psychoanalysis, make some of those connections, the
analyst could
never explicitly offer them; the odds are less good
that it will
happen, but if it does it will have entailed

a

more profound structural

change in the consciousness of the patient.
The role that self-knowledge plays in psychoanalysis is

unique precisely because of its notions of unconscious mental processes-one expects to discover a different set of hidden facts about oneself,

undertakes the search with
self knowledge only through
psyche.

different set of risks, and attains that

a
a

somewhat extensive restructuring of one's

That is to say, one comes out of

a

valuing the deepest kind of self-knowledge.

'successful' analysis

And though there is no

way to legitimately influence any other values

a

patient may have,

radical or otherwise, though there is no way to influence whether
'political' contingencies will be drawn into the scope of the quest for

truth, to value self-knowledge in the way one does in analysis will

always hold the possibility of revolutionary, critical thinking.
The radical content of psychoanalysis emerges through its

hypotheses of the

unconscious mind.

The unconscious is accessible

only through the techniques of psychoanalysis, particularly through
the transference, which in turn depends for its emergence and resolution
on the tools of free association and interpretation.

It is

the inter-
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pretive method which both demystifies
appearances and also unearths
new information-making the
process both treatment and
research-with

which to widen our theories of the
human mind.
The method is elegant in its
simplicity.

The analyst remains

largely anonymous and the situation
offers as little stimulation as
possible.

Whatever thoughts, feelings, and behaviors
arise therefore,

particularly fantasies and actions in relation
to the analyst, can be
attributed to past experience and internal
psychic material.

Archaic

infantile conflicts, sexual and relational,
literally come to life in
the transference relationship; the analysand
relives his or her

original neurotic conflict in the passionate but
ambivalent relationship
to the analyst.

Impulses, feelings, fantasies are "transferred" to

the analyst, who does not engage or "gratify" them,
but rather insists

that the analysand appropriate them as his or her own internal

psychic history.

It is the task of the analyst to interpret the un-

conscious material which emerges in the patient's free associations
and behavior in the analytic setting.

Theoretically

is possible only after the most arduous work,

,

interpretation

pursuing free associations

and resistances (unconscious efforts to block the treatment, primarily

efforts to be gratified within, rather than to scrutinize and resolve
the transference relationship) until they yield their deep unconscious

determinants.
The presumption is that as the patient becomes aware of this

previously unconscious material it will cease to govern his or her behavior and internal experience.

As neurotic conflicts are resolved, the
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analysand will have an expanded
sense of autonomy and Increased
energy
to devote to 'productive'
activities.
It is precisely because
psychoanalysis places such a high
premium

on autonomy, because influence
is so explicitly ruled out,
that its

political content holds a place in
the education of counselors.

That

is, if it must remain solely
up to the patient whether or not
the

treatment abuts on political realities,
then it is all the more important that the therapist create her own
political framework within
the therapeutic process.

This can be done if the therapist views
the

process as part of an ongoing research endeavor,
one that will build
our eventual understanding of the components
of critical thinking.

It

goes without saying that this attitude on the
part of the therapist will
in

turn have

a

bearing on the course of the therapy for the patient.

The point here, however, is not to create

a

political experience for

the patient but rather to remove from the patient
the burden of making
a

political experience happen for the therapist.

creating

a

This is done by

viable political context for the professional, independent

of the patient

s

insights and changes.

In

this task, other treatment

processes will not substitute for psychoanalysis, which "stands more in
awe of the unconscious

,"

and thereby becomes research as well as

treatment.

While these quarrels with critical theorists' assessment of

psychotherapy may seem minor by comparison with the acuteness of their
theoretical work on thevalueof psychology for political theory and
their superb critique of revisionist schools of psychology, it must be
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remembered that mine is

project intimately concerned with the treat-

a

ment process-even though

I

do not purport to train undergraduates
as

counselors or therapists, (obviously not analysts),
but rather to assess

what it is that one must begin to study in order
to work in the mental
health professions.

Ultimately, neither critical theorists nor recent

Freudian feminists offer

model on which to base

a

a

collaboration

between political theory and psychoanalysis, since humanistic
therapy
and alternative education fail
social

critique.

Thus

guidelines, and yet not

in the first place to mount a serious

am left with many questions, some initial

I

a

clear theoretical framework by which to

"operationalize" the terminology of the research.

What language can

be used to define feminism. Women's Studies, interdisci pi inary,

'political

psychology'?

Though

believe that the language of psycho-

I

analysis can suffice to elucidate these terms,

I

am faced with the

contradiction that the women's movement by and large has made Freud
its arch villain.

Furthermore, the existence of feminist therapy

would seem to argue that there is already

a

model on which to base

a

Women's Studies counseling program, and that it is possible to proceed

directly with curriculum development.
basis on which to build

Before going on to explore the

collaboration between psychoanalysis and

a

feminist scholarship, therefore,

I

will

first attempt to assess

whether feminist therapy has managed to avoid those problems

in

politics/psychology 'synthesis' raised in this chapter. Have feminist
therapists paid too high

a

price in terms of the quality of their theory and

the viability of their therapy, for explicitly blending thei

r pol

itical and
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psychological perspectives?

Does the advance over Freudian theory

and method that they purport to represent
really constitute

political and psychological venture?

a

radical

J

CHAPTER
FEMINIST THERAPY:

II

A CRITICAL REVIEW

Overview
Feminist therapy adds the explicit political edge that the

humanistic therapies lack.

Juxtaposing political and psychological

terms in the naming of the venture makes it, by definition,

direct attempt at
logical

a

synthesis of the two disciplines.

a

This termino-

device again derives, no doubt, from the New Left's 'politics

of the unpolitical' and again the heritage is not specifically

acknowledged. Such historical amnesia represents the loss of intellectual

links to

a

more complex and dynamic political theory.

Here, for

instance, in their own assessment of feminist therapy's eclecticism,
the blandness of the approach is self evident.

The ways in which we interact are consistent with the
philosophy of many radical and humanist therapists.
Like
radical therapists, we advocate an intensive examination
by the therapist of her own value system so that she can
facilitate change rather than adjustment to existing
societal norms... As humanism espouses, both therapist and
client are individuals struggling to become self-actualizing.
As radical therapists have noted, both therapist
and client labor under the same constricting political
and social system which hinders the full development of the
Feminist therapy goes a step
individual as a free agent.
further in its detailed analysis of the effect of sexIt also seeks to
role stereotypes on women's growth.
facilitate awareness.of and expansion beyond those external ly imposed 1 imits
40

3

41

The theory behind feminist therapy is
vague and confusing;

very little is written,2

what's in print is theoretically weak,
and

there is little agreement among the authors.

However, despite this evidence that something
referred
to as feminist therapy exists (at least
to the extent
that there are women who label themselves as
feminist
therapists and their work as feminist therapy),
discussion
of what feminist therapy is and of what feminist
therapists
do in practice is absent from the literature,
particularly from academic and professional journals.
The most general

statement that might be made is that the

theory and practice are organized around principles of
sisterhood.
There is not, unfortunately, an agreed upon definition for
the cluster

of concepts designated by that term, nor do feminist therapists
spell
out details of applying sisterhood to psychology.

Whether an individual was a feminist who learned to
conduct therapy or a therapist who identified with
feminism, her feminist beliefs had an impact on her therapeutic orientation, and vice versa.
In short, a meshing
took place whereby feminism and therapy no longer existed
as discrete parts of the individual's life but became
integrated into feminist therapy.
Perhaps the first problem here is the variety of meanings

attributed to feminism, and the fact that feminist therapists rarely
make explicit which school of thought they are drawing on.

They

seem not to realize that one's political and philosophical orientation
will

have drastic consequences for the questions which

be challenged to answer, the methodology which will

a

theory will

be deemed approp-

riate for locating answers, and the establishing of goals for psychotherapy.

Broadly considered, one can distinguish three separate branches
of feminist literature.

_

5

The first, drawn from classical liberal
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theory, sees society as basically
sound and attempts to extend
humanistic values to include women.

Socialist feminism, on the other hand,

locates the problematic status of women
within the 'larger' context

of capitalist relations of production.

In the tradition of Engels 6
,

first priority is given to an assault on
the relations of production

under the assumption that changes in women's
predicament will auto-

matically follow

.

7

Lastly, there is radical

feminism, which views

of society's problems as resulting from
institutionalized

all

patriarchy.

In

other words, all social ills can ultimately be reduced

to a question of the relations between the sexes
and the lower status

of women.

Radical

feminism does not have

a

clear cut link to an

established political theory and draws frequently on interpretive
anthropological evidence.

There are minor divergences among the

theorists in any given classification, as well as frequent overlaps;

nonetheless these three represent the basic philosophical orientations
prevalent among American feminists today.

Feminism and Psychotherapy:

Theoretical Considerations

If we define feminism as the need to combat sex-role stereo-

typing, then we have already made certain assumptions about society
and its relation to the individual.

In

order to take

a

feminist

stand bounded largely by the struggle against sex-role discrimination
and in favor of equal
is

rights for women, we must presume that society

basically all right but that women deserve

pie.

a

larger piece of the

Therapy becomes the process by which they achieve the "self-

image" and the skills, for instance assertiveness training and sex-
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uality workshops, requisite to
taking their fair share.

If feminism

is defined as the need
to alter the relations of
production,

then

consciousness raising as to one's
role in society becomes
predominant
in the therapeutic process

oriented skills.

-

A radical

again with an eye to developing
action-

feminist approach would follow

a

similar

line except that consciousness
raising would be focused more
directly
on the oppressed position of women.
Despite the fact that these

latter two seem to mount

a

more serious social critique, they
are

finally more utopian than materialist;
both espouse the possibility
of a harmonious, conflict-free social
order.
If our definition of feminism includes
a drastic transforma-

tion of the quality of society and the
individual's experience within society -- not just a partial

redistribution of assets, nor

a

rearranging of jobs that may cover over the same
old relationships
between men and women, nor

a

simple reversal of the positions so that

women are empowered and men disenfranchised-^then the
therapeutic
stance becomes far more problematic.
The original

impetus behind introducing

a

psychological per-

spective to social theory was that the marxist predictions for the

development of revol utionary consciousness had failed to materialize 8
.

Marx had not adequately come to grips with the subjective components
of revolution -- he believed that purely external events would bring

about the dissolution of "false consciousness."

To now adopt a

psychological vantage point in which external events are once again
placed at the center and deemed sufficient to restructure political

*
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consciousness, is to return to the
political naivete that preceded
the failed European revolutions of
the early part of this century.

Why believe that consciousness
raising will do when its called
therapy

what it couldn't do under its own
aegis?

Psychologically this represents

a

return to the preFreudian

vision of the mind wherein all mental
phenomena are equated with
that which is conscious.

It presumes at best a descriptive
rather

than dynamic theory of the unconscious.

If consciousness raising

techniques are adequate to bring an idea into
consciousness, then it
cannot have been repressed.

It may have been out of the line of at-

tention, but not altogether out of mind.

Furthermore, there is no

theoretical explication of the ways in which consciousness
raising

might lead to deeper, characterological change.

The entire problem

is perceived as one of information, which Freud
repeatedly demon-

strates in his distinction between

a

descriptive and

a

dynamic

theory of mind, begs the question entirely: internal, psychic conflict

actively prevents repressed ideas from attaining consciousness

9
.

If one accepts the necessity of exploring the unconscious as
a

correlate of the structural changes that might lead to revolution-

ary consciousness, or to

a

of characterological

level

sufficient to undertake large scale, urgent
productive working communities,
more elusive.

a

social

integration

tasks and to build

therapeutic posture becomes far

The extent of the regression that may occur in the

course of bringing one's psychological past into consciousness mandates
a

far more careful

definition of the authority relationship that
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develops in therapy.

The capacities for
responsible judgment,

coun-

ted political activity,
membership in a social community,
become linked
to the development of an
autonomy which cannot simply
be given over
by a therapist but must
be discovered and, in a
sense, earned through

the resolution of the
relationship with the therapist.

circle of logic, but

a

It is a mean

paradox which can be wished away
only at great

cost.

The only route to autonomy is
to allow the patient to
discover
herself; once you create strict
boundaries, there is no way to

guarantee that the patient will come
to espouse your political view
of the world, or for that matter,
any view which might be described
as

'political.'

Feminist critics discovered that therapy
is

a

value-laden

process by exposing the anti-woman bias
frequently embedded in the
work of traditional therapists.

We are in a position, therefore, to

work openly with those values and challenge
them.
still

But may we not

be promulgating a complex network of our
own unexamined values

that represents the fabric of society?

Feminists have

a

tendency to

extricate themselves from society at large--it is manmade,
not their

responsibility nor reflective of who women are.
naive conception, all the more so for clinicians.

However that is

a

Where our values

coincide with society's, or with our patients', we don't notice ourselves as value-influenced and don't see ourselves as influencing
the therapy.

It is only when we come to see ourselves as at odds with

societal values that we begin to question the role of the therapist's

cultural presumptions in her work.

When

a

feminist patient seeks out

a
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feminist therapist, there is no such
disjunction to provoke scrutiny.
If a therapist's value system
is not identical with society's
and/or

with her non-feminist patient's, how
does she make her point about
that and still allow full room for the
development of autonomy?
is a
a

This

particularly sensitive judgment, since the
therapist always, to

certain degree, stands back from the patient's
own assessment of

what's wrong.
cal

(Regardless of egalitarian rhetoric in the
more radi-

therapies, all therapists at minimum presume that
the patient

doesn't know, at least at first, what's wrong.)
All

therapists need and use some theoretical model to help
tnem diagnose and treat their patients, and no theoretical model accepts the patient's definition of her
problems
as ultimately correct.
Over and over again patients ask
therapists to help them never to be angry, to be satisfied in self-restricting jobs, and to end their headaches
and depression without disturbing their repressed anger. 10
In actuality,

it is

impossible to build

a

counseling program

based on feminist therapy -- there are as many versions of feminist

therapy as there are feminist therapists.

definitions that range from
2)

1)

a

I

have heard informal

woman therapist who likes women to

one whose awareness of feminist issues indirectly affects her ther-

apeutic stance in sessions;

3)

one who builds therapeutic interven-

tions around feminist political analysis; 4) one who adheres to and

promulgates

a

strict political line in session.

The mistake is that

while we might mistakenly support this eclecticism in the name of

sisterhood and believe that they are all feminism, we cannot possibly

assert that they are all therapy.
here as elsewhere, are the internal

What remains to be established,
links between one's political
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therapy.

of psychology and
psycho-

What all of these
versions of feminist
thera Py share in
corcnon,
aS1 6
ambiguous commitment to
sisterhood, is that the
y have
defined themselves in
opposition to that which
exists, that is, in
terms of what the are
y
not.
The danger, and in
this case not an
idle
danger, is that the
move to a simple opposite
leaves untouched the
less exposed sources
of oppression.

Feminist therapy begins
with
in

professional psychology and

of psychology as

a

science.

a

a

critique of current
practices

looser critique of the
current state

What's usually attacked is
psychoanalysis

though distinctions are
not generally made between

nonFreudian schools.

It is assumed that all

Freudian and

bad therapy, whether

done by psychiatrists,
psychologists, or counselors is
Freudian. A
usual list of charges^
covers statistics on the
disproportionate
number of women in treatment,
and the reverse disproportion
of women
professionals; the equation of
healthy male with healthy adult
characteristics and healthy female with
pathological or at least undesirable

characteristics (i.e., sex-role bias
in mental health assessment
and
diagnosis); the replication of
societal disenfranchisement in the
onedown position of the therapeutic
situation; failure to address the
real

life

crises that typically face women,
emergency or develop-

mental, for example divorce, rape,
postpartum depression, menopause,
or "empty nest" syndrome.
Feminist therapy sets about correcting and/or
never committing
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these sins; that is its starting point and its foundation.

The critical vantage point adopted is that "The question
for
social workers in direct practice with women is how to apply
the

conviction that cultural conditioning accounts for the dilemmas of

many women clients

."

12

Radical

therapy takes up

a

position essenti-

ally identical with this:
First, we believe that people are good, and that left
alone in a nurturing environment they will develop in
a positive and life-promoting way.
They can live in
harmony and well-being with themselves, each other,
and the earth.
.

.

Second, we believe that people feel bad because they are
oppressed by forces outside themselves.
,

P

Because "It was begun, in short, out of attempts to make it different

from something rather than attempts to create something in and of
1
itself," ^ what you have is

a

theoretical void in psychology filled

in by a side array of therapeutic techniques developed from a cultural

critique which has nothing substanti ve to say about the human mind.
To look again at the radical

therapy program

...the source of people's unhappiness is relationships
of unequal power and resultant oppressive social conditions 1 5
.

When people feel bad, they come to believe that there is
something basically wrong with themselves and with life.
6
We call this feeling al ienation
1

.

There is no recognition of the fact that such terms as "power"
and "alienation" are not psychological categories.

er as radical

This becomes clear-

therapy tries to explicate its own terms.

The psyche

and its processes of change and development are reduced to formulas

which have no internal, private meaning.

"Opppression plus lies plus
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isolation equals alienation."
equals liberation."

"Action plus awareness plus
contact

Contact is defined as protection
and support. 17

Furthermore, the existence of feminist
therapy dangerously

obscures the roots of the problem it is
trying to redress.
the illusion that feminist scholarship
has made

a

It creates

contribution to the

fields of psychology and psychotherapy
and that they in turn have

influenced the development of feminism.
because only
that

—

a

We are forced to admit that

political critique is offered -- and

in the end nei ther

a'

pol

i

tical

nor

a

a

weak one at

psychological critique

has been mounted; the contributions that
might be made are lost.

None of these characteristics [of feminist therapy]
taken individually distinguishes feminist therapy
from all other schools, but the constellation apparently is either unique enough, or perceived as
unique enough, to have created a demand. 18

What is most unfortunate is the belief on the part of feminist
therapists that the demand is being filled.

Because feminist therapy can-

not distinguish between different kinds of psychological

theories, it

cannot engage in the endeavor of theory-building which must be seen
as one of the crucial

tasks of

a

feminist psychology.

How does it happen and what are the consequences of developing a school

of therapy without reference to

of human mind?

a

psychology,

a

theory

Firstly, it must be remembered that what psychology

has come to represent is a science not so much of mind but of behaviors.

While radical therapy eschews any form of psychological explanation
as basically extraneous if not counterrevol utionary

,

liberal

feminist

therapists maintain loose connections to what may be informally termed
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feminist psychology,' and is generally
referred to as "psychology
of women."

The hard science split between clinical
and research

psychology is thereby perpetuated, despite
the fact that revolution
in psychology can only be made by
bringing clinical

evidence back

into research.
It is beyond the scope of this paper
to present a full

or critique of the "psychology of women" studies.^

In

review

part this is

because, as stated, they have only peripherally been
incorporated into
the literature and practice of feminist therapy.

Beyond that, the

term and the endeavors it represents are riddled with
conceptual con-

tradictions;

straightforward review must stay within (and thus
confines of an
existing research tradition.
(Methodological inadequacies of individual studies or inconsistencies among the
results of several investigations may be noted, of course,
but the underlying conceptual framework, as reflected
in the formulation of problems and operationalization
of terms, remains fundamentally unchallenged.)^
a

to some extent affirm) the conceptual

Thus the problems in

a

hard science approach*^

which are not neutral but rather have

—
a

a

-- problems

political meaning of their own

go unchallenged by the "psychology of women" research.

This involves

theoretical regression to preFreudian epistemological formulations

and to social

theory as not yet influenced by Marx and the critical

theorists.
More significantly, the "psychology of women" enterprise is

compromised in its very essence.
states

Earlier in the same essay Parlee

51
a s “b
eld 0f psychology, however, the
nn^ln^SV"
notion
of a psychology of women" seems
to me to be
a conceptual monstrosity.
because it implies the
d
r
6t ° f 3WS and theories to account
P ^ Cia
for the
thp hph!
tor
behavior and5 experience of females.
(That it
is the presumable "special"
nature of the laws and
theories and not the subject matter which
prompts the
psychology of women" designation is
suggested by the
”
absence of a subfield on the "psychology
of rats").

r

.

.

-

Feminist therapy is only vaguely connected
to

a

psychological theory,

and at that, one which is plagued by
conceptual flaws, an approach

long since abandoned by radical social
theorists for its conservative

political thrust.

Taken in sum this lack of theory, combined with

a

philosophy

of human nature based on environmental rather than
intrapsychic factors, is most insidious for the therapeutic it engenders.
If a theoretical orientation to therapy is defined in
the traditional sense as encompassing a series of propositions and techniques, a model for problem assessment, and a training methodology, it may be concluded.
that feminist therapy as such does not exist.
This
suggests that feminist therapy must be understood more
as part of a social movement than as a type of psychotherapy and less as a theoretical orientation in the
traditional sense than as a belief system and a number
of ways in which the system is put into practice. 23
.

.

The void created by the omission of

a

.

.

.

psychological theory is filled

by philosophy and social theory; philosophy becomes more important

than therapy.

"...

the techniques ultimately chosen by the feminist

therapist are less important to her than the shift in values that was

engendered by her feminist beliefs."
in

24

It becomes clear that the stance

which one believes that feminist therapy can be anything is really

one in which one believes that feminist therapy can be therapy at all;
in which,

ideally, the phenomenon of therapy disappears and there are

.
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only politically correct belief systems for
troubled persons.
The eclecticism that results from this liberal
view is, if

anything, the reverse of liberatory.
the critical

It is not merely a dilution of

force of psychology and individual change, it
represents

its complete annihilation, not least within the
academy.

In

the sur-

vey of feminist therapists cited above
33 different orientations were listed.
Twenty-four of
these (74 percent) can be characterized as newly developing and non-traditional in nature.... .a significant number
of respondents did not make use of formal academic training in traditional fields such as psychology and social
work to learn therapy. D

The Feminist Counseling Collective cited above as placing themselves
in the traditions of both humanistic and radical

"We use tools from Gestalt, transactional

therapy

announces,

analysis, bioenergetics,

parent effectiveness training, sensory awareness, moving family sculpture, role playing, and movement therapy."

The mistaken equation between variety or quantity and quality

extends beyond modes of therapy to the concept of therapy itself,
which ceases to have reasonable limits and boundaries.
Feminist therapy can be seen as the making of connections on many level s--connections between feminism and
therapy, between one woman and all women, between one's
personal problems and one's social awareness, between
one's beliefs and what one does, and between what one
Thus undoes in therapy and how one lives one's life.
like most forms of therapy, feminist therapy is not merely a means to be used from time to time to alleviate
stress but a way of life for the therapist and, potentially
Therapy becomes normalized and is
for the cl ient as wel 1
7
connected to rather than divided from everyday life.
[italics mine]

,
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This expansiveness has a most
pernicious effect on the critique

mounted by feminist therapy of the conditions
of women's lives.

One

finds feminist therapists celebrating for
the newly liberated woman
that which lies at the core of women's
oppression. Here the Feminist

Counseling Collective offers its groundplan for
what they call the
new "feminist ego ideal":
The new woman is centered in herself and can fulfill
her
own individual needs, yet remains aware of the needs
of
those she loves.
She accepts the full range of emotions
trom love to anger and can express them directly,
if
appropriate, or sift them through her rational thinking
process to choose which ones to express.
She can act
without embarrassment at her own initiative and aggression.
Hopefully the new woman will realize that her own
interdependence with others extends to community and
political involvement as a necessary part of being a full,
responsible adult. ...
.

.

.

The new woman is proud of her body and the natural beauty
of being alive and sensual.
She knows that her sexuality
is within herself, so she doesn't have to wait for someone
to arouse her sexually.
She can satisfy her needs alone
or with others in many different ways.
She can be both
aggressive and active, passive and receiving, without fear
of behaving in an unfeminine way.
Since sexuality is
centered in the self, the new woman prizes highly her
freedom to choose the way she expresses her sexuality and
her love.
.

.

.

.

.

.

She may choose to marry, to be celibate, to remain single,
to try a group marriage, to love monogamously with another
woman or man, to live communally, to become a mother: whatever she chooses will be an expression of her own nature
and her needs.
In other words, the feminist ego ideal
vulnerable woman 28

is

a

strong and

.

Perpetuating the old myth of "supermom," woman is challenged to be
all

things to all people, challenged to find fulfillments which the

structure of society has already made impossible.

The final judgment

of a concept as complex and elaborate as the ego ideal is

that it will
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be "strong and vulnerable."
It is only

ceptual

movement along

a

continuum, not in any way

a

con-

leap, to arrive at the voraciously consumeristic
therapeutic

which can emerge when feminist therapy loses all
sight of
analysis.

a

critical

The following is excerpted from the only book length
treat-

ment of feminist therapy:
No one should be deprived of the freedom to be fully
oneself
with a lover. Like flying or fucking or having a baby,
this
is one of life's great experiences.
If she cannot have this
freedom with her present lover, she may want to consider a
new lover. 29
on

Here's to fucking forever!
One of my definitions of a "healthy" woman is a woman who
is able to support herself in work that is fun for her. 31
A feminist therapist is one who supports women who want
to be assertive in going after what they want in the same
way men do [higher salary, dates, eg.,] ...
Is it not
far more "natural" to be joyfully free in helping oneself
to the good things in life?32
.

Techniques of Feminist Therapy
The goals of feminist therapy remain remarkably similar to those

of traditional therapies, if one looks at them in the abstract.

(Psycho-

analysis alone among the traditional therapies has succeeded in translating its goals into specific clinical terms:
ego shall be."
logical

"Where id was there

To the extent that feminist therapy cannot give psycho-

referents for its therapeutic ends, clearly it cannot share

anything in common with psychoanalysis.

)

An average catalog of the

goals of feminist therapy might read as follows:
To construct a new definition of self--a clear and individualized
standard of personal value. ... To increase awareness of
wants, alternatives, and power. ... To consciously choose
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It remains for us to critically assess
which therapeutic can best

achieve these ends.

To do so one must first translate them into

clinical realities.

The environmentalist point of view leads to

of personality and development, hence to
psychical

change,,

a

a

simplistic schema

simplistic formula for

(in particular its opinion of the role of the

therapist in the treatment.).

As the literature moves back and forth

between humanistic and radical language^ in its descriptions and
polemic, the same set of liberal assumptions emerges, ones characterized
by a focus on human interests rather than needs.
a

This position entails

psychological theory in which mind is divorced from body, and

conscious factors predominate over unconscious phenomena.

Registration

of intrapsychic life increasingly gives way to assessment of environ-

mental influences, and of a particularistic rather than universal sort.

The preference for cultural interpretations, coupled with what
has been loosely termed the feminist value system, mandates doing away
in one sweep, with unconscious motivation, with the dynamic theory of

repression, and, most important for technique, the use of the trans-

ference relationship as

a

therapeutic tool.

somewhat blind, superficial fashion.

This takes place in

a

In most cases, feminist

therapists do not merely eschew the use of transference, they maintain
(perhaps as a bit of magical thinking) that because it's bad it simply
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doesn't exist.

Where the concept of transference
is integrated into

feminist therapy it is misunderstood
and therefore misused.
Other psychoanalytic techniques are
likewise condemned and
abandoned by virtue of their association
with the negative authority

connotations of the transference relationship.

Here, for example,

therapist states, "I'm also noninterpretative.

No way would

I

know what this means and you don't." 35

I

a

say.

In this case it is not

altogether clear what she construes to be the
essence of the interpretive method, simply that she sees it as an
authoritarian modality.

Another therapist explains,
Sometimes women will say they're afraid of men.
I
used
to interpret that as a totally individual thing, that
the
woman's own personal history alone had contributed to
making her afraid--her father was punitive, and so on. 36
The kind of "interpretative" remark they have given up making bears

little if any resemblance to an interpretation in the true Freudian
sense.

(The criticism is noteworthy in that such remarks have increasing-

ly passed for interpretation in psychoanalytic circles
IV and V below.)

— see

Chapters

Interpretation requires movement between conscious

and unconscious levels of meaning; it requires that something heretofore

unconscious be brought into conscious consideration.
can only be offered at the end of

a

An interpretation

long trail of associations generated

by the analysand, who alone has the information from which it is

constituted.

Only the patient can verify the correctness of the inter-

pretation--not through her conscious response but through the associations she has to it.

An appeasing "yes" in response to something

suggested by the analyst is never sufficient conformation

for hypothesis
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put forth in the course of treatment.

The comments referred to above

as interpretation were the therapist's
speculations about some possible

connections that might be drawn between
her patient's past history and
present problems— no more weighty than
one person's partially informed

opinion about the vagaries of another's life.
as a form of professional

illusion if not deception.

To pose such an opinion

knowledge or wisdom is certainly at least
Still, to reject the interpretive method

based on how you misunderstand the way in which in
the first place it
is being incorrectly used is hardly sound or
advantageous.

Some of the techniques of psychoanalysis re-emerge in
diluted
form.

In lieu of free association leading deeper into the
unconscious

there are

a

variety of ways of expanding consciousness.

No explanation

is offered of the way in which we may now presume certain facts
to be

outside of consciousness, and this piece of illogic goes unnoticed.
Thus free association may reappear, newly christened "self-originating

feedback," in this form:
Keeping a journal of the significant events of the day is
another technique that helps to heighten a woman's awareness
of the thoughts, actions, feelings that are important reflections of who she is.
Depending on the nature of her
perceptual gaps, the counselor may ask her to record such
categories of events as the occurrence and thoughts that
accompany depression, irritation, self- recrimination, or
.37
anxiety.
.

Or, for another example, the great emphasis on emoting in experiential

therapies may be seen as one large elaboration of the part that

abreaction

Amnesia

,

plays in the resolution of psychical conflicts.

(In Social

Jacoby has treated in depth the problem of renaming and

presumably reinventing psychological concepts, with particular emphasis
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on its retrogressive political
effects on psychology.)

Through their

link to the feminist value system, these
bastardized Freudian techniques

are subsumed under the umbrella of the
truly nonanalytic battery of

therapeutic interventions, where they lose
all capacity to open out
onto the unconscious mind.

The techniques of feminist therapy are drawn
from Third Force

psychology and are also modelled on diversified forms
of political
activity.

The overarching theme seems to be the equalization
of the

patient-therapist relationship.

Four more or less discrete activities

on the part of the therapist can be isolated as
contributing to this

equalization:
disclosure.

consciousness raising, support, modelling, and selfThe techniques flow into and from one another in

a

mutually

supportive manner (i.e., modelling is supportive and raises consciousness), always referring back to the feminist value system rather than
to theoretical

conceptions.

They are intertwined in ways that make it

difficult to set forth individual techniques in logical order, therefore the discussion which follows must be somewhat repetitive and

loosely structured.

Support

.

"Feminist therapists see themselves as being supportive

to women and giving them permission to act in ways denied them.

as being assertive, making non stereotypical

life decisions"

38

.

.

such

A number

of problems emerge here which can be followed throughout this section on

techniques.

Firstly, this ostensibly liberating tactic can be shown

to be, in fact, inherently demeaning to the patient in that it presumes
a

certain level of dysfunctional ity.

Secondly, there is no way to
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gauge what this support will mean
to the patient at the
unconscious
level.
In fact, there is no guarantee
that at her entry into therapy
she has the capacity to take in
such support-weak ego boundaries,
a
fear of engulfing or of being overwhelmed,
excessive guilt,
of

psychical

a

host

difficulties might prevent the patient from
taking in

support or might provoke her to make
decisions that she is not ready
live with.

to.

There is an illusion that the patient is
finally being

cared for when she may be more alone than ever.
C onsciousness

Raising/Awareness Training

represent opposite sides of the same coin 00
.

.

These techniques

While awareness training

40
focuses on internal experience in an individualistic,
asocial manner
,

consciousness raising directs attention to external events to
the
exclusion of intrapsychic factors.

Though they may seem to move in

opposite directions politically and psychologically, the end results are
similar:

a

failure to unearth the concrete connections between the

individual and her social world.
To return to a point made earlier, this approach to enhancing

conscious functions is built on the flimsiest conception of an un-

conscious mind--a conception which can barely be described as psychological

in

nature.

How and why ideas become unconscious, what this

tells us about the nature of the human subject, are questions which
seem never to be asked.

This constitutes the supreme trivial izati on of

Freud's most dramatic discovery, the extent and nature of self-

deception.
As with support, the technique masks an essentially dis-

respectful and potentially manipulative direction.

It

is understandable
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that a woman needs time, help, and a
special set of circumstances to

discover her unconscious motivations.

But women are made to look foolish

and cowardly if they need help in order
to explore that which they

could apprehend at any time if they chose to
make
attention.

And it is manipulative to steer

a

a

certain shift in

patient's attention in

specific directions and then treat the intervention--"making
their
clients more aware by asking them questions phrased to expose
entrenched
stereotypical assumptions that the clients have unquestioningly

accepted -'neutral,'

as a neutral

one because it has to do with discovering

external facts.

Modelling

.

"Once our clients are aware of these conflicting

ideals (ideal woman vs.

ideal

adult), we as feminist therapists attempt

to make growth possible by offering a unified feminist ideal
to model

themselves upon."

I

will

for women

leave aside considerations of what

kind of standards go into the creation of this new ideal

— it

will

suffice to say that this quote refers back to the "ideal" woman

described by the Feminist Counseling Collective on

p.

53.

The important

point, in the context of therapy, is that this technique undermines

feminist concern over the undue influence that therapists may exercise
over their patients.

It is as

if they openly state that since patients

have to come out of therapy just like their therapists we might as well

openly indulge in personality manipulation.
of sisterhood can be presumed to be 'correct'

But

no— because

in some moral

the values

sense,

feminist therapists are exempt from such charges.
Once again, this technique leads towards increased dependence

,
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rather than the reverse, and brings with dependence
the possibility of
its regressive nature being ignored.

At best the patient remains stuck

at the same level of ego development, while
superficial changes may be

construed as

deeper structural change; at worst she may be traumatized

by a relationship which weakens her defenses without
having built up her

ego strength by first undoing the repressions held
together by those

defenses.

Self-disclosure

.

The ubiquitous and perhaps most important

innovation of the feminist therapy movement.
radical

It seems shared only by

therapists--while the humanistic therapies, even the NeoFreudians

advocate being more 'real,' more of

a

person in therapy sessions, they

do not by and large advocate telling stories about one's own life.

Outside of feminist therapy it is agreed that the patient is paying for
the opportunity to use the time for herself and does not need to pay
to hear about someone else's problems.

This is another example of an allegedly liberatory, respectful

therapeutic intervention being more denigrating than enhancing-- it
suggests that

a

person is in such serious straits that she can't find

the ordinary interactions of life in her outside world and must be given

them by the therapist.

It is clear how this would foster rather than

discourage undue dependence.

I

will quote at length on the operational-

ization of this technique, since it is so important and also represents
the essence of the feminist style of therapy.

Here are excerpts from

the only article that tries to theorize about self-disclosure; it offers
an inventory of three levels of "sharing":
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The criticisms here are
legion-the social critique can be
found elsewhere and so I will concentrate
on clinical matters, with the
understanding that the two are intertwined.
On the simplest level, it is an

unfortunate therapist who is incapable
of identifying and empathizing

without verbalizing her own feelings,
and we must immediately be
suspicious of the therapist's needs for
gratification if this kind of

self-disclosure is used at any time other
than when crucial for the
advancement of the therapy.
'pure,'

Even if the therapist's motives were

there would still be the possibility that
the patient might

experience the therapist as exploitive--wanting
attention, using her
time, etc., --and yet be too dependent to
verbalize those fears.
On the second level of sharing the therapist
communicates her past and present conflicts.
sharing this may
again help the client feel less inadequate. ...
•

•

.

.

.

The third, most difficult and most important level of sharing
for a feminist therapist is the openness and risk that leads
to full and deep intimacy between her and her client:
two
adults who care about each other.
not tellinq how one
feels, as on the first level, but being how one feels.
Jhe A9
therapist consciously chooses to expose herself completely 1
.

.

.

The criticisms, of course, become redundant.

implications of
of real

a

There are the

patient having to pay for experiences that are part

life; the possibility that she will grow dependent on this

intimacy and not seek out other contacts; the possibility that she will

construe the therapist's overtures as
else could like her.

a

sign that the Dr.

knows no one

And to come back to the distinction between the
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patient's unconscious and conscious
experience during treatment, it is

impossible to assess what this intimacy
truly feels like to the patient.
The gratification inherent in such
intimacy occurs at varying levels

of regression and may have
visible.

a

wholly other effect than that which is

If the patient should be precipitated
into a deeper level

of

regression she may be too frightened (of her own
impulses or the

therapist

s)

to speak about that openly, or she may simply
be too

dependent on the gratification she has found in the
relationship to
want to give it up.

Such regressions can and regularly do occur without

the participation of the therapist, simply on the basis of the
patient's

fantasies.

controls.

However, in the analytic situation there are built-in

For one thing, the analyst is alert to such possibilities

and continually examining the patient's associations for signs of this

kind of involvement

— signs

therapeutic mill.

For another, since the analyst will not actually have

which eventually become grist for the

participated in building the inappropriate involvement, the chances
are somewhat improved that the patient herself will eventually be able
to bring up the matter without having to fear the analyst's disapproval

or withdrawal.

The 'impersonal' quality of the analytic setting

creates altogether another order of trust and security than that which
is built upon a

purportedly non-hierarchical rel ationship--an equality

which is only thinly disguised reparenting.

One group of feminists

describes their new version of transference, oblivious to the necessary

authority relation in the parenting process:
We agree with our colleagues that real intrapsychic growth
requires dependency on the therapist, so the therapist must
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accept a parenting role.
Howevpr wo
that thls nece ssary
dependency occurs just as wpll whin
therapist
1* open, real,
nonhierarchical . iSeraplsU Jon't n«H t
a hierarchical
.
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Feminist therapy does not
perceive the intricacy of the
developmental process wherein the
ego only gradually acquires
the capacity to
mediate between internal demands
and external reality.
Hence, while
attentive to maintaining forms
that are egalitarian on the
surface,
feminist therapists do not give
weight to the intrapsychic effects
of
taking on a parenting role; they
do not understand that such
a role
must, regardless of its external
appearance, be hierarchical.

Conversely,

psychoanalysis allows the transference
to develop while forbidding the
analyst the role of parent; regression
on the part of the analysand
can then be examined rather than
acted

out-in the language of psycho-

analysis, can be remembered rather than
44
repeated.
The simplification of development into
two stages--child vs.

grown

up— rather

than an ongoing, arduous process, results
in

flattening out of therapy.

One returns to

a

a

childhood phase of anger,

identification, dependence, gives the patient what
she never had, and
she automatically matures through that phase
into adulthood; she

experiences her anger, identifies with
take in support and nourishment.

a

new role model, learns to

The psychoanalytic view, wherein

developmental fixation is attributed primarily to fear of internal
impulses in relation to the environment, firstly, offers

a

more cogent

explanation for the prevalence of such developmental failures.

It is

not that there are millions of bad mothers but that the child's needs,
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as prepresented in the psyche, are
insatiable; the path to maturity,

given that fact, is fraught with danger.

located within

a

Secondly, when fixation is

multitude of conflicting forces, the prospect
of

inducing regression by replicating the circumstances
under which the

fixation was established is far more awesome.

nourishment offered to the patient will have

One cannot expect that
a

necessarily remedial

effect on psychic scars; one cannot expect an instant
transition to
integrated, adult relations from childhood need to traumatic
that it has
split the ego.
This problem brings us to one final, extended difficulty which
lies concealed within the set of techniques which makes up the feminist

therapy style.

For the present it can only be noted, for it is

a

subject which has impact on and must be looked at within the women's

movement as

a

total

phenomenon.

The failure to elaborate

a

develop-

mental process, and therefore to comprehend fixation and regression

(within the therapeutic, or any setting), robs therapy of the opportunity
to contribute to women developing more highly evolved relationships,

and more fully integrated commitment to their social responsibilities.
A patient can transform any mode of therapy--certainly this

includes analysis--into

already partakes of

a

a

Weltanschauung

.

However, when the therapy

political world view, and one which precludes

examining the patient/therapist relationship if it challenges that
view-- then the patient's primitive identification with her therapist
and her primitive identification with the idea of feminism become

merged.

Rather than challenging some of the immature needs that may be

met by affiliation with

a

political group, feminist therapy supports
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the kind of group psychology phenomenon
described by Freud 47 and most

eloquently by Alexander Mitscherl ich. 46

Impressive evidence has been

offered by Mitscherl ich and by Christopher
47
Lasch
to the effect that

primitive group identifications are increasingly
replacing more mature
object relations as the social formations of
advanced capitalism

encroach upon family life.

It is one of therapy's major potential

contributions that it can offer

a

structured relationship with one

individual with whom conflict resolution and growth is
possible, the

opportunity to abandon identifications of

a

lower developmental order

in order to embrace a more integrated, responsibly
adult commitment

to an idea and a community.

ference— and

As "sisterhood" becomes a form of trans-

countertransference— whi ch cannot be explored and worked

through, therapists relegate feminism to the same fate as other failed
political movements.

Psychoanalysis and Feminist Therapy
Within psychoanalysis, as within no other theory, are concepts

which give

a

material base to the efforts to juxtapose political and

psychological projects.

While other theories might support more

grandiose aspirations, psychoanalysis offers the opportunity to recognize
the truth of our condition and still

hope to improve it.

NeoFreudian

and existental ist theories offer far more hope, but they do not

recognize the unfreedom of the society in which personal transformation

must take place— and in the end, that is no hope at all.

Because

Freud's assessment of the possibilities for therapy was based on the

concrete formulations of his metapsychology, he was not overly optimistic.
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He is often quoted as having
said. "you will be convinced
that much will
be gained if we succeed in
transforming your hysterical
misery into
everyday unhappiness." 48 He
understood that, until everyday
life was

better, no amount of therapy would
bring people genuine happiness.
This
afforded him a very sophisticated
political vision-even in tents of
the women's movement, which,
with few exceptions, has made him
its arch
villain.
In a letter to James Jackson
Putnam, he wrote:
I
believe that your complaint that we
are not able to
compensate our neurotic patients for giving
up their
illness is quite justified.
But it seems to me that this
s not the fault of therapy
but rather of social institulons.
What would you have us do when a woman
complains
about her thwarted life, when, with youth
gone, she notices
that she has been deprived of the joy of loving
for merely
conventional reasons? She is quite right and we
stand
elpless before her, for we cannot make her young
again.
But the recognition of our therapeutic
limitations reinforces
our determination to change other social
factors so that
men and women shall no longer be forced into
hopeless
situations.

Out of our therapeutic impotence must come the
prophylaxis
of the neuroses.
The more energetically one attacks the
sexual problem in such cases the more one is able to
palliate.
Where the conditions are not so hopeless sublimation creates new goals as soon as the repressions are
1 if ted. 49
The limitations of therapy in the psychoanalytic view are
inextricably

bound to the material base of the theory.

At the core of this

materialism is the analytic paradigm which supports

a

mind/body unity,

in contradiction to the more reduction!' stic philosophical

schools.

Idealism sees human beings as self- forming, able to create their lives
from "free will" and from within their intellectual capacities.

The

current humanistic movement shares this heritage, though "a suspect

Cartesian tradition in reverse:

I

feel, therefore

I

am."

50

Behaviorism
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and mechanistic social

science see us as empty vessels, constituted

by what has been poured into us, whether
stimulus-response conditioning

or bourgeois ideology.

In

contrast, the Freudian view grasps the human

experience in its totality, accounting for desires,
consciousness, and
the relation of these to actions and cultural
formations.

Marcuse

states, "Identifying the energy of the life instincts
as libido meant

defining their gratification in contradiction to spiritual
transcendentalism:
critical

Freud

in so far as

s

notion of happiness and freedom is eminently
it is material isti c--protes ting against the

spritualization of want ." 51
The theoretical vantage point which acknowledges conflict as the
basis of social relations and recognizes the social influence on

individual development, affords teachers and clinicians more opportunity
to work honestly and

progressively with students and patients, and

to survive with integrity.

Until

now, awareness of the contradictions

between appearance and reality, theory and therapy, social service and
social change, has either paralyzed professionals or been denied by
them.

Psychoanalysis offers an alternative.

We can hardly afford to

live in our ivory towers and presume that orthodox Freudian analysis

would be an appropriate tool for undergraduates, or to be used in
treating lower class patients in community mental health centers.
However, psychoanalytic theory provides insights to these crippling

contradictions, and the metapsychology of human change has important
implications for applied psychology programs, for pedagogical methodology,
and for working with blocks to class consciousness.

The relationship
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between psychoanalysis and praxis
is not merely speculative.

The theory

specifically addresses the relationship
of thought to action, and the
ways in which that relationship may
be developed.

As women come to see our mistreatment
as not just unfair but

profoundly degrading and violent-as we
break the middle class myth that
sexism is about unequal employment
opportunities, personal inhibition
and nothing

more— will these theories account

in some meaningful

what has been done to us, and for our own
participation in
of violence?

a

way for

process

As women begin to scrutinize themselves, can
humanism

or marxism provide

a

foundation for the breaking of silence, the develop-

ment of critical discourse; can they provide sustenance
adequate to the
urgent tasks of social change?
A notion of the individual as an empty vessel

into which the

conditions of life are poured— whether that means bourgeois ideology or
learned behaviors— cannot adequately account for the complexity of
even 'normal

1

Certainly such

experience; it cannot explain even the simplest dream.
a

viewpoint cannot lend meaning to the mental life of

those who are not making it under the strain of what our society

presently imposes as normality, whether we mean by that depressed
housewives or hospital i zed schizophrenics.

The flip side of this

ideological position, wherein we are depicted as self-creating, utterly

harmonious and loving creatures who would grow up all right if only
our self-esteem were not so wounded as children is not powerful enough
to account for the extremes of individual and social distress which

we have all witnessed— not the experiences of the passive victim or
the active oppressor.

Does that version of innate, loving, harmonious
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sociality make sense of Hitler?

Vietnam?

child molestor suffer from
alienation?

Wife beating?

Does a

Would he have grown up

a

nice

person if mother had liked his
finger paintings better?

Can he have
been so seriously psychologically
derailed because his father worked
in a

factory— or owned

a

factory, for that matter?

Does it make clear,

finally, why women have taken so much
abuse, largely unquestioningly,
for so long?
We are searching still for

theory of subjectivity which can

a

explain not only the violence of men but
also the rather extraordinary

self-deception which allows oppressed people to
collude.

While lying

to others in the interests of self-preservation
is perfectly understand-

able, what can motivate us to lie to ourselves
when these lies allow
us to continue acting against our own interests?

This self-deception

can be explained only if we posit that there are things
about ourselves

not just things about what others do to us, that we
must not know.

,

As

we move to explore our inner worlds more deeply we will uncover
not
just feelings, thoughts, memories which we have pressed out of awareness, but also impulses, urges to impermissible activity and impossible

satisfaction--impulses which

no mother can satisfy or make tolerable

and which threaten the ties that bind society.
It

is not that

masochism is

a

learned coping pattern imposed on

women from without and irrelevant to their true natures, but rather
that masochism is the only psychical structure offered to women (unlike
to men who are given other choices)

so that they may contain their

unmanageable sexuality and aggression. Masochism is hardly an irrelevant

'
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or unnatural phenomenonit is

a

psychological achievement
necessary

to both men and women
as the foundation for
the sacrifices which
devolve
on us to maintain our
families and communities:
it is what allows us

to tolerate pain in a
meaningful and enriching way.

It is only the

hyperattenuated form it has taken
on in the lives of women
which is
not in any way 'natural
.

The significance of this
emerges in one's assessment of the

depth of conflict between the
individual and her social world, and

therefore the depth of influence one
can attribute to societal demands
on the psyche.

The humanistic theories posit
tasks for the infantile

ego which are too simple to merit
the awful consequences that result

from the failure to master these tasks;
too simple to have merited an
ego in the first place.

One must expect to find, as layers are
peeled

away in the therapeutic process, not
only assertiveness, independence
and loving cooperation, but also
destructiveness, immature, amorphous

sexuality, narcissistic psychic structures
which must be mediated by
the ego over a long developmental process
that witnesses the creation

of what Freud termed secondary process thinking
and the moral capacities
that make human social bonding possible.

If we are not prepared to

face this reality in ourselves, if we will give no
voice to impulse
life in our daily existence, then it will continue,
unconsciously, to
hold sway and govern our behavior.

For

a

theory which can sensitively move back and forth between

the individual and the social, which will not collapse the person into
a

merely social, external being, nor glorify her out of all social

determinants altogether, we must return to the notions of the human mind
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posited by Freud in the early days
of psychoanalysis.

Psychoanalysis begins with the instinct
theory.

It posits that

conflict is the essential psychic and
social condition of humanity;
that our instincts and desires are
inevitably in competition with
external reality.

This has radical implications for
social theory.

Underlying the societal organization of
the human existence
are basic libidinal wants and needs;
highly plastic and
pliable, they are shaped and utilized to
'cement' the qiven
society.
Thus,
the libidinal impulses and their
satisfaction (and deflection) are co-ordinated with
the
interests of domination and thereby become a
stabilizing
force which binds the majority to the ruling minority.
Anxiety, love, confidence, even the will to freedom
and
solidarity with the group to which one belongs— all
come
to serve the economically structured relationships
of
subordination. 33
.

.

.

If we do not accept conflict resulting from
material want as the basis

of human and social development, there can be no dialectical
understanding of the individual or society. Without appreciating the
ego's role
in mediating conflict,

it will

be impossible to reconstruct ourselves

as actively responsible for our own emancipation, and for building

emancipated social relations.
If sexuality does not play the constitutional role which
Freud attributed to it, then there is no fundamental
conflict between the pleasure principle and the reality
principle. ... It was precisely because he saw in
sexuality the representative of the integral pleasure
principle that Freud was able to discover the common
roots of the 'general' as well as neurotic unhappiness in
a depth far below all individual experience, and to
recognize a primary 'constitutional' repression underlying
all consciously experienced and administered represssion.
For Freud, an enormous gulf separated real freedom and
happiness from pseudo freedom and happiness, that are
practiced and preached in a repressive civilization. The
revisionists see no such difficulty.
Since they have
spiritualized freedom and happiness, they can say that
'the problem of production has been virtually solved. '53

.

.

.
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All

revisions of analytic theory have been centered
around

rejection of the instinct theory as being too

mechanistic.

a

By and

large, these changes in the theory were
necessitated by problems in

therapy.

No doubt there were genuine problems and they
have been

ameliorated by the revisionist therapeutic innovations.

However, that

does not suffice to explain the revisions, nor does it
adequately convey
the consequences to the original theory.

Marcuse writes, "Therapeutic

findings may have motivated the theoretical
sexuality; but such

...

.

a

reductions in the role of

reduction was in any case indispensable for the

revisionist philosophy."

54

While

I

have argued that historians have

not been sufficiently sensitive to the complexity of the therapeutic

process, still the essence of critical theory's objection to NeoFreudian
and existential /humanist revisionism remains cogent:

"This is what is

crucial, that the contradiction between theory and therapy is lost,
not that changes are made in the name of therapy.

relationship is dialectical."

55

.

.

.

Rather the

The result of obliterating the tension

between theory and therapy has been the destruction of the theory's most
radical aspects and the trivial ization of therapy.

As the instinct

theory is undermined, repression and the unconscious cease to be dynamic
concepts, reflective of intrapsychic and social conflict; psychology
ceases to be dialectical and no longer supports

a

radical

interpretation

of social problems and the nature of social change.
As the repression of instinctual gratification recedes into
the background and loses its decisive importance for the
realization of man, the depth of societal repression is
Consequently, the revisionist emphasis on the
reduced.
influence of 'social conditions' in the development of the
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neurotic is sociologically and
psychologically far more
inconsequential than Freud's neglect of
these conditions.
The revisionist mutilation of the
instinct theory leads to
the traditional devaluation of the
sphere of material needs
0
of spiritual needs. Society's part
in the regimentaI™
tion of man is thus played down.
Neurosis too
appears as an essentially moral problem,
and the individual is
held responsible for the failure of
his self-realization. 56

™

/

.

.

.

Because the unconscious, repression, and the
libido theory are
at the heart of the Freudian theory, and
at the center of controversy

within psychological disciplines
in depth.
a

I

have chosen to review these concepts

This controversy has been long and bitter and has
resulted in

wealth of literature, much of which is plagued by ambiguity,
confusion,

and polemic.

Once again, it is difficult to clear away the debris and

see where the truth lies, or know whose interpretation to trust.

The

theory cannot be held primarily responsible for how it has been read,
though it will be important to look for weaknesses that might support

conformist misreadings.

The fact that psychoanalysis has been used to

justify certain conservative social analyses makes it all the more
important to discriminate between its central and its interpretive
elements.

Reich indicated early on the manner in which conservatives

might apply psychoanalysis:

Adaptation to reality is interpreted simply as adaptation
to society, which, applied in pedagogy or in the therapy of
the neuroses, is unquestionably a conservative view. 57
Yet the theory itself will demonstrate that though he participated in

some such errors, "Freud's own insights into the historical character

of the modifications of the impulses vitiate his equation of the reality

principle with the norms of patricentic-acquisitive culture."

58

Regardless of whether or not we choose ultimately to reject the
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content of the drives as they are
spelled out in analytic literature,
it is crucial

that we retain an understanding of
the role of instinctual

conflict in individual and social
development.

Many radical theorists

have thrown out psychoanalysis altogether,
seeing it as the bastion of

conservative mental health care.

Much of the damage done by American

analysts centers around their clinging to
oppressive derivative notions.

Concepts such as "penis envy" have been used
in therapy and literature
to persuade women to conform to an oppressive
reality.

However, it must

be reiterated that the conclusions some have
drawn from Freud's sexual

psychology (or from his 'pessimistic' cultural anthropology),
do not
touch the heart of the theory, repression and the unconscious mind.
Even if Freud in the end justifies civilization, he has in
the interim said enough about its antagonistic and repressive
essence to put it in question. The reverse is true of the
revisionists: whatever criticisms of society they advance
are absolved by the concepts and formulations that point
towards health and harmony. 59

While the discussion of repression and the unconscious which
follows is not polemical, it is surely not scientific in the empirical
sense.

read, in

That is to say, the research was not undertaken, nor the literature
a

neutral fashion:

to engage in a historical

psychological theory at this time is

a

reading of

profoundly political act.

CHAPTER III
GENERAL PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY:

REPRESSION

AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

Overview
Students of psychoanalysis know it to
be

ordinary complexity.

theory of extra-

As stated above, it represents

principles regarding mental functioning,
the workings of the mind, and

phenomena.

a

a

a

a

set of

research methodology into

mode of treatment for pathological

In order to fully appreciate the
psychoanalytic enter-

prise, one must apprehend the ways in which
those three aspects

are inextricably linked.

Psychoanalysis evolved through their inter-

action and it is not possible to discard any one
facet, nor alter
the theoretical principles by which they interrelate
and mutually

influence one another, without serious damage to the theory's
integrity.

There is the further compl exi ty— for any theory— of the many

components that must be included in

a

comprehensive description and

explanation of the psyche: development, personality, clinical theory,
cognition, perception, memory, etc.

Contemporary efforts often view

these as disparate elements which need not meet the requirements of

unification.
as

Each one of these is taken on its own terms and presented

"psychology.

"

This is particularly true in academic psychology,

which tends to focus experimental ly on the various cognitive aspects.
There are also attempts at more comprehensive psychologies, generally
76
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developed from varying clinical
perspectives, which, again, tend to
take one of these elements as a
starting point and build an entire
theory around it.

Object relations theory, for example,
attempts

to provide an exhaustive explanation
of psychological development

through an examination of early social
relationships.

In general,

those psychologies that were developed from
the exigencies of clinical

practice (NeoFreudian and existentialist), turn
their attention almost

exclusively to development, personality and clinical
theory.
Psychoanalysis sets as
be inclusive of all

a

goal

a

unity of explanation which will

these mental qualities and functions.

At its

heart is the dynamic theory of mind, central postulates on the
nature

of the psyche

— the

origins, meaning, and function of consciousness.

These precepts generate and include, but are not identical with,

theory of development and personality formation.
is

a

This nonidentity

evident by the mere fact that psychoanalysis did not have

a

fully

developed concept of personality until Freud introduced his tripartite
mental organization, the id, ego, and superego.

The theory of mind

built on principles which entail

a

certain view of development and

personality but which do not require

a

commitment to precise develop-

is

mental

sequences

.

Those are to be evaluated only on the basis of what

they can explain about how people come to be who they are, as adult
men and women in private and public social relationships; they are
to be hypothesized and verified only through clinical

data which

has been subjected to psychoanalytic interpretation.

The relations

between the theory of mind and, respectively, personality and development, are neither rigidly determined nor arbitrary.

What is important is
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to elaborate and revise the notions
of personality, and the develop-

mental

sequences adduced to explain adult personality
in

compatible with the basic framework of
psychoanalysis.

a

manner

One must

view the particular developmental story that
Freud set forth in the

context of that framework--what questions he was
attempting to answer
and at what level of abstraction he was offering
explanations for the

extraordinary phenomenon of consciousness.

That is, one must elaborate

and/or revise the picture of personality and development
along lines

compatible with the central ordering principles of psychoanalysis,
lines equal

in explanatory power with that which Freud has offered.

Yet general psychological theory is the aspect of psychoanalysis

that is least studied and least well understood.

NonFreudians seem

completely ignorant of it; Freudian nonanalysts

who have appropria-

ted analytic theory for the purposes of social theory have often

tampered with the theory for failure to appreciate its dimensions

2
.

And in professional analytic circles, that level of theoretical

speculation has come into high disfavor.

3

To further complicate matters, there is the complexity and

confusion which arises from the gradual evolution of psychoanalysis
over such
pieces.

a

long period of time, with no final integration of the varying

In that regard,

it is not always possible to know which Freud

is being discussed or cited--and this is true of people who are

ostensibly Freudians as well as critics who know only fragments of
his work and might be expected to quote it out of context.

The effort at integrating the earlier work with the later for-

mulations is to some extent the responsibility of the individual reader.

79

Many analyst's

interpreted the direction of Freud's late
work as

moving away from general psychological theory
toward an exclusive
focus on clinical theory,
support.

a

shift which in fact the work does not

Nonetheless, the last major revisions— the postulation
of

the death instinct, the structural theory of
mind (id, ego, superego),

and the final hypothesis of the nature and role
of anxiety— have
all

been taken as

phenomena.

a

shift in emphasis from unconscious to conscious

Hence we have seen

functions-- personality

a

growing preoccupation with ego

and "character"— at the expense of their under-

lying instinctual determinants.

This move has drawn support from the

fact that, at least superficially, personality and character, whether
normal or abnormal, can be elucidated in terms of developmental and

clinical considerations, without reference to general psychological
theory.

(For the nonanalytical ly oriented, in fact, they are discernible

qualities which can simply be argued to be one way or another without
reference to psychology at all: women are either passive or they are
not, and one way or the other, personality qua personality can be taken
to be the result of cultural

etc.

influences, social learning processes,

).

These issues are of central
political

importance in

a

discussion of the

implications of psychology and psychotherapy

,

which indeed

must concern themselves with the form that the adult personality
assumes.

What factors lead to the development of autonomous rather

than conformist or authoritarian traits?

By what route do people

arrive at what they consider to be their moral codes and how do they
attain the capacity to live by those codes?

What governs their ability
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to accurately assess the environment
in which they live and their

influence and impact on that environment?

Underlying any discussion

of "false consciousness" is the fact
and meaning of our being

conscious creatures at all.
locates the individual

It is the theory of mind that fundamentally

in society and provides the context in which
a

concept of personality takes on meaning.
human infant’s psychological origins

The particular story of the

and the manner in which those

processes are mediated developmental ly over time into the adult

personality lay

a

complex and material foundation for our understanding

of the private and social facts of human experience.

The fragmentary

psychic structure of the infant struggles with its instinctual in-

heritance and problematic environment; the struggle gives rise to

consciousness and the capacity to integrate needs and aims through

judgment

and reasoned action.

In the case of psychology and feminism these issues underlie

the controversy over Freud's theories on women.

For in fact, what is

argued over repeatedly is whether or not his views on female person-

ality

— and

therefore the developmental sequence he proposed as leading

to mature "psychological

femaleness"--is scientifically accurate and

philosophically acceptable.
indistinguishable.)

(The two questions are often treated as

This debate takes place almost totally without

reference to the theory of mind and its requirements for developmental
theory.

Freudians and nonFreudians alike argue over whether or not

women do grow up as he said they do,

whether they should grow up that

way and whether his reasons for suggesting that particular develop-
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mental path for them are
"plausible."

Consequently the story of

female development is rescripted
with a portrayal of the
mature woman
that is more politically
palatable despite the fact that
the new

versions cannot account for
any of the qualities (which
are in fact
developmental achievements) we
commonly associate with maturity:
sexual orientation, gender
identity, moral development,
the evolution
of the structured and

structuring ego.

If,

indeed, these have been thrown
into question, along with

the larger issue of what relation
they bear to other aspects of ego

-functioning, then we are urgently in need
of

a

research methodology

through which to develop and test new
hypotheses.

method is precisely what has been abandoned

Yet research

in rejecting Freud’s

general psychology; for it is only through the
appl ication of those

highly abstract postulates that clinical
inquiry comes to constitute

research and can be used to build theory.
In order to evaluate and revise Freud's
portrayal

of female

psychology (or male for that matter), we must trace
the way in which
developmental theory was elaborated, and in turn generated
of personality.

a

theory

The implicit connections between the basic formative

components of the psyche and the complexity of adulthood must be made
explicit, and the relation clarified between gender identity on the
one hand, and personality or character on the other.

In

other words,

we are attempting to assess whether or not the manner of generalizing

from components of psychic development to the mainstream of one's

personality is defensible, and to ascertain just how much of that
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generalizing did and should take
place along sex-linked lines.
Are the psychoanalytic
notions of personality
development
compatible with the theory's
basic framework? To answer
this question,
I

will

use tthe twin pillars of

analytic theory, repression and
the

unconscious, as ordering concepts
for
theory of mind.

a

discussion of the Freudian

While the topic suggested here,
repression and the

unconscious, is almost infinite
within the scope of Freudian
theory,
the nature of the question
lends itself well to focusing on
two tasks
of significance for the student
of Freud.
First, through examining

these two concepts we can elucidate
psychoanalysis as

a

dynamic theory

of mind which accounts for and gives
meaning to those aspects of

human experience and behavior which
hitherto had been inexplicable.
The existence of the unconscious is the
only theoretical postulate

sufficient to explain neurotic symptoms, dreams,
jokes, and parapraxes;
one can't account for the existence of
these phenomena if one con-

tinues to hold to the belief that psyche is
exhaustively described by

what is conscious.

Furthermore, one can only describe

,

and not

ex P^ ain these phenomena unless one attributes
a motive-internal

conflict--as well as

quality to the unconscious.

a

is at the heart of the dynamic conception,

It is conflict which

though the terms of that

conflict may be seen to shift dramatically through the revisions of
the theory over time.

In the

course of documenting psychoanalysis

as a dynamic theory through the use of repression and the unconscious,
it will

be necessary to demonstrate their centrality to the theory

and to establish that

from such concepts.

a

coherent and defensible theory can be built
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The second task is to follow
the development of psychoanalytic

theory as Freud revised and
developed it along the lines of
what he
might have considered to be
"dialectical orthodoxy ." 4 For in
whatever ways Freud or his followers
may have refined the derivative
conceptions of psychoanalytic theory (the
etiology of the neuroses,
the description and classification
of the various drives, the elabora-

tion of psychosexual development,
the addition of

personality, etc.), the dynamic

a

concept of

conception of mind rests, and always

will, on the disjunction between innate

somatic drives and the

possibilities of reality; on the management of this
conflict by the
agencies, conscious and unconscious, of the mind.
It is impossible,

really, to separate Freud's theory from the

history and method of its formulation. The factors
addressed here
lend themselves to an organization which devolves from
this

(chronological) method of investigation:

Freud said of psychoanalysis

that
It has not been a matter of indifference for the course
of its development or for the reception it met with that
it began its work on what is, of all the contents of the
mind, most foreign to the ego--on symptoms.
Symptoms
are derived from the repressed.
The path led from
symptoms to the unconscious to the life of the instincts,
to sexuality. ... 5
.

I

.

.

propose to add to this investigative trail only the study of dreams,

which along with symptoms, are the principal phenomena from which
the

unconscious and repression are inferred.
If we continue on Freud's path, we find that in the course of

his investigations he eventually grew less concerned with the explicit
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distinction between what is conscious and
what is not.

It is beyond

the scope of this chapter to present
those later developments in any

but outline form:

it is not genuinely possible to
enter into a full

exploration or even exposition of the theories
of libidinal development, or of the structural

theory of mind, without first tackling

the Oedipus complex, which will only be
discussed fully in the context

of psychosexual development (Chapter IV).

Yet it is important for the

purpose of this discussion to illustrate some of the
fundamental

elaborations of the concepts of repression and the

unconscious in

order to demonstrate that later developments in no way implied

a

rejection of their centrality to the theory.
This, then, provides the two principles for the organization
of the following discussion and its manner of exposition:

to show

how the concepts interrelate (in part along the lines of Freud's

investigative method) and build

a

dynamic theory of mind; to use

a

somewhat schematic history-of-ideas approach in following the develop-

ment of Freud's conceptualization of consciousness and what

is un-

conscious in order to begin to establish principles of "dialectical
orthodoxy" for the development of psychoanalysis.

Hysteria:

Hypnosis to Free Association

A recapitulation of Freud's work before the emergence of

psychoanalysis proper will help to locate the concepts of the unconscious mind and repression as two of its central theoretical
postulates.
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work.

We may begin by looking at
the influence of Charcot
on Freud's
The most significant elements
here are, first, the diagnosis

of hysteria which states that
conversion symptoms can be connected
back to jdeas, and second, that
hysteria can be cured through the
use
of words in the form of hypnotic
suggestion.
This "ideogenic"

conception of symptom etiology was
enough to challenge, in Freud's
mind, the universally held belief
that what is mental could be equated
with what is conscious. The ideas
which govern symptoms are clearly
inaccessible to consciousness.

Though the unconscious is

rudimentary

a

concept at this stage, one of the central
ordering principles of the

theory of mind has already emerged, that
of psychic determinism
From the time that it became apparent
that symptoms were not bizarre,

meaningless phenomena, Freud was to maintain that all
psychic events,
no matter how seemingly inexplicable or irrational,
have meaning which
is

determined by

unconscious antecedents.

Psychic determinism is

not in any way related to the strict biological determinism
which is

often misread into psychoanalysis. Freud is not attempting

a

reduction

of meaning to mechanism, in fact his effort is not one of
simplification
at all, rather the reverse.

It is a juxtaposition of meanings which

he strives for, an enrichment of conscious meaning by reference to

unconscious roots.
Upon returning from France, Freud, together with Breuer, began
to use hypnosis in their treatment of nervous disorders.

The method

they employed, however, was that of catharsis rather than hypnotic

suggestion.

The rough theory of hysteria that they put forth at this
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time was that a memory of

a

traumatic event remained inaccessible
to

consciousness and that the memory governed
the symptom. The cathartic
method involved directing the hypnotized
patient to talk his or her
through memories of the traumatic event;
at the end of the session, if
the memory had been fully recaptured,
the symptom would disappear.
As Freud encountered difficulties with
hypnosis, he began to

introduce free association, which was to signal
the end of his belief,
held concurrently with the use of the cathartic
method, that "hysterics

suffer mainly from reminiscences ." 6

With the use of free association,

Freud came up against two obstacles to treatment:
refusal

resistance, the

or inability to associate, and transference,

a

special form

of resistance in which the patient created the neurosis anew
through
an irrational

emotional attachment to the analyst; an attachment which

became far more important than being cured.
bound to

h id e t h i s

"The use of hypnosis is

resistance; the history of psychoanalysis proper,

therefore, begins with the new technique which dispenses with

hypnosis ."

7

This shift is critical

effects the movement from
for it

a

— it

is that

descriptive to

a

which definitively

dynamic theory of mind,

was no longer possible to postulate the cause of conversion

hysteria as

a

merely accidental trauma, nor to explain its occurrence

as having set in during a hypnotic trance, as Breuer does.

no longer be deemed sufficient to simply describe mental

It could

events by

whether they were conscious or unconscious, it was necessary now to
offer

a

reason for certain ideas being kept unconscious.

Resistance

demonstrates that ideas are blocked from consciousness due to internal
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conflicts— the patient has reasons,
themselves unconscious, for
limiting his or her self-knowledge.
This extraordinary fact of
self-deception is perhaps the most

trivialized of all Freudian ideas; the
failure to grasp its significance
represents the failure of all revisions
of analytic theory.
the principle which informs the
theory through all

ments, and supplies
revisions.

For the theory must provide

can take place, and

a

a

its later develop-

standard of judgment by which to measure
those

a

secret from oneself,

It is

a

motivation for keeping things

mechanism by which such an astonishing event
relationship between the process of self-

deception, the content of the hidden material, and
pathological
phenomena.

It will

be by the exigencies of these three questions that

Freud will feel continually spurred to improve his
hypotheses and

within the context of these three that he will contain his theory.
This clinical

innovation (free association) and the resultant

changes its use made in the theory are

a

superb example of the inter-

relationship between Freud's clinical and theoretical sources, essential
for any understanding of the epistemological status of psychoanalysis.
The descriptive conception of the

unconscious mind does not account

for the motive or the mechanism of self-deception; while it correlates
to a certain extent with pathological

them.

phenomena, it does not explain

The emergence of resistance in the treatment process necessitated

the concept of repression,

against itself.

a

view of the mind dynamically divided

"If anyone should seek to regard the theory of

repression and of resistance as assumptions instead of as results
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following from psychoanalysis,

should oppose him most emphatically ." 8

I

The concept of repression, deduced
from the results of clinical

method, derives its validity from what
it has the power to explain,

what it can make sense of.

Psychic determinism underlies what here

constitutes the rudiments of the interpretive
method:

that the surface,

to be intelligible and exhaustively
explained, must be viewed in terms

of its hidden determinants.

Again, the interpretive method intends

not to reduce one to the other but to enhance
one by the other.

(This

remains true despite the fact that in recent times
pseudo-interpretation has been used to mask some lazy and pernicious
clinical work, for

example the pervasiveness of the "nothing but" phenomenon--"That

1

s

nothing but hostility.")

The Emergence of Sexuality

There

is

one further discovery that comes with the introduction

of free association, and that is the importance of sexuality in the

etiology of the neuroses.

At this point (around the time of the

writing of the Studies on Hysteria ), the notion of conversion hysteria
being caused by the memory of

a

traumatic event was still retained;

yet more and more the event turned out to be sexual in nature and to
have occurred in early childhood.

Thus the etiology stood as follows:

an event occurs in early childhood which contains an incompatible

idea, probably sexual; some form of psychic defense moves in to

separate the idea from its correlated affect; this act of repression
works reasonably well until puberty, when the reactivation of sexuality

necessitates further repressions, resulting in compromise formations
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which then manifest themselves as
symptoms.

They are compromises in

that they fend off sexuality and do
not allow it expression until it
is so disguised as to appear
asexual,

some satisfaction.

but ultimately they do permit

This formulation provided the starting
point for

the individuation of the various neuroses,
with the traumatic event
in hysteria being an instance of parental

All

of the data accumulated thus far was leading
Freud more and

more toward
It

is

seduction.

preoccupation with the nature of the repressed material.

a

important to bear in mind that at this point (1895-6) he
had

already abandoned

constructing

a

the Scientific Project , his first attempt at

comprehensive general psychology.

Freud's growing concentration on drives as

a

of consciousness and the unconscious mind.

The Project evidences

major explanatory factor
The motivating force be-

hind the differentiation of the ego (ego at this time is roughly

equated with conscious processes), is seen as being the need to find
some relief from relenteless endogenous stimuli through the ego's

mediating between innate drives and external reality.
The following picture of the infant's psychological origins
emerges from the Project

.

Conflict is built into the instinctual

inheritance of the human organism, if for no other reason than

extreme neonatal immaturity and prolonged developmental process.
Instinct, in the Freudian lexicon, refers to mental representations of

somatic needs, not to fixed, "instinctive" patterns of behavior.

Because of the human infant's inability, motor and psychic, to satisfy
its needs it is subject to constant internal

tension. While the infant

—
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has neither concept of self nor
concept of other, it requires

concrete objects in the world for the
satisfaction of its needs.

At

first it strives to attain release from
internal tension through

hallucinatory wish fulfillment.

This tendency toward tension re-

duction Freud names the pleasure principle;
the process of immediate
drive discharge through hallucinatory wish
fulfillment is the essence
of what he terms primary process thought.

Eventually, wishful thinking being what it is, real
dissatis-

faction, increasing somatic tension, confront the infant
with the

discrepancy between hallucination and reality; the infant must
begin
to distinguish between internal

and external.

In the

beginning the

pleasure principle is maintained through the illusion that everything
needed is contained within the organism.

Gradually, as the ego is

differentiated, immediate drive discharge through hallucination
abandoned

is

in favor of delay, which gives rise to memory and thought

what Freud termed secondary process.

He is suggesting that thought

arises only through the discrepancy between internal psychic reality,

which is at first hallucinatory, and the actual satisfactions provided
by the external world.

If it were possible for all

a

baby's needs to

be satisfied immediately, we would not be thinking creatures;

not possible, not merely because parents aren't

it is

fast enough or smart

enough, but because the psychic equipment with which the infant enters
the world is too fragmentary and too vulnerable.

Every child must, of

necessity, be subjected to these same learning tasks.
The process of development requires that another person have

satisfied the infant's needs so that it can sustain memories of
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satisfaction which it then endeavors
to reproduce-first through
hallucination and then through
action guided by thought.
In this
regard, psychoanalysis implicates
social relations at the heart
of
development. This is particularly
important given that Freud appears
to neglect the impact of
external objects on early development
in his

assertion that for quite some time
the infant has no genuine concept
of "other." What
psychoanalysis says, in fact, is that we
are as

psychologically precarious as we are,
precisely because of being born
both needing a concept of other,
due to our dependence, and yet unable
to sustain such

a

concept.

Much of the story of early development

centers around the gradual achievement of
the concept of an object-a

fact which has the most important
implications for our adult social

relations.

"It is a basic contradiction between the
longing for

relaxation and the longing for objects which is said
to be the forerunner of love and hate ." 9
If the ego does not develop through the direct
influence of

objects

(as opposed to the Neo Freudian account), then on
what

basis does development proceed?

Freud suggests that the ego develops

along the concepts of its own body.
Let us imagine ourselves in the situation of an almost
entirely helpless living organism, as yet unoriented in
the world, which is receiving stimuli in its nervous
substance.
This organism will very soon be in a position
to make a first distinction and a first orientation.
On
the one
hand, it will be aware of stimuli which can be
avoided by muscular action (flight); these it ascribes
to the external world.
On the other hand, it will also be
aware of stimuli against which such action is of no avail
and whose character of constant pressure persists in spite
of it; these stimuli are the signs of an internal world.
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In later

|_

elaborations on the nature of thought, critical

thinking--judgment--is also seen to be grounded in the
ego's earliest
stages of development along bodily concepts.

The process of negation 12

is based on one of the infant's earliest
discriminating modalities,

taking in

and

spitting out,"

a

rudimentary way of determining

what is acceptable to the organism based on what it
inside itself.

is

willing to keep

Over time, the ideas attached to primitive judgments

("thing presentations") become associated with words, which will provide
the subject with the distance and objectivity required to separate

critical thought and action from wishful thinking.
In

the Project , Freud attempts a neurophysiological explication of
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these facets of mental function!
ng-not in an attempt to reduce
their
meaning to the workings of
a machine, as has
sometimes been asserted,
but rather on the belief
that an adequate depiction
of mental processes
must include both mechanism and
13
meaning.
To that end, Freud
provides a model wherein the shift
from quantity (of psychic energy)
to quality accounts for the
phenomena of consciousness. He
proposes
different neuronal systems for primary
and secondary process thinking,
and attributes different motives
and functions to the systems.

Against the backdrop of the material
realities of the mind,

framework

a

emerges which is sufficient to capture
the intricacy and meaning of
complex persons in their social relationships.

Freud has shifted from

an effort to explain some mysterious
aspects of mental functioning
to the effort to explain the human
subject itself:

sciousness arise?

how does con-

and in respect to being governed by conscious
choices

rather than strict instictual ties between
subject and object, what

manner of creature are we?

Though he will go on to offer far more

elaborate theories of neurosis and of general development,
Freud's
theory of mind, or at least its conceptual framework, is
hereby
establ

i

shed.

Infantile Sexuality:
In

The Libido Theory

1897 Freud formulated

in a letter to Fliess:

a

major reconceptualization, as seen

"The physical

structures which in hysteria are

subjected to repression are not properly speaking, memories.
impulses deriving from the primal scenes." 14

.

.

but

The notion of re-

pression being instituted due to internal conflict, as representing
a

flight from internal danger, has finally been fully integrated into
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the theory.

Though Freud had been increasingly
faced with the

realization that his patients' early sexual
traumas had been, more
often than not, fictitious, he had only
reluctantly abandoned the

seduction theory in favor of infantile
sexuality.
that sexual instinctual

"We have to learn

impulses accompany life from birth onwards,

and that it is precisely in order to fend
off those instincts that the

infantile ego institutes repressions.
With the adoption of infantile sexuality, the
dynamic theory of

mind comes fully into its own; there is

a

internal coherence and explanatory power.

dramatic gain in the theory's

Self-deception only makes sense

if it is one's own impulses about which it is
necessary to be deluded.

There is no clear advantage to not knowing about external danger,
since the more one knows, the better one can mount

a

defense.

The

neurophysiological model had always attested to the fact that it was
from mental representations of internal danger that the psychic

mechanism took flight through repression; in the case of external
danger, real flight is more efficient.
Again, clinical experience can be seen to account for
source of theoretical speculation:

a

major

once more it is the fact and

specific quality of transference which provoked these revisions in the
theory.

The fact of transference appearing, although neither
desired nor induced by either physician or patient, in
every neurotic who comes under treatment, in its crude
sexual, or affectionate, or hostile form, has always seemed
to me the most irrefragable proof that the source of the
propelling forces of neurosis lies in the sexual life. 16

Infantile sexuality is of great importance both for the understanding

:
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of neurosis and for maintaining

a

dynamic theory of unconscious

processes— clearly these two factors are closely linked.

In speaking

of the diphasic onset of human sexuality, Freud directly equated the

nature of sexual development with the singularly human trait of be-

coming neurotic.
sexual

It is in large

measure due to the fact that the

instincts are capable of displacement and substitution to such

great extent and over such

a

a

protracted period of time that neurosis

is a viable adaptation pattern for human beings.

We are thus left with the following etiology of hysterical

symptomol ogy:

a

child experiences her early sexual impulses as in-

compatible and institutes some form of repression against them, refusing entry into consciousness of the ideational representations of
these impulses and severing the ideas from their accompanying affects;

during puberty those earlier impulses, whose ideational representations
have flourished in the unconscious, become unmanageable and additional

repression

is required;

in the form of a

the impulses find "substitute satisfaction"

symptom— the symptom expresses both

a

repressed sexual

impulse and also accommodates the standards of the ego.
"The patient's symptoms constitute his sexual activity ."

In short:

17

The Dream Theory
It remains for us to look at one additional

aspect of psycho-

analytic theory and practice which is of great significance for
general theory of the unconscious and also of special

a

importance for

formation.
an understanding of the role of sexuality in symptom

Let

first came to study
us begin by looking at the manner in which Freud

dreams
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It was discovered one day that
the pathological symptoms
of certain neurotic patients have
a sense.
On this discovery the psychoanalytic method of
treatment was founded
It happened in the course of this
treatment that patients,
instead of bringing forward their
symptoms, brought forward
dreams.
A suspicion arose that the dreams
too had a sense. 18

From this it can be seen that dreams
occupy

a

place in psycho-

analytic epistemology similar to that of
symptoms, and they afford

confirmation of the principle of psychic determinism:

dreams are

meaningful psychic events and their meaning cannot
be reduced to the
neurological mechanisms by which they occur.

exhaust the meaning of
that occasion

a

That is, one cannot

dream by explaining the physiological factors

it— though contemporary researchers

are still

engaged

in such endeavors.

While the dream theory can be established separately from that
of the neuroses, the unconscious, and repression, it reflects back on

those aspects of psychoanalytic theory significantly.
the crucial

Freud summarized

theoretical connection between dreams and the

and repression as follows:

"...

unconscious

the essential characteristic and

the most significant part of my dream theory— the reduction of dream

distortion to an inner conflict,

a

kind of inward dishonesty

The dream theory states that every dream is

that the wishes are disguised.

a

—

.

.

wish fulfillment, and

The first half of that statement re-

flects the significance of drives (represented in the wishes), and the
second lays the groundwork for an understanding of the unconscious
mental processes (the manner in which the mind creates these disguises);

together they underline the role of conflict in dreaming (the motive
for disguise).

Dreams afforded Freud the clearest opportunity to study
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the laws which govern unconscious
mental operations.

He stated:

"The

best part of what we know of these
processes in the unconscious is
derived from our study of the dream-work ." 20
Through the dream-work
(the mechanism of disguise), the
latent content of the dream (the wish,

which

is the mental

representation of an instinctual drive) is
trans-

posed into the manifest content (the
disguised wish).

This provided

the first detailed description of primary
process, and displayed the

unconscious as being regulated by the pleasure
principle, since it
hallucinates

a

wish as being satisfied in order to attain
immediate

drive discharge (in the case of dreaming, this
allows the subject to

continue sleeping undisturbed), tolerates mutually
contradictory ideas,
has no sense of time or space, and readily
condenses and displaces

ideas.

Freud was also able to deduce, therefore, that the mechanism

of dream construction provides

a

model for understanding the manner

in which neurotic symptoms are formed.

The significance of the dream theory derives from the fact that
it provides a study of non-pathol ogical

aspects of human mental

phenomena, and from the fact that the line of investigation which leads
to it

can be carried out independently of any of the evidence and

proofs which establish the theory of symptom formation.

proofs are

adduced to support the thesis that

disguised wish:

a

A variety of

dream expresses

a

children's dreams, which express undisguised wishes;

that the wishes in adult dreams can be undisguised through psycho-

analytic dream interpretation; the appearance in dreams of primal
symbols, whose meaning can be established independently of dream

interpretation; the character of the wishes themsel ves--their un-
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acceptable nature explains why they would be
disguised.

The independent

verification of the dream theory lends considerable
confirmation and
also universal applicability to Freudian
suppositions regarding the

unconscious and repression.
Thus the dream theory, taken in conjunction with
the Scientific

Project, provides

a

model for mental functioning that is grounded in

material reality— the necessities of the body—
yet sophisticated

enough to confront the human subject on its own terms.

entiated neuronal systems of the Project

,

The differ-

which correspond to freely

mobile (primary process) vs. bound (secondary process) psychic energy
can now be seen in terms of the complex motives and functions that

they serve.

The pleasure principle operates at many interrelated

levels of meaning and purpose:

in sleep the ego withdraws its interest

from the outside world and returns to hallucinatory wish fulfillment.
At the simplest organismic level, dreams are the "guardians of sleep."

They prevent

a

buildup of tension from arousing the dreamer.

Yet no

two people create the same dream, and only an extraordinarily complex

psychic apparatus can help to account for the specific sources and

meanings of any individual's dream images.

In summary,

then, we see the way in which psychoanalytic theory

and practice evolved:

the unconscious and repression

are deduced

(first in the descriptive and later in the dynamic sense) from symptoms,

dreams, parapraxes, transference, and resistance; in the course of

developing

a

theory which could explain these phenomena, drives and

eventually infantile sexuality were postulated.

Freud had this to say
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about the historical development
of psychoanalytic theory:
the other new factors which were
added to the
cathartic procedure as a result
of my work, transforming
1
PSyCh0 nalyS1 S 1 should men tion
particularly:
thp H^°t
?
the
doctrine of
repression and resistance, the
recognition
lle sexuall ty, and the interpreting
and
!
making
u
p of dreams as a
use
source of knowledge of the unconscious. 21
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The theory as formulated thus far
affords the following construction of the unconscious and
repression:
consciousness and the

unconscious are not merely descriptive
terms; ideas may be strong or
active and unconscious, in which case
they will be inaccessible to

consciousness without encountering resistances;
ideas may be merely

temporarily unconscious, in which case they
may now be thought of as
unconscious descriptively but preconscious
dynamical ly--that is, they
can enter consciousness without encountering
resistance.

institutes acts of repression

The ego

against ideational representations of

impulses emanating from the unconscious which are
incompatible with
its task of self-preservation, the ideas remain in
the

unconscious,

and their derivatives continue to influence development
and behavior,

while the ego has lost its control over them and has been to that
degree impoverished of its strength.

In the

coming years, Freud will

increasingly struggle with the implications of the fact that these
two sides of the mind, each functioning according to its own set of

principles, are not necessarily available to each other.

In

attempting

to accord full meaning to conscious phenomena by interpreting them in

terms of their biological substratum, he will build an increasingly

complex picture of the human mind.

With the passage of time,

a

description of the mind in terms of what can and cannot be admitted

,
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to consciousness will

fall

short of what is required to describe
the

person in his or her total experience.

The Systematic Theory of Mind
The theory thus stated raised several questions,
as did it

point in certain specific directions for continued development
and
research.

In

particular, Freud was to focus over the next several

years on the nature of repressed drives.
had both clinical and theoretical

writings reflect
of

1

a

This research, once again,

sources.

While the theoretical

continuing effort to document the nature and stages

ibidinal development (in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality
,

for example), there were also

a

number of problematic factors in

Freud's practice with which he was forced to come to grips.

These

involved him in an ongoing exploration of the forces, or agency, of
repression.

Ultimately he was to postulate the existence of the ego

instincts, which had their own source of psychic energy and whose

purpose it was to oppose the sexual instincts.

In

order to accomodate

the fact of unconscious processes pertaining to the ego, Freud developed
his theory of the
one.

unconscious mind from

a

dynamic into

a

systematic

That is, if we are unable to equate the ego with consciousness,

if we must admit that some ego processes are unconscious, then it
is more sensible to organize the mental

apparatus around general systems

of functions than around the two qualities of

conscious or unconscious.

Each mental

system,

a

thought being either
(Preconscious

Conscious, and Unconscious) has certain qualities and properties, and

operates according to its own set of laws and principles in order to

101

fulfill

its functions and purposes.

Freud's speculations during this
period culminated in the meta-

psychological essays which present

a

detailed classification of the

instincts, explicate the process of repression,
and the relationship

between repression and libidinal development,
and formulate the

systematic theory of mind.
As Freud continued in his practice, two
obstacles to treatment
had become more and more troublesome:

the overdetermination of symptoms

(that they can seemingly be traced to many different
causative

factors), and, more important, the refusal of
even though all

a

neurosis to disappear

its symptoms might, one-by-one, be cleared up.

attempt to develop

a

His

more adequate theory of the neuroses, one which

could account for more than the symptoms (which had come to seem like

merely the surface characteristics of the neurosis), is clearly reflected
in his theoretical writings during the first fifteen years of the

twentieth century.
By 1915, in "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes," Freud was

employing

a

fully developed language for the instincts--each of the

innumerable component instincts was described in terms of its impetus,
aim, object, and source.

(For the purposes of psychoanalysis, only

aim, the mode in which satisfaction is achieved, and object, the

person or thing that affords satisfaction, remain significant.)

He

went on, in that article, to present his first real attempt at
classification:
instincts.

the self-preservative or ego-instincts vs. the sexual

Despite the fact that very little more was said about the
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ego instincts at this point,
their emergence in the theory
is
critical, for the reworking of
the theory of the unconscious
from the
dynamic to the systematic
conception is concurrent with
this oppositional

classification of the instincts.

The paper goes on to trace
the

vicissitudes of the sexual instincts,
essentially in terms of the
possibilities for pathological development.
Reversal, turning around
upon the self, repression,
and sublimation are seen as
modes of defense against instinctual
impulses.

The first two alone are not

enough to account for neurosis-they
will establish fixation points
that result in

perverted or inverted forms of adult
sexuality.

To

account for neurosis, Freud needed to
examine repression.
This he does, most significantly in
two metapsychological

papers also written in 1915, entitled
"Repression" and "The Unconscious."
The 1915 essays offer the fullest
expositions of these two central

concepts and their relationship to the drives
and the neuroses.

Repression is now elaborated as

three-phase process.

a

In primal

repression, the ideational representations of instinctual
impulses are
refused entry to consciousness.

This then establishes

a

fixation point

in devel opment-- the instinct remains attached
to the presentation which

continues unaltered in the unconscious, sends out mental derivatives,
and makes associative connections.

The second phase of repression,

termed repression proper, involves the derivatives of the repressed

instinct-presentation, and the associative chains of thought with

which it has become linked.

Repression then consists merely in pre-

venting those ideas from reaching consciousness--they are not destroyed,
but rather preserved in the unconscious where they continue to flourish.
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Repression, of course, does not
succeed in barring all mental
der-

ivatives of the instinct-presentation
from consciousness-if
we would never even know that
it had occurred.
attain

a

it did,

When these derivatives

form sufficiently different from
the original idea, they are

permitted to emerge.

"Neurotic symptoms, too, must have filled
the

condition referred to, for they are
derivatives of the repressed,
which has finally by means
of these formations wrested from consciousness the right of way previously
denied it ." 22
is termed by Freud the return of
the repressed:

The third phase

the forces of

repression prove unequal to the strength of
the instinctual impulses
(which may be provoked by some frustration that
succeeds in touching
the primal

repression), and that is when symptoms will form.

Freud postulated the notions of anticathexis and
hyper-

cathexis to explain economically how repression works,
and how it

may be reversed, that is, where the forces of repression
get the psychic
energy to perform their task, and what manner of psychological
change
is necessary to undo that.

Freud stated that,

"...

in reality

there is no lifting of the repression until the conscious idea, after

overcoming the resistances, has united with the unconscious memorytrace."

23

It is possible to tell

a

person something of which he or

she is not yet conscious, and though that idea might then be held in

the conscious mind it will not necessarily produce any genuine change
in consciousness or undo the repression that had banished the idea to

the

unconscious.
Freud goes on to formulate the systematic theory of mind in which

the topographic aspect (referring to spatial, though not necessarily
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strictly anatomical locations)
of mental functioning
becomes integrated with the dynamic and
economic aspects:
the system Ucs,

primitive and ancient, consists
of that which is innate and
inherited
as well

as all

that is placed there by acts
of repression; the system

Pcs contains all thoughts which
are unconscious only descriptively,
and
may at any time gain access
to consciousness; the system
Cs, (which
is more or less the equivalent
of the ego), evolved from the
outer-

most cortical layer of the brain and
in most direct contact with the
world, is responsible first for
differentiating between internal and
external, and then mediating between
the two.
rules, qualities, and functions.

Each system has its own

We then have a model

in

which anti-

cathexis (repression) is seen to occur
principally between the systems
Pcs and Ucs.

Within this framework, hypercathexis, the reversal
of

repression, also takes on

a

specific, non-metaphorical meaning.

The Metapsychology

Freud's metapsychology is
theory.

a

highly problematic component of his

There is no agreed upon definition for the term, nor is there

consensus on its role in theory building.

consider it to be largely

a

Contemporary thinkers

biologistic embarassment.

Yet in the

context of the reading of Freud offered here, it can be defended as
the epitome of that level of psychoanalytic explanation which lends

itself to

a

radical social theory 24
.

Freud considered his metapsychology the attempt to describe

psychological propositions in economic, dynamic, and topographic
dimensions.

In the

absence of an adequate definition of metapsychology,
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it appears Freud was aiming
at a psychological

conception which

would capture what Paul Ricoeur 25
has termed the elements
of "force"
and "desire:"
a conception which does
not reduce one to the other
but
insists on holding several levels
of explanation and description
simultaneously.

Marie Jahoda suggests that through
the metapsychology

Freud turns his attention to
those questions about human nature
which
he considered to be most
fundamental

and most pressing:

"the dynamics

of conflict; the limitations of
self-knowledge; the reducibility of

meaning to mechanism; personality;
development; and relation to
environment." 2 ^
Through his continued insistence on the
juxtaposition of

quantitative and qualitative explanation, Freud
provides, from the
Project to the metapsychology,

a model

in which the development of a

concept of reality is of necessity linked to

a

model of moral develop-

ment; thinking emerges only through the conflictual
interaction of the

dependent infant with the responsible social world.
logical

presentation of repression offers

a

The metapsycho-

nonmetaphorical description

of the process of self-deception which is integral
to psychic survival,
and consequently

that process.

nonmetaphorical description of the reversal of

a

This will be of critical

importance when we come to

evaluate what is required to effectuate not only

consciousness but

a

a

change in

change that enhances the individual's capacities

for committed political action and involvement in committed social
groups.

The metapsychology also provides

a

framework in which to assess
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the role of emotions in psychological
change.

In

these essays Freud

distinguishes very carefully between
repressed ideas and "repressed"
affects, stating that, in fact, there are
no "repressed" affects.

The affect which has been severed from
its idea may suffer one of
three fates:

remain as it is, be suppressed or inhibited
altogether,

or be transformed into another charge of
affect.

While the manner in

which repression works is that its force is
directed against ideas, if
it doesn t squelch the affect it will not
have succeeded.

Thus the fate

of the affect is important for any understanding
of neurotic symptoms.
In

conversion hysteria, for instance, the idea disappears altogether

(though the area of the body in which the symptom appears may
be

governed by the idea), and the affect may be seen as
an excessive innervation (in typical cases a somatic
innervation), sometimes of a sensory, sometimes of a
motor character, either as an excitation or as an
inhibition.
.
Insofar as it is rendered possible
only be .means of extensive substitute formations, the
.

.

repression which takes place in hysteria may be pronounced entirely unsuccessful; with reference to
mastering the charge of affect, however, which is the
task of repression, it generally betokens a complete
success.
It has never been altogether clarified what part the release

of feeling, or "abreaction," will
in the therapeutic process.

play in hypercathexis

,

and therefore

The relationship between abreaction and

insight is of particular interest.

Many of the contemporary therapies

rely almost exclusively on reclamation and expression of feeling, either
as the means to insight or, in the belief that insight is irrelevant,
as ends in themselves.

The humanistic therapies, in all their variety,

tend to share this premium on expression of emotion.

Psychoanalysis
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distinguishes between emotions
which are mature and those
which are
not (the latter being tied
to infantile
drives),

as well as between
modes of expression which have
or have not been mediated
over a developmental process. The analytic
method discourages the expression
of immature, unmediated affect,
in that such expression is
likely to
satisfy the conditions of drive
discharge sufficiently that it will

block rather than enhance insight;
coming under the sway of the

pleasure principle, it reflects

a

wishful attachment to childish

satisfactions and is incompatible with correct
judgment and
of reality.

a

concept

The release of emotion, under these
conditions, is seen

as likely to intensify rather than undo
an early fixation point

precisely by gratifying the impulses behind
the fixation.

Under less

than optimum conditions, the partial undoing
of defenses required for
the release of affect may have

a

distinctly harmful effect, leading

to serious regression or even disintegration
of ego strength.

Psychoanalysis is indeed not clear on the precise relation of
affect and expression to insight; the psychoanalytic method
requires

recollecting archaic feelings and subjecting them to intellectual
scrutiny, rather than "acting them out."
is the

belief— or at least the hope, for

theoretical ly
then be

— that

Underlying this requirement
it is not spelled out

the reclaimed affects and their energic force may

integrated into the adult personality.

analysis can be used as

a

Certainly psycho-

rationalization for maintaining intellectual

defenses at the expense of expressiveness and at the expense of the
body, which must, after all, contain this energy in some manner.

None-
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,

the metapsychology provides

a

conceptual framework in which

to view the tension between intellect
and affect, and in so doing,

provides for the fuller working out of the
relation between the two
in the process of change.

Therapies which celebrate the uncritical

release of feeling may do as much to undermine
change in consciousness as to enhance it.

The highly abstract metapsychol ogical speculations
are to be

viewed now against the richly elaborated developmental
phases of the
libido (see Chapter IV) and the concurrent process of
ego development;
from this admixture

a

much richer and more coherent theory of neurosis

emerges.

Children are protected against the idangers that threaten
them from the external world by the solicitude of their
parents; they pay for this security by a fear of loss of
love which would deliver them over helpless to the dangers
of the external world.
.the child embarks on his attempts
at defence
repression which are effective for the moment
but nevertheless turn out to be psychologically inadequate
when the later re-animation of sexual life brings a reinforcement to the instinctual demands which have been
repudiated in the past.
If this is so, it would have to
be said from a biological standpoint that the ego comes to
grief over the task of mastering the excitation of the
early sexual period, at a time when its immaturity makes it
incompetent to do so.
It is in this lagging of ego development behind libidinal development that we see the essential
precondition of neurosis. 28

—

.

.

—

The revisions in psychoanalysis which come after the metapsychol ogical papers do not fundamentally alter the theory of re-

pression and the unconscious; they will be presented here only in

order to give an over all perspective of the growth of the theory and
also because these changes have at times been misconstrued as

constituting

a

rejection of the central significance and force of the
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unconscious and repression.

The Death Instinct

Beyond the Pleasure Principle entails
of the instincts, and also forms

a

a

major reclassification

central building block of what is

to become Freud's next view of the
organization of the psyche.

Here,

as so often before, the theory was
reworked in order to accommodate

certain phenomena emerging within Freud's
clinical practice. Specifically, Freud sought

a

way to explain the phenomenon of repetition

compulsion, particularly as it occurred in the veterans
of World War
who returned suffering from traumatic nervous

disorders.

I

What, he

asked, could be presumed to account for the compulsion
to return to

experiences which could not in any way be described as affording

pleasure?

Furthermore,

earlier work on narcissism had led him to the

conclusion that both the sexual and ego instincts were libidinal in

origin--that is, they drew their energy from the same source.

They

might often be in conflict, but structurally they were not oppositional.
Hence, some other force had to be postulated in order to maintain the

instinctual dualism at the heart of the dynamic point of view.

The

overarching dualism is now seen as life against death rather than as
a

conflict between the sexual and ego instincts.
This late reclassification of the instincts provides

a

more

coherent ontological theory concerning the primary driving forces of
human motivation, and can account for phenomena which the pleasure

principle cannot.

The new theory represents

explanatory power, yet also leaves

a

a

major step forward in

problematic legacy in its wake,

&
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particularly in its application
to clinical practice
(and through
that indirect connection,
to research and general
theory development).
While the death instinct is
essentially a biological concept,
not

verifiable through psychoanalytic
evidence (or any psychological
evidence for that matter), its
derivative, the destructive drive,
is
a manifest, observable entity.
The death instinct remains highly
controversial within psychoanalytic
circles, but innate destructiveness was a concept which practitioners
were quick to adopt.

(In

general it might be said that the death
instinct and the destructive

drive have both been accepted or rejected
more for their moral implications than on grounds of scientific validity;
this was certainly true
in the area of clinical

practice.)

The old theories could not be directly applied
to the
phenomena; the latter had first to be analyzed, i.e.,
thei r unconscious meaning had to be investigated.
But
classifications such as "erotic" or "destructive" could
be applied directly to the raw material of observation,
without any previous analytic work of distilling and
refining (or with a bare minimum of it):
they could be
applied.
according to physiognomic rather than psychoanalytic criteria, i.e., judging from outward appearance
rather than from the meaning they yield to analytic study.
It is easy to say that a patient is hostile, much easier
than, e.g., the reconstruction of an unconscious fantasy
from transference behavior
[Italics mine]
.

.

.

The trend toward

easy characterizations rather than arduous grappling

with unconscious instinctual material which begins here will be

compounded by the next major revision in analytic theory, the shift
from the systematic to the structural conception of mind.

The Structural Theory
The final theoretical revision of major importance (within the

Ill

scope of this paper, that is-there
is also the later work on
anxiety
which is, in other contexts, extremely
important) is Freud's modulation

of the systematic into the
structural theory.

Here he postulates

three discrete agencies of the mind,
the famous trio id, ego, and
superego.

The agencies are

each seen as having many various
functions,

processes, and qualities, including that
of being conscious or unconscious.
The following quote shows that, by the
time Freud had culminated
his work explicating the unconscious,
the term had ceased to hold the

same significance for him:
It would put an end to all misunderstandings
if, from now
on, in describing the various kinds of mental
acts we
were to pay no attention to whether they were
conscious
or unconscious, but, when classifying and
correlating them,
inquired only to which instincts and aims they were
related
how they were composed and to which of the systems in
the
mind that are superimposed one upon another they belonged 30
.

The systematic conceptualization had been devised primarily
as

a

result

of investigating repressed drives, and the resultant awareness
that

aspects of the ego were unconscious.

From here Freud was led more and

more to explore the agency of repression, and it was this exploration,
coupled with the need to account for exceedingly destructive guilt
feelings in his patients that motivated the shift from the systematic
to the structural

conceptualization.

The structural theory again

represents an impressive step forward in the explanatory power of
psychoanalysi

s

.

For the first time Freud has put forth

a

theory of

the whole person, rather than one that accounts for mental qualities

and events.

In the

earliest years he was entirely preoccupied with
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unconscious processes; during the period that
followed he gradually
turned his attention to consciousness.

Finally the inexplicable

phenomenon of relentless feelings of guilt which
he encountered in
his practice (and had been extremely concerned
with from the time of

the writing of Beyond the Pleasure Principle!
forces him to adopt

vantage point from which he can look at the totality of

a

a

person's

motives.
Freud proposes that personality should be regarded as
habitual mixture of purposes to which human actions
are geared:
satisfying needs of the organism [id],
meeting internalized standards [superego], and relating to
the external world, its demands and opportunities [ego]. 3
a

"!

In

adopting this point of view, it seems almost inevitable that he

will describe the mind in terms of structures--the cumulative and
enduri ng resul ts of a tenuous and only abstractly predictable develop-

ment— rather

than in terms of processes, which are by definition less

grounded in historical context.
The id is described essentially as was the system Ucs.

The

two major changes consist in the addition of the superego, and in the

richness and complexity of the ego as it is now presented.

In The

Ego and the Id

the ego is introduced as a coherent organization of
mental processes (p. 15) which arises from identifications
with abandoned objects (pp. 36 ff.), is organized primarily
around the system perception-conscious (pp. 27-8), but
also includes the structures which are responsible for
resistances and are unconscious (in the same sense as
the Id is, pp. 16-18), has neutral energies at its disposal (pp. 61-63), and can transform the energies of
instinctual drives into energies of its own (pp. 64-5).

The superego is introduced (though it had been hinted at earlier,

generally referred to as the ego ideal, in, for instance, the essay
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On Narcissism") as a separate agency which
had been differentiated

out of the ego and with the specific task
of observing and passing

judgment on the ego.

It is described as the inheritor of the
Oedipus

complex (in the form of parental introjects to enforce
the incest
taboo), and as representing the conscience.
The adoption of the structural theory brought serious
and often

unexamined problems along with its explanatory advances, in much
the
same manner as did the introduction of the death instinct.
structural theory provided another easy way out for

support for offering global characterizations of

a

cl

The

inicians--another

patient's "person-

ality" rather than staying with the tortuous process of investigating

unconscious processes.

It is possible to interpret the structural

theory— in clinical terms— as indicating
ment from expanded self-knowledge to

a

a

shift in the goal of treat-

smoother, more functionally

adaptive relationship among the mental agencies, and between the

patient and his or her social world.

This was not Freud's intention.

His final formulation of the aims of therapeutic treatment— "Where Id

was there Ego shall

be"— clearly locates self-knowledge

at the center

of the process of reducing conflict among the provinces of the mind

and among the varied motives and aims of the total person.
the structural theory provided, for those who wanted it,

set of answers by which to define health than could

a

a

Nonetheless,

more finite

doctrine which

had no answers other than to assert that pursuit of the truth about

oneself counted above all else.
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In the abstract,

then, Freud's theory of personality
(the

relations among id, ego, and superego)
is not normative.

Yet it is

with the introduction of the concept
of personality that even he begins
to generalize about the outcome
of "normal" psychological

adulthood-

ground on which until then he had
feared to tread. Albeit with serious
reservations, he takes the context that
personality theory begins to
provide for viewing the early stages of
libidinal development and

speculates on the differentiation of female
from male personality.
From the very beginning the discussion
is fraught with ambiguity, for
the term personality seems clearly to convey
more than an abstract
set of principles governing the relations
among the mental provinces.

The word rapidly begins to blend its
psychoanalytic with its popular

meaning— and though

::

probably everyone understands what is being re-

ferred to in the notion of "personal ity

offer

a

is both

definition.

,

"

few people could actually

Consequently, Freud is moving in territory that

psychoanalytic and not, with no set of theoretical principles

governing that movement, nor even making those discriminations.
is not at all clear,

It

for instance, on what theoretical grounds he

arrives at the conclusion that because narcissism and masochism are

prevalent psychic phenomena in the little girl's development, they
then enter the mainstream of her adult personality and become

acceptable normative characterizations of her style, mode of perception, object relations, and general orientation toward life.

This process of generalization begins with the shift to the

structural theory:

examination of conscious and unconscious mental
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processes does not lead to distinctions
between the sexes; examination of repressed content may
point up some differences but does
not
suggest a framework within which
to theorize about those differences.

Once one begins to view early development,
and the repressed material
of that early development as being
ultimately intertwined with the

motives, purposes, and aims of the whole
person, concepts such as

masochism, narcissism, and passivity may
be construed to transcend
their meaning as psychic constructs and
attain normative value as they
are generalized into the adult personality.

One does not necessarily

stop at saying that there is a high incidence
of masochistic fantasy
in oedipal

girls; even Freud, against his own cautions

suggest that the
In fact,

goes on to

,

normal" female personality is more masochistic.^
on close scrutiny,

it becomes apparent that the theory

of psychosexual differentiation is built almost entirely
upon the

structural theory.

It is differences in the process of superego for-

mation, in turn dependent upon differences in the oedipal experience
of boys and girls, which lays the groundwork for the alternate pictures
of personality development painted for men and women.

It appeared

that the structural theory finally provided Freud with

a

in which to view the development of the whole person;

lished the links between

a

framework

that it estab-

basic conception of the nature of the

human mind, the phases of libidinal development, and the emergence of
an integrated personality from that developmental

process.

Yet those

who came after Freud lost the links between those facets of psychoanalysis and it remains to be seen whether their error derives in part
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from Freud's legaey-whether
in fact, the connections
Freud made
between psychosexual development
and personality were correct
and
whether those connections are
compatible with his theory of
mind.
How,
indeed, does one generalize from
qualities and processes present in
everyone s psychic development, to
normative presumptions about the
way those processes enter the
mainstream of personality? To what
extent is it possible or theoretically
logical to make those generalizations along the lines of gender?
What theoretical steps are involved
in the process by which Freud
came to a view of the female personality

as passive, narcissistic, and
masochistic, and is that process de-

fensible?

In

what ways have successive generations
drawn upon Freud's

late work to build

rather than

a

a

value-laden psychology of "normal" personal
ity

psychology and

a

clinical method dedicated to the

discovery of truth, whatever it may be?
To explore these questions, the next two
chapters will examine
in detail

which

a

the theory of psychosexual development, and the
manner in

theory of personality was extrapolated from it.

I

will focus

particularly on the Oedipus complex, which is the nucleus of Freud's
theory of personality (and of his notions on moral development, which
are often ambiguously intertwined with gender-linked notions of

personality development), in hopes of making explicit and evaluating the
connection between psychosexual developmental theory and the formulation of

a

theory of personality.

It is the aim of the next two chapters

to disentangle from Freud's own work and the writings which came after

his, material

analytic.

and method which are not, strictly speaking, psycho-

1

CHAPTER

IV

THE THEORY OF PSYCHOSEXUAL DEVELOPMENT

Overview
From the outset, Freud's theory of mind
presumes

of view.

a

genetic point

Because of the lessening of "instinctive," biologically
de-

etermined behavior patterns, human beings are to be viewed
in terms of
how they become who they are.

The components of adult personality

are not inscribed onto the infant psyche, awaiting only
nourishment
and time for maturation.

At every turning point the nonidentity between

internal, psychic reality and external, objective reality will spur
the infant's ego development.

Freud locates infantile sexual drives at

the center of this motivating conflict, and posits a series of

developmental tasks and crises endemic to the concurrent, but not

coincidental, maturation of the ego and the sexual instincts.
The Oedipal conflict is axial among those tasks and crises, and
lays the foundation for the emergence of the adult psyche:

it is a

period during which childhood passion is left behind, gender identity
and sexual orientation are established, the superego is formed,
and the structured and structuring ego as well; for only
then, on the strength of its new identifications and the
desexualized energy now available to it for sublimated
activity, does the ego begin to function as an organized,
independent, and influential agency.
It is also this picture of the different resolution of the Oedipus

Complex in boys and girls, and the impact of that resolution on superego
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development, that provides the
starting point for Freud's
speculations
on female personality.
In order to understand the
explanatory enterprise inherent in

Freud's evocation of the Oedipal
constellation, it is necessary to view
it in the context of his theory
of libidinal

development as

a

whole.

Taken out of that context, concepts
such as penis envy and castration

anxiety indeed become meaningless, or
even foolish.

Critics of Freud

have reworked the Oedipal conflict (or
discarded it) in order to make

childhood development compatible with

a

preferred view of adulthood,

particularly with reference to an assessment
of gender differences,

yet to rewrite the Oedipal complex with an
eye only to what comes
after it and not before is to essentially
eviscerate Freud's conceptual
framework for understanding how men and women come
into being.

Con-

versely, but with the same result, object relations
theorists shift
the emphasis to what comes before (i.e., from Oedipal

to preoedipal

factors), at the expense of accounting for how those early develop-

ments must then be mediated before the person is fully formed.
contrast, psychoanalysi
a

s

poses the question of human sexuality in such

manner as to expose its very roots.
how does a newborn baby, who must certainly not
be credited with having a psychological representation
of his sexual equipment, but who has a bi-sexual psychological potential, develop a psychological identity as a
man or a woman? The question so formulated indicates
immediately that Freud conceived of the process not as
a foregone conclusion, not as the inevitable unfolding
of maturation, but as an active interplay between the
child and varying sequences of external events; hence
a process beset by difficulties whose mastery or mere
endurance determines the type of sexual identification
.

.

In

.

which is ultimately achieved.

1
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In

order to elucidate the criteria by
which to evaluate and

revise Freud's account of the Oedipal
conflict and the gender related

personality traits he presumed to emerge from
its resolution,
first present
It will

a

I

will

summary of his basic notions on libidinal
development.

then be possible to discern in what manner
he saw this crisis

in libidinal

development as contributing to the physical achievements

which are integral to adulthood.
In

following Freud's developmental account it is important
to

remember that by sexuality he means

sensuous strivings, from the

al

very beginnings of life; and that adult sexuality is what it
is only
by virtue of how it comes into being.

Sexual

instincts, as all

instincts, straddle biological and psychological categories-instincts are mental representations of somatic drives.
there is no sexuality that is not psychosexual

libido theory is not pansexual

,

.

For Freud

Furthermore, Freud's

as readers often misconstrue it ot

be because of its emphasis on sexuality.

The importance of sexuality

derives from its conflict with other trends--in the early theory with
the ego instincts and later on with the death instinct.

The complexity

of human life, of "abnormalities" in development, derives from the

necessity of mediating instinctual impulses over

a

long period of time

and through the agency of the immature ego, whose nature and develop-

ment in turn depend on its role in the mediating process.

Sexuality

plays the specific role that it does by virtue of its peculiar qualities-its antiquity, its imperiousness,
mal development or fixations."

its plasticity, and its proneness to

That is, it is present from the earliest

moments, does not tolerate much frustration, readily undergoes trans-
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formation into other psychic trends,
and the transformative
process
has a close connection to
pathological phenomena.

The Erotogenic Zones
As pointed out earlier, Freud
describes the instincts in terms

of impetus, source, aim, and object.

He turns his attention to aim

and object, relegating the study of
source and impetus to biology.

Adult sexuality is

a

synthesis of component, partial instincts—
infantile

eroticizations of parts of the body, along with
the paired instinctual

modalities (each containing an active and

a

passive side:

looking and

being looked at, touching and being touched,
inflicting and accepting
pain.

The paired instincts "exist separate from sexuality
and are

united with it as they are instruments of satisfaction." 4
)

All

of

these components must be integrated into adult sexuality over
the

extended and tenuous developmental process; adult sexual experience
is multi-layered and resonates against infantile satisfactions
and

strivings which have been transcended and subsumed in the final psychosexual organization.

Both the aim and the object of libidinal

strivings are mediated over this long developmental cycle, not

identically or simultaneously, and both are subject to

a

variety of

fixations and developmental failures.
This last point is particularly significant, as the Freudian

account of early ego development relies on an elaboration of aim over
object, and all cultural ist revisions, particularly current object

relations theory, substitute the role of the object as pivotal from the
beginning.

The Freudian viewpoint assumes that no development happens

without objects, but goes on to state that in the beginning the infant
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psychs doss not have

occurs, therefors
aims.

,

a

concspt of ths objsct.

Early sgo development

primarily undsr ths asgis of ths vicissitudss of ssxual

Sines psychoanalysis implicitly locatss ths objsct at ths csntsr

of ths infant's dsvslopmsnt, objsct rslations really adds nothing to
the Freudian account.

By substituting one aspect of psychic develop-

ment for the complex totality, object relations theory offers

a

seriously diminished explanation of the origins of the ego--that which
it is so at pains to establish.

This argument will become clearer as

we trace below the stages of psychosexual and ego development, beginning

with the history of sexual aims, and continuing our examination with

a

look at the changes in the role of the sexual object.

Psychoanalysis views the process of libidinal development through
the concept of an erotogenic zone--the familiar Freudian categories

of oral, anal, phallic, and genital.

(It is through the last two that

the role of the object will truly move into the foregound, as the child

enters the Oedipal conflict.)

Like other popularized aspects of

Freudian psychology, the stages of libidinal organization have been
highly trivialized and they have entered common parlance as

a

rather

simplistic typology.
The erotogenic zones are established through association with
an

important bodily function, for example the mouth via the feeding

process.

The satisfaction of the somatic function is experienced as

pleasurable and an independent need to re-experience that pleasure
sets in.

The sexual

instinct attaches itself to the survival function

distinct from
and then becomes separate from it: the aim is sucking, as
can be
feeding. To underline this point again, though the instinct

5
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gratified only through an object with whom
the Infant is Involved, the
young ego does not know this.
.

.though any instinct can be satisfied only through

.

an external

agency, this initially in no way enters into
the

^presentation of the instinct of the concept under

which the instinct is brought.
Internal representation of an

instinctual object is

a

later psychic

acquisition, achieved through its own slow and primitive
developmental
process.

The fact that early experience and memories will be

psychically reworked in terms of later
identifications with, and intro-

jections of objects, does not alter this truth.
In

a

1915 revision of the Three Essays

,

the theory of the eroto-

genic zones is elaborated under the notion of libidinal organization.
A complex of

factors— fantasies

,

aims, instinctual vicissitudes,

etc.—

are seen as moving through developmental phases under the dominance
of a specific erotogenic zone.

With this relatively late revision of

the libido theory.

sexuality is now neatly characterized as a linear
progression moving through the various pregenital
organizations of the libido— the oral, the anal, the
phallic, in that order— and culminating in the genital
organization.
For any reader with a general acquaintance
with Freud, it must come as something of a shock to learn
how late it was that Freud came to weld together the two
themes which had been with him for many years— the complex
history of human sexuality, and the erotogenic zones
so
that the former could be divided up into stages by reference
to the latter. 6

—

Early Object Relations

How does the object enter into the earliest psychic representations? Initially, as stated above, the infant's psychosexual experience
does not involve an object:

the stage of autoerotism.

The infant

endeavors to satisfy sexual aims through its own body, and perceives

123

them as so satisfied regardless
of the presence of an object.

The

infant subsequently becomes attached
to the person or persons who fulfill vital physiological needs and
are thereby instruments of sexual

gratification as well.

"The first objects of sexual longing,
like

sexuality itself, supervene on the infant's
dependence on the mother
as the source of food and comfort ." 7

This object attachment is quite

primitive in that, again, the ego has no concept
of itself or of an

object but rather experiences itself as if
boundaryless, merged with
the environment. The path to object choice is
therefore slow and

complicated.
Before object choice proper becomes possible the infant will
move
from

autoerotism to

a

phase of primary narcissism.

There is still no

psychic representation of an external object, but the ego begins to
have a concept of itself and to take itself as its own object.

functioning is regulated by the pleasure principle.

Psychic

The primitive

"pleasure ego" perceives all goodness as within the organism, and all
badness or unpleasure as emanating from without.

Though it does not

admit of object choice, narcissism does provide the foundation and

possibility for the first form of object choice— identification

.

It is

only after primary narcissism has been somewhat mediated, when sexual
aims are further evolved and there has been a concomitant development
of the ego in respect to delay, judgment, and general secondary process

functioning, that object choice proper becomes possible.
With weaning and toilet training, the child's developmental
tasks are becoming increasingly social.
on more structured detail:

The phases of the libido take

teething transforms oral incorporative
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sexuality to oral cannibalistic.

Later, concurrent with the exaggeration

of sadistic impulses found during the
dominance of anal sexual aims,
the infant first develops "consideration
for the object."

The "Phallic" Libidinal Organization

Eventually, children enter into the period of
infantile sexuality

which Freud termed "phallic."

The designation is, in and of itself,

problematic-- to use it is to already land oneself in the
midst of the

controversy over Freud's supposed phallocentric bias.

In

the most

straightforward sense, "phallic" implised that the erotogenic zone
under which sexual aims are satisfied during this period is concentrated
in the genital

organs.

Furthermore, during this period, children re-

cognize only one genital organ--the penis.

The first distinction they

make between the sexes is that of phallic vs. castrated.

However, the

assumptions which underlie Freud's notion of "phallic primacy" and
therefore his assessment of clitoral and vaginal sexuality have almost
impossibly entangled implications, particularly as he revises the libido
theory and the Oedipus complex in accordance with the structural theory
of mind and begins to speculate on male and female personality.
The important characteri stic of libido in Freud's phallic stage
is that its aims are satisfied through highly "active"

sexuality.

Freud appears at this point to begin equating masculine with active
and feminine with passive, despite the fact that he has explicitly

warned against making this assumption.
One might consider characterizing femininity psychologically
This is not, of course,
as giving preference to passive aims.
It
is perhaps the case that
the same things as passivity.
.

.

.

8

9
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in a woman, on the basis
of her share in the
06 tor P assive behavior is
carried over into her
1 751
9 9 e t r
r lesser extent, in
^°
proportion to the
limitc
+
!
estncted
-

or tar-reaching within which
her sexual
ife thus£ serves as a model.
But we must beware in this of
1 "
9 the lnfluence of social customs, which
simi
l'aHv’^fn
lmilarly
force women into passive situations.
All this is
still far from being cleared up.
In

choosing to name this period of the
emergence of active

sexuality by

a

term commonly associated with the
masculine genital organ,

Freud ignores his own caveat.
will

His equation of active with masculine

have serious consequences for his assessment
of gender differences.
Until entry into the phallic phase, the
development of the boy

and girl are seen as identical -sexual aims
up to this point will not

have made a contribution to the ego's concept
of itself as gendered.

And this is so not because the male mouth is
interchangeable
with the female mouth, or the male anus interchangeable
with the female anus, or the male phallus, i.e.,
penis,
interchangeable with the female phallus, i.e., clitoris—
which is anyhow obviously not true— but because through
all three phases the function of the dominant
organ is
represented in the same way in the two sexes.

Because of Freud's implicit, and by his own terms mistaken, equation of

masculine with active, he sees that identity not as neutral --boys and
girls are alike— but as skewed— girls are like boys.

Lample-de Groot,

10

Following Jeanne

when he takes the position that male and female

development do not progress through the Oedipus complex as simple mirror
opposites, he adopts the notion that "the little girl is

a

little man." 11

The implications of this theoretical position and its problems for

Freud's developmental account will be spelled out below.

For immediate

purposes, it is important to maintain some distinction between what
Freud has to say about the development of sexual aims at this stage,
and the valuations that his terminology may be seen to assign.
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In

the debate over the connotative—
and even the denotative-

implications of the term "phallic," the
significance of this developmental period is often obscured.

Since the Oedipal period is so much

concerned with object relations, it is easy
to lose sight of questions

pertaining to sexual aim.

The debate focuses on aim only long enough

to argue whether or not "phallic" is
adequate to describe female as

well as male experience-and at that,
attempts to answer the question

often fail on grounds that have little to do
with the vicissitudes of
sexual aims.

Hence the internal relation between the evolution of

sexual aims and object relations is lost.

As

a

result, revisionist

theories eliminate the biological substratum from their
account—
they efface the sexual component of "psychosexual

complex then becomes

a

purely social phenomenon.

.

"

The Oedipus

Marcuse was an early

critic of this trend:

... The Oedipus wish is the eternal infantile desire
for the archetype of freedom— freedom from want.
if
the child desired only impermissible security and not
impermissible pleasure, the Oedipus complex would indeed
represent an essentially educational problem. As such it
can be treated without exposing the instinctual danger
zones of society. 12
.

The criticism is not merely academic.

.

Freud has constructed

a

paradigm wherein psychosexual development moves forward of necessity
through its own internal tensions as they interact with social factors,
and in so doing acts as catalyst to the developing ego.

A depiction of

phallic or Oedipal development which relies solely on social and
relational factors, to the exclusion of the child's own urgent sexual
aims, cannot account for the forward

movement of sexuality nor for the

necessity of the ego's attaining its new synthesizing capacities.

3
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The resolution of

object relations.
sexuality.
the child

the Oedipal crisis is very much

story of

The phallic period represents the peak of
infantile

Though the end result will be
s

a

a

radical transformation of

object relations, it is important to remember that in
the

Freudian paradigm these changes are initiated at the behest
of new
instinctual urgings, and not vice versa.

It is the attempt to satisfy

phallic sexual aims--impulses which will grow increasingly threatening
in the child s object world--that brings the child into
a crisis in

social relations.

The Oedipus complex will confront the child inevitably

with the fact of gender difference; the need to assign meaning to

morphological sex difference occurs in the context of that crisis in
social relations and its resolution will make the most substantial

contribution to the development in the ego of the concept of gender.

The Oedipus Complex
The story is by now familiar even to lay people, and certainly
to students and scholars of Freud, though again it is never safe to

assume that the concepts have been grasped in the context of Freud's

explanatory enterprise as

a

whole.

Writers on the subject seem often

not to remember, for example, that it is infantile sexuality that is in

question in Oedipal fantasies,

1

and that the phenomenon in its

totality happens largely unconsciously

.

There are critics who point-

lessly argue that they don't remember thinking any such thing.

There

are apologists who are at pains to defend childhood Oedipal theories as

plausible, when in fact unconscious fantasies need not be held accountable to the criterion of plausibility.

For theoretical purposes they

need only be demonstrated as universally or inevitably occurring:

if
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they help to make sense of human sexual
development they need not, as
it were,

"make sense."

The first task, then, is to recapitulate here the
Oedipal drama
as Freud described it for the girl

and boy.

Following that it will be

possible to arrive at an understanding of what aspects of
development
he is purporting to account for and how he uses the
Oedipal conflict
as an explanatory device.

where it

is

In so doing we may be able to begin to see

possible to separate the specific content that he imparts

to the Oedipus complex from its abstract role in the developmental

schema.
The boy moves gradually from the anal libidinal organization into
the phallic, as he becomes increasingly preoccupied (via fantasy and

masturbation) with his penis as an organ of pleasure.

His sexual

needs of the mother intensify with this more active sexuality and he

becomes jealous and possessive.
"For the small boy the penis as a source of pleasure becomes
a

highly valued possession."

14

With his curiosity and attention

turned toward this valued possession he is bound to make the discovery
that some people--including his mother and sisters--do not have one.
Thus the phallic libidinal organization instigates two phenomena:

a

jealous and possessive object relationship with the mother, and the

discovery of morphological sex differences.

These two dramatic

psychical events occur more or less simultaneously, and inevitably

become intertwined in meaning:

how one stands in relation to desired

objects has something to do with which sex one is, and that is de-

termined (at least in some major part) by which kind of genital organ
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one possesses.

(In Freud's view it is
determined more simply by whether

or not one has a penis.

There is as yet no clinical
evidence on fantasi

for either sex regarding the
absence, in boys, of a vagina or
clitoris,
though it is difficult to say what
the failure to collect such data

may mean.

Regardless of the possible existence
of fantasies, it is my

contention, argued below, that the
absent penis will make its own impact
on children of both sexes.)

integral

Because jealousy

and possessiveness are

to this stage of ego differentiation,
it seems inevitable that

some form of evaluation will be attached
to sex differences.

not to imply

a

This is

specific extent to which jealousy figures into
Oedipal

conflict, nor that the evaluations that currently
seem to hold sway are

universal, nor that the specific gender roles that
at present form
the backdrop for the child's assessments need
enter into the valuing

system in the way that they now do.

The Freudian model does assert,

however, that all of these are crucial ingredients of the
Oedipal
crisis:

jealousy, possessiveness, the discovery of gender differences

and the attempt to give meaning to those differences.
It is no doubt true that the Oedipal

constellation would take

on different contours and possibilities for resolution if we were to

alter our typical family structure

— for

instance if fathers were to

assume primary caretaking responsibilities.

However, the child's

Oedipal preoccupation with gender difference and with mother vs.

father is not historically constituted— i
alteration of typical sex-roles.

t

cannot be undone by an

Though it is not possible from this

vantage point to gauge what part role expectations play in the concept
of gender identity, it is certainly the case that, at the very least,
the Oedipal child sees role in reproduction as an essential element.
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The questions

'Who am

in my masculinity?/Who am

I

I

in my femininity?'

are answered partly in relation to the
questions, who is mother?/

who is father?/ How do

I

stand in relation to the two of them?' And

though some of the Oedipal triangle can be
reduced to mother vs. non-

mother rather than mother vs. father (hence
female vs. male), it
remains the case that a preoccupation with sex
difference is becoming

paramount because it bears so importantly on the dominant
organ of
pleasure.

If we also remember that the ego develops along
bodily

concepts, then we must understand that the little boy is highly

identified with and narcissistically invested in his penis.
For the child, then, sexual difference is something
other than a mere anatomical fact:
it is a profound
enigma that leads it to radically question and restructure its life. The fact of sexual difference
confronts the child with a radical lack in what had
hitherto been the self-sufficiency of its phallic
narcissism .* 5

Each child must learn this lesson for him or herself.

And at this

juncture it is impossible to guess whether the tasks set before the
ego in respect to gender difference would be more or less complicated
for a child raised in a setting other than the traditional nuclear

family J

6

As Freud said, "Childish love has no bounds but also no aim.
is doomed to

disappointment."^

It

The boy may increasingly desire

sensual/sexual contact with his mother and it may be of

a

"phallic"

(active) nature, but he does not desire nor is he capable of a

mature sexual relationship.

He is trapped in the seemingly ubiquitous

contradiction that ensues from having an intensely sexual constitution
from birth which then takes twelve years or so to achieve maturity
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(that is, to achieve expression
through fully integrated sexual
aims
and within a developed, whole-object
relationship). As Freud said.
It is my belief that, however
strange it may sound

we
that southing 7n’the
Jr iebe itself is unfavorable to the
realization of complete satisfaction 18

nat,i
nature of the

.

During the Oedipal period the boy is
brought face to face with this
fact of human existence as he accepts
the truth of his sexual incomplete-

ness/inadequacy and is forced to relinquish
sole ownership of the

object of his sexual desires.
What he believes then, is that those who do
not possess
did so once and had it taken away.

He fears that he will

a

penis

suffer the

same fate (castration anxiety) and his fear is
intensified by his own

projected destructive fantasies.

To safeguard his valued organ of

pleasure, he must abandon his hostile competitive feelings
toward his

father as rival and begin to turn to him as the stronger,
"the better
protector.

19

By identifying with the father he not only gets to keep

his penis, in the bargain he is also permitted to retain some
object

attachment to his mother, though clearly not on the same terms as
before.
It seems possible that one of Freud's serious errors in the

account he gives of male development is to overestimate the thoroughness of the boy's renunciation of this, his first, most passionate

attachment.

In

the later revisions of psychoanalysis Freud further

exaggerates this when he incorporates his account of the boy’s Oedipal
resol ution into his theory of supergo formation.

castration anxiety as so overwhelming

a

Freud now describes

force in the young boy's life
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that his Oedpius complex
is

not simply repressed, it is
literally smashed to
b
th<
shock of threatened castration.
Its
fihid? i 03 r,
abandoned ’ desexualized and in
part
d
re lncor Porated into the
°? ject
ego where
thev
°f
Sup
eg ° and ° ive that new
structure its cha^t
h
acteristlc ^^ties.
In normal, or
it
b tt r ^
t0 Say ’ ld ® al cases
the
>
Oedipus
complex
P^ictc
x sts no ?
longer, even in the unconscious;
the
superp
ego becomes its heir. 20

V

^

^ r

Since the fear of his father is
based partly on

his own projected

hostile feelings which the boy
then perceives as directed back
toward
himself, the superego is often far
more stringent than parental standards might warrant. The boy
binds his aggression against the
father
by turning it inward toward himself.
As Jahoda points out, the castration
complex

has.

led to "the

resolution of that part of the Oedipal
complex which produces hostility
to the father.

1,21
.

.

hostile feelings toward

Nowhere does Freud discuss what becomes
of
the mother for having frustrated or
disappointed

the boy, nor even for her role as rival

(the negative Oedipus complex).

for the father’s affections

It seems almost inescapable that some

of what we see as enormous ambivalence on the
part of men toward
women, and particularly the hostility expressed in
exploitation and

devaluation, must find its roots in the only partial
resolution of the
boy's Oedipal feel ings— that which Freud thinks has
totally "dissolved."
It cannot be a simple

matter for the child to abandon his fantasies

of mother as omnipotent and come to see her as inferior; on the most
basic level he has been so deeply identified with her that it is

blow to his own narcissism to see her as weak and inferior.

a

If indeed

he makes restitution for that narcissistic blow by transferring his
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;giance to his father, still

mo

ler as an

br

cen.

of

i

bo
is

masculine identity may be somewhat clear, but the
fate of the
identification with his mother--the mother/female in
himself—

s

lurky at best.

fr

i

se

;e

id

th

all-powerful figure can be so swiftly and so
cleanly

The path to identification with the father
and the acquisition

In

th

it seems unlikely that the tie
to the

a

Freud

s

account, then, the following accomplishments emerge

'successful' resolution of the Oedipus complex in boys:

a

of masculine identity (though as stated above, this may be
at

expense of total ego development, if, as

I

surmise, the masculine

itifi cation entails thenceforth splitting off female elements from

ego); heterosexual orientation;

a

strong superego (though Freud

so

itimes describes it as strong and at other times as overly harsh

in

iuch a way as to ultimately undermine the morality which it endeavors

to

jphold); the abandonment of childish passionate but unsatisfiable love

fo

the mother.

And the little girl?
wa

As indicated earlier, Freud's original view

that female development exactly paralleled male--she felt toward

fa

ler precisely as he did in relation to mother.

re

)rt of two instances of a negative Oedipal

pa

iionate attachment to the mother and sense of rivalry with the father-

ca

;ed him to revise that view,

ex

laining the shift of the girl's attachment from mother to father,

an

22

Lampl-de Groot's

complex in women--a

and left him with the problem of

of her sexuality from active (clitoral) to passive (vaginal).

(It

me

its underscoring from the outset that the first of these two is a

qu

stion which any revised account also must address.)

134

As we recall, development up until

identical for the boy and girl.

the phallic period has been

Even to the extent that they may have

been treated differently, that does not
yet enter their internal self-

representation as gender difference; the ego is
ungendered.

The

girl enters the phallic period under the
dominance of clitoral

sensa-

tion. Through her preoccupation with this organ
(again, expressed

through fantasy and masturbation) she will discover, as
did he, that

what boys have is different— visible, manipulate, "bigger
and within
her concrete, perception-bound cognitive limits, better for
all she
„23
knows."
She, too, must come up with an explanation for the difference
and is also likely, in the process, to view the difference in terms of

comparative value.

We can only guess (beyond the data available from

clinical sources) by what criteria the boy and girl make their evaluations.

Differences in size, position in urination

,

whom it makes

you like and from whom it sets you apart as being different, are all

possible ingredients.
that the little girl

Freud says, and not altogether convincingly,
"makes her decision in

a

flash

."

24

Culturalist

accounts, on the other hand, assert that it is the child's perception
of male social privilege, based on differences in role, which leads
both boys and girls to assess maleness as superior.

Though the

culturalist account falls short for the reasons that it always falls

short—that it depicts the process

as unidirectional, with no active

participation or mediation on the part of the child; that it fails to
explain in the first place why culture is the way it is, and has,
in

this instance, granted privileged roles to men and not

the question remains a thorny one.

women— still

Neither theory has much to say

.

135

about what might constitute the
components of self-concept.

might gender role play in

a

What part

total concept of gender identity?;
what

part of a general sense of identity is
constituted by gender?; what
part by role?

The culturalist point of view would
seem to imply that

gender identity is totally constituted by
role, and all but equates
identity with gender identity.

While psychoanalysis would assert that

gender identity is but one aspect of total ego
functioning, Freud is
ambiguous on the question of what part it plays.

He never makes a

clear distinction between gender identity and gender
role, despite
the fact that role considerations clearly enter into
his thinking,

particularly regarding woman's role as childbearer (which in turn he
does not distinguish from child rearer

However, you choose to read it, the clinical evidence indicates
that the young girl emerges from her confrontation with gender

difference with

a

sense of herself as inferior.

Drawing restitution

for this narcissistic wound from the knowledge that she is, after all,

more "like" mother than her brother is, is not altogether to the point.
At this stage what she wants is not so much to be like mother as to
possess mother.

In

that regard, the identification with mother that

forms part of the resolution of the girl's Oedipus complex may imply

regression to earlier defenses based on an ego structure still more
prone to psychic boundarylessness and merger.
is

The point

I

am making

different from Freud's suggestion in his later years (much emphasized

by other theorists, orthodox and revisionist alike) that the girl

never altogether leaves her preoedipal object relational world.

I

am

proposing, rather, that the dimensions of her struggle with phallic.
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active sexuality within the context of
the Oedipal complex tend to
force her to abandon her path forward
and regress back to preoedipal

identification with mother.

One way, albeit

more primitive way, to

a

have mother is to be like her, to internalize
her.
The traditional account calls for the little
girl

her affectionate and sexual ties to her mother.

to abandon

She blames her

penisless mother for her own missing organ, and from
then on her

relationship with her will be characterized by ambivalence
and
hotility.

While the castration complex signifies the end of the
Oedipal

complex for boys, it ushers it in for girls.

Up until

been passionately and exclusively attached to mother.

now, she has
It is the

discovery of morphological sex differences that will draw her into
the inevitable triangle, involving her with her father and setting
her
up in rivalry with her mother. "In contrast to the boy where oedipal

attachment to the mother precedes the castration complex, her
passionate oedipal attachment follows the 'discovery' of her castration and the accompanying feelings of envy and resentment against her

fate as a female."
girl

What emerges from the castration trauma for the

is penis envy, and it is out of this envy that she turns to her

father.

First she seeks her father's penis for herself, and sub-

sequently this changes into the ("passive") desire for
that will substitute for the missing penis.

In

a

baby by him

order to accomplish

this shift to her father as object choice she must identify with her

underprivileged mother (though she feels ambivalent and resentful
toward

her, and though identification with mother at this point may

involve regression rather than resolution) and abandon her object
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attachment to her.

Clearly

far more complicated situation than that

a

which faces the boy--which makes, in the end, for poorer odds at

a

good resolution.
Because, Freud continues, women have so much less to lose, they
do not develop as strong a superego as do men.
In girls, the motive for the demolition of the Oedipus
complex is lacking.
Thus the Oedipus complex
escapes the fate which it meets with in boys:
it may be
slowly abandoned or dealt with by repression, or its
effects may persist far into women's normal mental life.
.

.

b

From this assumption, along with Freud's belief in the prevalence of

envy in the girl's early experience, he deduces an interlocking set
of characteristics that must develop in her "personality."
be more narcissistic, over-compensating for her genital

She will

inferiority.

She will have less sense of justice, owing to the interference of her

envious feelings.

Because of her more poorly developed superego she

will be intellectually weaker (having less capacity for distance and

objectivity), develop less of

a

tendency to sublimation, and be less

concerned with social issues and matters of principle.

The package,

as it evolves for women, is based on three interrelated mental

trends

—

passivity, masochism, and narcissism.
It is around this catalog of derogatory personality character-

istics that the debate over Freud's theories on women will center.

Over time theorists and critics have become concerned not with the
which
nature of the female Oedipal experience but with the personality

presumably must result from its resolution.

And this despite the fact

between the
that the theoretical constructs regarding the relationship

personality are
components of the Oedipal complex and the formation of
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vague and often contradictory.

In hopes of

clearing away some of the

resulting confusion and obscurity,
let us go back and take

a critical

look at what Freud has to say
about the vicissitudes of sexual
aims
and object choice during this
developmental phase.
If, in the next

chapter, we endeavor to discern what
in Freud's Oedipal account is
not essential or inevitable, it
remains here for us to isolate that

which is universal and therefore must
be retained in any alternative
account.

To do this we must once again focus
on sexual aims as they

evolve during the stage of phallic sexuality.

A Critical

Review

discussing the transformation of sexual aims during
the

In

Oedipal period we must ask how the phallic libidinal
organization is

transcended and subsumed in the genital organization.
is

Though there

agreement on little else, there seems to be consensus on the
fact that

this transformation entails

by objects:

exclusive.

a

rather momentous change in the role played

autoerotism and genital sexuality proper are mutually
If we hold to the view that it is the urgency of sexual

aims that will provoke

a

reorganization of object relationships and

not the reverse, can we accept Freud's account of the manner in which
this happens?

Karen Horney was the first to say no,
in this by Ernest Jones

28

07

and she was supported

and in part by Otto Fenichel

29
.

What she

takes issue with, in her earliest essay, is the notion of phallic

primacy ,i

.e.

,

that the little girl

strivings and therefore requires

a

is

essentially masculine in her

dramatic psychic motivation for the
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shift from mother to father and
active to passive sexuality.

Horney
contends, contra Freud, that no
explanation is required for that
transition,
female sexuality has its own
counterpart to the innate
heterosexuality she incorrectly
perceives Freud as ascribing to
boys.
In her

account, the girl turns to her
father out of innate heterosexual
strivings spurred by early vaginal
sensations. As critics of Horney
have pointed out,
her position is far more biologistic
than Freud's.
She endeavors to equalize what she
believes is an asymmetry in Freud's

description of the differences between
male and female development.

Misreading his description of the boy's
somewhat more straightforward
path to genital heterosexuality, she
reduces it to

developmental pattern, rather than

a

a

biologically fixed

hard won and probably only

partially successful psychical achievement; then
she endeavors to offer
the same account for the girl.

She is positing that woman as well as

man is born and not made, whereas Freud had asserted
the opposite for
both.

Moreover, as Nancy Chodorow points out
the Horney-Uones-Klein account does not follow what I
take to be a fundamental rule of psychoanalytic evidence,
that it comes out of clinical experience.
It relies on a
biological hypothesis of natural heterosexual drives which
psychoanalysts have no way of testing or supporting with
clinical or observational methods, and it has no explanation for how or why these drives should come to the fore
when they are claimed to do so 31 [ Italics mine.]
.

.

.

.

The little boy is not innately heterosexual, he is, perhaps

circumstantially, matri sexual --and so is the little girl.
open question how mutable that circumstance is.

It is an

Until very recently,

early as well as extended childcare was inevitably provided exclusively
by women.

There is as yet only speculation

and not clinical

research
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on the possibility and
implications of altering, at any point
in the

child's development, our system of
unilateral female parenting.

At

present it is impossible to predict
what impact such changes in the
child s early object world would make
on the content of Oedipal
fantasies or the opportunities for varied Oedipal
resolutions.

must be reiterated,

It

however, that these considerations can in no way

obviate the fundamental tasks of the Oedipal period—
including the

attainment of

a

sense of gender identity and sexual orientation.

Re-

arranging the personnel in the Oedipal triangle, whether that means
men as primary parents or couples that are homosexual,

does not alter

the fact that sexuality is a psychological achievement— the integration

of psychic and somatic experience— and not
For all

a

biological fact.

the flaws in Horney's alternative, her concerns stand

to be reckoned with.

As Chodorow explains

In Freud's account a girl /woman never does come to be
heterosexual, that is to want heterosexual intercourse
for itself.
She first wants a penis narci ssistically
(as her own body organ), turns
to her father (develops
a heterosexual orientation) because he will give her one,
and then comes to want a baby from him as an alternate
narcissistic extension (substitute for the penis she can
never have).
Nowhere in this account does she want sex
for anything except reproduction and the restitution of
her narcissistic wound. 33
In

other words, following her resolution of the Oedipal conflict, the

little girl has no explicitly sexual aims.

desire for

a

It is only through her

baby as substitute for the missing penis, and not because

it is initiated by her developing phallic sexual aims,
to the vaginal

"that she attends

sensations that are stirring and forms the sexual aim of

being penetrated."

As Wollheim points out, this roundabout account
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of penis envy leading to vaginal
(passive/masochistic) sexuality is
hardly consistent with Freud's
paradigm of psychosexual development.
While Freud's account explains
how such a thing might come
about, and
may even be an accurate description
of many women, contemporary as
well
as Victorian, it is hardly
plausible (given his own understanding
of
the importance of sexuality) as
an ideal picture of the nature
of

female sexuality.
The question has not been dealt with
to this day.
later work abandons this line of inquiry
in favor of
1

st critique of the Freudian libido theory.

a

Horney's

general cultural-

The point was debated in

analytic circles 35 from 1924 until the mid
1930's, when Freud, with
the help of Helene Deutsch 36 and Lampl-de
Groot, appears to have

successfully quashed the entire question.

When the controversy is

revived years later, the entire question of the
outcome of female
sexual aims appears to be lost beneath the furor
over object relations

and the nature of female ego development and personality.

No one has re-

surfaced the issue of how she thenceforth goes about attaining
satisfaction for her sexual aims.

Freud has subsumed her sexual aims (which

he describes as essentially passive) under her "passive personality."

Astonishingly, he has given narcissistic restitution priority over
sexual gratification.

The little boy makes

a

painful bargain to

protect himself from narcissistic danger (castration), but he does not

altogether abandon his sexuality.
developmental path as entailing

a

Freud depicts the girl's ideal
total

tion of sexuality for its own sake.

sacrifice,

a

thorough renuncia-
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Yet abandoning phallic primacy is
an altogether problematic

solution to the enigma of female sexuality.

Freud's insistence on those

interpretive elements which he derived
from his notion of phallic
primacy and then wove into

a

picture of female personality may indeed

represent "the most dogmatic stand of his
37
career ."

Certainly he

is on shakier ground here in terms
of reliable psychoanalytic evidence;

certainly his logic is less persuasive, and his
theoretical approach
less consistent with psychoanalytic principles.

Yet on the other hand

Is one simply to forget that Freud
increasingly stressed
the importance of phallic primacv to his theory in
spite of
the criticism of his followers? If one is not
inclined
either to forget the constancy with which Freud maintained
this position or to explain it away as one more example
of
authori tari an , patriarchal rigidity or male chauvinism, then
perhaps it deserves renewed consideration.

What is at issue is important.
If one denies phallic
primacy then it seems one must also deny— or radically
revise, as Jones attempted to do— the theory of the
castration complex. But in that case what remains of the
Oedipus complex? Can it still function as the principal
underpinning of psychoanalytic theory ? 38
Thus if we concede that the Oedipus complex is

a

universal and

necessary experience in child development, then we must also be willing
to concede that the

role for both sexes.

phallus— and castration threat-play some central
Though we may not agree with Freud's conclusions

regarding the impact of castration anxiety on girls (or on boys for
that matter), the psychoanalytic account of psychosexual development

requires us to reckon with the fact that the girl's discovery of her
lack of penis is an integral component of her sexuality.

Castration poses essentially the same question to men and
to women.
It is the absent phallus that secretly and multifariously haunts our desires for power and dependence and
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implies that we, men and women alike, are
fundamentally
in question in ways that are the same
as well as different. 39
If we abandon

the psychoanalytic paradigm, and with it the
Oedipus

complex, then in essence we are left with no theoretical
framework
that can make sense of human sexuality at all, certainly
not of the

development of sexual identity and sexual orientation.

Jahoda under-

scores for us the unique and radical nature of Freud's perspective:
His model of psychological sex differentiation in childhood, however, is on a different plane, precisely because its
major premise is a-historical , namely the coexistence in
the early years of a human being of a vast repertoire of
emotion with a limited scope of cognitive ability.
.In
addition, the categories of thought which Freud brings to
bear on this situation are important whatever the historical
situation. What are these categories?
.

.

First there is the recognition of the fundamental unity
of body and mind:
the discovery of ones own body which
inevitably has different results for each sex and leads
to concept and theory formation in the child.
Second
passion, tamed and untamed, is the subject of his
thought, not stimulus and response. 40
.

.

.

.

.

It is striking that for women Freud ceases to locate passion at

the center of his questioning.

Freud's surprising lack of curiosity

extended beyond his easy acceptance of the girl's renunciation of her
mother, and of her immediate devaluation of her genital organ; it is
most dramatically at work in his easy acceptance of her renunciation
of clitoral, active sexuality.

If he asks too few questions about the

impact of castration anxiety and penis envy on her assessment of her
own worth and her relation to her mother, he asks no questions at all

about their impact on her active sexual strivings.
If we do not cut off the line of questioning where Freud did,

then a whole new realm of sexual devlopment opens up for exploration.
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particularly with regard to
mother/son and father/daughter
object
relations. We have already seen
what may result from excluding
maternal
contributions to male ego development;
if the father's contribution
to
female sexual and ego development
is not merely as conduit
to vaginal
sexuality, then what role might
he play?

What have been the conse-

quences to female development of
fathers not having been allowed
full

a

role in their daughters' development?;
of daughters feeling

compelled to deny identifications, other
than envious ones, with their
fathers?
An alternate account of female
psychosexual development requires
us not so much to challenge the notion
of phallic primacy, but to ex-

plore more rigorously the fate of the little
girl's phallic sexuality,
in

particular clitoral sexual

i

ty— to

fill

out in greater detail the

story of her active sexuality's traumatic encounter
with the fantasy
that she lacks the proper organ to express and
fulfill that sexuality.

And if an alternate account also creates the need for

a

new set of

hypotheses regarding men and women's attainment of the desire
and

capacity for parenting, so much the better, for the old account
could
hardly be said to do justice to that most central of human experiences.

CHAPTER

V

PERSONALITY THEORY AND FEMALE PSYCHOLOGY

Overview
We have seen how psychoanalysis slowly evolved from

a

theory

which could account for mental qualities into one which endeavored
to grasp the total

person.

The theory developed through the two

interrelated sources of its own internal inadequacies and problems
clinical practice.

in

Research on narcissism, guilt, aggression,

repetition compulsion,

and the properties of neurosis beyond its

symptoms, led Freud not only to give increased weight to the ego in
his later writings, but also to locate the ego within a more complex

mental organization, serving both the id and the superego.

The

relations among these three agencies of the mind--how one deals with
biological needs, the

world, and one's 'conscience '--are the in-

gredients for Freud's concept of personality.
Over the same extended period of time, Freud elaborated the

picture of human sexuality, and ultimately integrated

variety of

a

themes--sexual development, object choice, and gender identity— into
his conception of the adult personality.

The need for

a

theoretical

vantage point on the whole person may seem quite obvious from where we
now stand, but the pieces of this puzzle came together quite slowly,
with extensive revisions along the way.

It was very late in the

history of psychoanalysis before Freud fully understood that it was
145
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necessary to relate the consciousor unconscious-ness of mental
events to the complex aims,
motives, purposes, and needs of
the person
within his or her environmental
context.
The increased importance of
the ego combined with other
factors
to dramatically change the
face of psychoanalytic theory
and practice

after Freud's death.

Ego psychology has come to d
minate the

theoretical scene, while traditional
analysis of neurotic symptoms
gave way to analysis of 'character.*
Both of these developments are drawn

from trends in Freud's late work and
some of the problems in current
usage can be traced to ambiguities and
inconsistencies in Freud's

theoretical writings on these subjects.

His work on personality is

fragmentary at best, and not always compatible
with his own explanatory framework.

Since Freud did not fully integrate these later

formulations with the main body of his theory, there
was more opportunity
for error on the part of those who followed him.

In

some cases, those

who attempted to document subject matter that Freud had
only begun to

explore were taken as speaking for Freud himself.

(Helene Deutsch's

writings on female psychology, for example, are largely responsible
for the popularization of Freudian views on "femininity" in this

country.
In

is an

essence, the focus on observable, conscious factors, which

inevitable concomitant of ego psychology, almost invites

reductionists stance (though it certainly doesn't necessitate

a

it).

If

one seeks an escape from that which Freud always knew was most radical
and threatening in psychoanalysis

— the

unconscious mind and the libido

theory--one can more easily find it after the introduction of the
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concept of personality.

It becomes possible to
hold on to physiognomic

descriptions and explanations
without reference to hidden
psychic
determinants; since one still comes
up with a picture of the
psyche
that is familiarly human, in
the sense that we can recognize
ourselves
in such descriptions, it
is tempting to do away with
levels of

explanation that are more difficult
and more unpleasant. It is possible
for instance, to recognize oneself
as obsessed with guilt, to
explore
what that feels like, and to discover
how that might serve some
"neurotic" purpose, without then tying
that sense of guilt to its
instinctual underpinnings.

In

theory and in practice, hypotheses-

certainly interpretations-regarding the
ego are easier and more comfortable.

They refer to that which feels familiar and
to what we are

used to recognizing as constitutive of our
humanity.

To the extent

that such hypotheses or interpretations touch on
unconscious material,

thatmaterial is likely to be less repressed, less alien
to integrated
ego functioning, than interpretations that touch on id
impulses.^

Yet Freud

s

theory clearly specifies that the ego must be seen

against the backdrop of the vicissitudes of psychosexual development
if it is to remain a meaningful construct.

It is not possible to

sustain the dynamic theory of mind unless the ego is drawn in relation
to

instinctual forces, and, in turn, the superego is seen as closely

tied to the id.

By what path, then, has personality come to be

increasingly equated with ego?

And what are the consequences of this

distortion for our current reading and application of Freud's notion
of female psychology?

t

.
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Personality and Character
Two separate trends in Freud's
work were drawn on as the shift

was made from symptom neurosis and
a focus on unconscious phenomena
to character neurosis and psyche as
defined by ego functions:

the

structural theory with its concept of
personality and psychoanalytic

characterology
(C harakter )

.

"Personality"

(

Personl ichkei

and "character"

)

are not well defined terms even in Freud's
own work, and

they are far less well articulated as currently
used.

Freud himself

only intermittently distinguished between the
two conceptually, 3
it seems that they have come to be used almost
interchangeably.

and
Not

only have they merged into one hazy, undefined concept,
but their
common, popular meanings have colored the position they occupy
in

psychological theory and practice.

flattening out and

a

The result has been both

distortion of the notion of personality.

a

For

where personality would appear to imply dynamic relations among the
agencies of the mind, character is more purely

a

function of the ego;

and the moral connotations of character have little, if any, place in

psychoanalysis
Freud introduced characterology in his 1908 essay "Character
and Anal

Erotism."

In

this paper he begins to discuss the manner in

which defenses against instinctual impulse become chronic and are

thereby integrated into the overall structure and nature of the ego.

Contained in this idea is the foundation for

a

typology of character

with reference to the particular instinctual impulse being defended

against--oral

,

anal, phallic.

"
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As the instinct theory is deepened
and expanded, the typology

takes on some of the richness of the complex
libidinal organizations,

with their typical modes of defense as well
as developmental^ specific
instinctual impulses.

enormously useful:

For Freud, however, typologies were never

they are far too simplistic to encompass the

infinite variety of forms which he encountered. "Types
are crude
pictures.

.

.

easily drawn, invariably overlapping and difficult to

prove or disprove

." 4

It is

in some respects difficult to understand

why the oral-anal-phallic typology has captured the lay public's
interest to the extent that it has, since, taken separately from the
rest of psychoanalytic theory, it becomes

a

somewhat flat, unimaginative

screen through which to view one's history.

As such, it is also

rather unpersuasive, which may account for some of the scorn to which

psychoanalysis is sometimes subjected.
the notion of

a

Regardless of its limitations,

"character type" has become

current diagnostic practice.

5

a

central component of

The "types" have by now vastly pro-

liferated (besides oral, anal and phallic there are passive, compulsive,

hysterical, schizoid--virtually limitless "types"), and "type" has
become

a

designation of both personality and character.

"organization of these types into

a

Yet ultimately,

meaningful classification has

remained elusive.
While the construction of diagnostic typologies is certainly

influenced by Freud's early work on characterology

,

it is more directly

7

connected to his later usage of the term .'

Within the context of his

clinical practice, he came to be increasingly concerned with character
as an aspect of resistance to treatment, that is, with

'character
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defenses.’

Fenichel describes this shift in treatment:

Thus it was the necessity for analyzing
the resistance
which in practice started psychoanalytic
ego psychology.
Moreover, in this way two other things were
discovered:
first, that certain attitudes of the patient's
which
always recurred when similar instinctual dangers
were
mobilized served the purpose of resistances, and
second
that not only was that purpose fulfilled by
them in the
psychoanalytic treatment, but that the same behavior
patterns were also used by the patient in his ordinary
life, either to prevent his expressions of certain
instincts or to prevent his becoming aware of them. This
discovery opened the way to the first "psychoanalysis of
character
that is to the analysis of the purpose and
historical genesis of certain characterological attitudes
as repressions. 8

The inordinate difficulty in overcoming these defenses, their
intract-

ability, occasioned an innovation in technique "which consisted in

denoting as the most important task of analysis the overcoming of
resistances, in place of the direct interpretation of the patient's
symptoms."

9

Whereas symptoms mask specific (if overdetermined) un-

conscious material, character is
the ego.

a

more diffuse, chronic, attribute of

It expresses itself more in form than in content,

for

example, more in the attitude which the patient typically adopts toward
the analyst than in the content of what he or she says.

Though character neurosis has superseded symptom neurosis as the

primary diagnostic category, the same problems with definition pertain.
The term 'character neurosis' has achieved currency in
contemporary psychoanalytical usage without ever having
been given a very exact usage.

That the notion remains so ill -defined is no doubt due to
the fact that it raises not only nosographical problems
(what are the specific attributes of character neurosis?)
but also both psychological questions regarding the origin,
basis and function of character and the techni cal question
of what place ought to be given to the analysis of so-called
'character' defenses. 10
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Given this preliminary account of character
as it takes shape

within the treatment process, we still have no
consensus on what

precisely is meant by the term.

Gerald Blum, commenting on the plethora

of not very specific definitions says
we 9 a ther only that character is somehow a
function
of the ego, related in some way to the social
environment.
Even the gross point of whether it is synonymous with
all
ego functioning (Fenichel) or simply one among a long
list
of functions (Hartmann) remains controversial.
In view of
this hazy state of affairs it appears futile to question
the
distinction between character and the equally vague
concept of personality. Academic psychology's offering
clouds the issue still further by way of.
two alternative definitions of character:
the ethical or moral
1)
aspect of personality; and 2) the conative aspect of
personality without any ethical or moral evaluation.
[Italics mine.]
•

•

•

.

.

Hypotheses regarding the formation of character are equally contradictory.

Some writers cite preoedipal experience, primarily oral and

anal, as decisive, and others turn to Oedipal phenomena as the nucleus

of character.

(Again, in this instance, Freud is of little help,

for

he suggests both of those possibilities and furthermore, he suggests

this in essays where he too seems not to be discriminating between

personality and character.) The resolution of the Oedipal complex is
where we might reasonably expect personality and character to overlap,
to become intertwined:

period will have

a

the chronic defenses of the ego in the phallic

strong impact on the emerging relationships between

id, ego, and superego.

However, it is not possible to understand the

relationship between character formation and personality unless we can
understand them on their own terms.
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S fflptoms, Character Ne
uroses, and Secondary fiain

The shift in technique
from analysis of symptoms
to analysis of

character is accompanied
historically by the alleged
disappearance of
symptom neurosis.
(, say "alleged" with some
caution.
I
am aware

that
the rarity of symptom
neurosis is almost universally
accepted. However,'
I find neither
the statistical nor the
clinical arguments persuasive. 12
I think
it far more likely that
symptom neurosis is more prevalent
than suspected— still largely
affecting women in the form of
certain
of the eating disorders-and
is currently either misdiagnosed
or un-

diagnosed altogether.)

In an

essay entitled "Psychoanalysis and

Character," Fenichel documents the
historical transition:

^ ^

interesting fact that the neuroses themi
seives,
which the analyst had to deal with,
have changed
We began today with the statement
that in the classical
a contlnu °u s Personality was
disturbed at certain
nnin^K
po
nts by inappropriate actions, impulses,
or thoughts
In modern neuroses that is
no longer the case.
Here the
personality does not appear to be uniform,
but open, torn,
or deformed, and in any case so involved
in the illness that
one cannot say at what point the
"personality" ends and the
symptom" begins. iJ
’

‘

.

This apparent transformation in the nature
of neurosis will present
the same temptation as did the incorporation
of the aggressive drive and
the structural

theory into clinical practice.

One can eschew 'deeper'

interpretations in favor of superficial comments; one
can offer, or
imply, prescriptions

based on some presumption of the 'well-adjusted'

personal i ty.
This tendency is further underscored by the increased importance

character neurosis lends to what Freud termed the "secondary gains" 14
of neurosis.

The primary gain of neurosis is always, in the abstract.

.
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the avoidance of unpleasure.

The motivation for the
repression is

flight from internal tension;
it may represent an
adaptation to external reality, but that need
not be the case.
Secondary gain is not

originally

a

component of the neurosis (or the
neurotic defense)-

it is an advantage in relation
to the environment that develops

the defense has been adopted.

15

prospect of such gain was not

a

once

"The adjective implies that the

motive for the formation of the neurosis

in the first place but that
once the neurosis had been formed,
the

secondary gain provided an additional
motive to hang on to

it.

16

The desire to continue to exploit secondary
gains forms an

important aspect of resistance, the sine qua non
of character neurosis
and analysis of character.

Symptom neurosis rarely achieves as

effective an exploitation of the environment as does
characterological
defense structure; symptoms offer the advantages of
illness, but
beyond that they are bizarre, ego alien
one's way in the world.

occurrences which do not smooth

Their chief value lies in the ability to ward

off unpleasure— the primary gain— while still affording an
acceptable,

because highly disguised, instinctual discharge.

As such they remain

more intimately tied to deep unconscious material.
Secondary gains are incorporated into the defensive functions
of the ego much as are character resistances which become absorbed into
the overall

structure, and are perceived as integral, even acceptable

parts of the self.

They are easily rationalized as "just the way

am," if noticed at all

I

8
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The integration of neurotic tendencies
into the ego means
the feeling of alienation so characteristic
for the psychoneuroses, is gone, and that these tendencies
assume a
function in the service of self-preservative and
selfexpansive goals; they are now part and parcel of what
one
feels to be oneself. ... to which one is now bound
by the
secondary gains which they impart. 17
It may even be that the motive of secondary
gain is part of the mechanism

for establishing defensive character traits.

This is, of course,

a

purely speculative point— but the role of secondary gain in
neurosis
and in general personality development and character formation
is not
a

minor question.

Secondary gains are accrued at the cultural level,

and as such represent an important intersection of the individual with

society (albeit mediated through early family experience); they make

direct cultural contribution to character and personality.
Freudians, led by Adler, built

precept of secondary gain:

a

a

The Neo-

psychology almost exclusively on the

the neurosis as a utilitarian arrangement

between the ego and external reality.

dismissing intrapsychic

In

factors, they effaced the dynamic theory of mind and substituted an

exclusively cultural and therefore inadequate explanation of consciousness.
Freudian psychoanalysis maintains
and secondary gain.

distinction between primary

a

It does not see repression and the. unconscious as

the ego's fictions, necessary in a harsh environment and dispensable in
a

more graceful reality.

Rather, it

scious, and it considers represssion

".

a

.

a

assumes

universal

psychoanalysis maintains the distinction
gain, it is not

.

genuine uncon-

phenomenon."

1

While

between primary and secondary

point that is much pursued.

primary and secondary gains of repression

a

The tension between the

may provide

a

significant

window on the relationship between intrapsychic and cultural factors

in
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character and personal ity~ that
is, between the universal
and the
historically specific, particularistic
influences on human development.
The focus on the ego, resistance,

and secondary gain, it can

be readily seen, treads
dangerously close to the Alderian
stance

which Freud had denounced years
earlier.

Unless we take pains to

maintain the ties between character
defenses and what they defend

ISilnst, between the ego, the superego, and the id
dynamic theory of mind, or of pathology.

,

we end up with no

And many factors-cl inical

applications of the structural theory and the
model of personality,
clinical

interpretations of the death instinct and innate
aggressive

drives, the disappearance of symptom
neurosis— are mitigating against
the maintenance of those ties.

The end result is an etiology of neurosis

that is more moral than psychological, more
culturalist than Freudian.
In

Adler's view neurosis is an arrangement motivated by

the ego; it comes very close to being a lie, a
fraud, and
the understanding of a neurosis is the uncovering of
its
secret purpose, hence an unmasking.'"

Pathology, then, represents an unsuccessful adjustment to
society, and

treatment becomes
once again, such

a

a

process of re-education. To underscore this point

therapeutic stance presumes

a

model to which we

encourage people to adapt— presumes that we know all we need to know
about mental

"health," and can confidently set about curing people.

This is in direct contradiction to the analytic ethos (regardless of

whether or not this ethos has been fulfilled in relation to women)
that each case, each fragment of unconscious material, is

which presents
the mind.

_

a

a

new mystery

fresh opportunity to explore the unknown reaches of
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femininity/' or, "My dear, you're just
being hvst.PHrai
Finally, what has all this to do
with women anyway?
the point to this extent in an
essay on female psychology?

answer is,

paradoxically, both simple and complex.

Why belabor
The

It is important

for the simple reason that it is
not female psychology that is being

researched and debated, it is female
personality and character -anri
they are barely psychological categories
these days.

The complexity

derives from the fact that so many different
historical trends combined
to obscure the real

issues at the heart of the question of sexual

psychology (male and female).

Female psychology ceased to be debated

in psychoanalytic circles for several

surfaced, it was in the context of

a

decades, and when the issue re-

psychology more concerned with

personality and characterological factors than with the unconscious
mind.

Of course these historical developments bear equally on men and

women in many respects.

It is clearly detrimental

to men to enter a

treatment process in which conformity and adaptation are more the rule
than not; it is equally damaging to have psychology hold up

a

model

of masculinity which requires excessive sacrifice and ego impoverish-

ment while masquerading as superior or privileged.

However, when one

remembers the norm that is being held up to which women are encouraged,
or even pressured, to adapt, the insidious oppressive effects on women
stand out more clearly. This is not to belittle the impact on the male

psyche --and physical heal th--which may ultimately be traced to con-

forming to

a

traditional and psychoanalytic

picture of masculinity.
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Indeed the

distinction between the oppressed and
the oppressor is not

clearly so clear in the psychological
realm as it is in the objective,
social world.

However, even in purely psychological
terms,

a

case can

be made for the fact that while both
men and women are required to

make excessive psychological
social

sacrifices, men have more access to the

benefits which in the first place merit those
sacrifices.

And

this remains true, at least insofar as
privilege is divided by sex,

across class and racial lines; clearly some privilege
is assigned not
by sex, but by class and color.

The weakening of the interpretive method, which often
goes along

with the shift in treatment to diagnosis and analysis of characterological pathology rather than interpretation of symptoms, completes
a

vicious circle.

It ought to have been new data, drawn from the

psychoanalytic process

— interpretations

of dreams, symptoms, and

especially the transference--that were used to refute or confirm
Freud's hypotheses regarding female psychosexual development and female

personality.

Yet in place of research, psychoanalysis became

a

vehicle

for re-education and social adjustment.

Perhaps most reprehensible is the way in which the new approach
was used to justify the barely

veiled slander contained in the diagnosti

category invented for hysterical personality/character.

It is a loose

collection of pejoratives, some of which even contradict each other.
The rubric was used to cover everything that might be deemed unfortunate
or unpleasant in a woman's personality (loosely termed, i.e., her

external demeanor), and so it had to include descriptors for both passive
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and weak as well as
aggressive and flamboyant.

The inconsistency is
smoothed out, deu s ex machine
by subdividing hysteria into
,
categorieshysterical personality, hysteroid
personality, hysterical character,
etc., and differences in style
are traced etiological
ly to an earlier
or later developmental onset 20
At this juncture there has been a
.

complete and unacknowledged elimination
of the psychological components
of personality and character in
favor of moral and/or physiognomic
components.
a

One can make moral judgments about
an hysterical woman in

way that one cannot evaluate an hysterical
symptom.

The blurring of

primary and secondary gains conveniently
allows the exploitive, manipulative aspects of the hysterical syndrome
to be incorporated into

theory of personality and character.

It is interesting to note,

a

in

passing, that Freud explicitly refused to draw any
direct correlation

between hysterical symptoms and hysterical personality 21
.

We began in the first place with

a

weak theoretical framework

(the problems in Freud's theories of Oedipal

sexuality) from which to generate

a

resolution and phallic

theory of personality or character.

Through proliferation of the terms, accompanied by

a

and distortion of their meanings, we end up with

framework which is,

in itself,

a

flattening out

indefensible--which is not, in effect, psychoanalytic.

The

problem applies equally whether one is employing that framework to

confirm or disconfirm Freud's theories on women.
For decades now we have been debating the nature of the female

personality, the female character, and something even more amorphous
called "femininity."

This last would appear to be definable as

"

159

'psychological femaleness,' and is,
one can only suppose, a
composite
of personality, character,
psychosexual profile, and perhaps
a soupgon
of mystery. Are women
passive or not? Narcissistic?
Masochistic?

Hysterical?

These words are used increasingly
as external descriptors,

not as reflections of women's
internal experience, and with
reference
to their popular and not their
psychological meaning.

—

The entire dehate

in some res Pects b ogus because
it is based on the fraudulent.

c ategories

of personality and character

.

Critics are at pains to demonstrate that
female personality/

character is not passive, envious, masochistic,
etc.

Defenders of Freud

scrupulously marshall clinical proof that indeed
women do have

a

pre-

ponderance of masochistic fantasies-which is
beside the point since
as yet we have not established the
theoretical

link between fantasy and

personality or character formation. Sometimes Freudians
attempt to

gather theoretical proof, from the theory of psychosexual
development,
that the well-adjusted female personality ought to be
passive and

masochistic.

More commonly, if questioned, analysts will agree that

Freud's theories on psychosexual development can't really stand as
they are, and then they drop the question.
If we don't know what personality and character represent, nor

what goes into their formation, surely there is little point

whether or not they are gendered or how they become gendered.
were to presume, with the "orthodox" Freudians, that it
girl's developmental

in debating

Even if we

is the little

task to attain "passive" sexual aims, we are still

in no position to state that she therefore has a passive "personal ity.

And the controversy has raged not around her sexual aims, which indeed
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make

a

major contribution to the ego's concept
of gender, but around

her personality or character-which in
turn may or may not be the same
as her ego.

No one has yet proved that personality and
character— in the

psychological £r the popular sense— are gendered at all,
nor in what

manner they might be.
defend

a

Analysts are on very tenuous ground trying to

position in which "personality style" or "character traits"

are sex-linked.

On the other hand, because anti-Freudians do not

distinguish between ego and personality, when they argue for an androgynous personality, they eradicate the concept of the gendered ego.
It may conceivably be arguable

(and this is not to argue the point

one way or the other) that the female ego's attitude toward itself,
the world, and the superego need not be any more passive than the

male's; it is not conceivable to posit the mature ego's concept of
itself as ungendered.

An adult who does not know that he or she

belongs to one of the sexes (or at least isn't very uncomfortable

without that certainty) seems an unimaginable creature.

Inequities

in the value and privileges we currently ascribe to the sexes cannot

be rectified by wishfully undoing the distinction between them.
As Wollheim points out,

sexual

22

if the ego is a bodily ego, then it is a

ego; if it is sexual, then at some point, whether we accept the

specifics of Freud's account or not, the ego is also
If we hypothesize a nonsexual

,

a

gendered ego.

or a nongendered ego, then we can no

longer employ the Freudian paradigm to explain the genesis and

maturation of the ego.
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Having attempted to clear away the debris
that has collected

around Freud's already problematic legacy
regarding "femininity,"
and a general psychology of personality
and character, let us return

once again to the specifics of Freud's account.

In

Chapter IV we

began to isolate some of the problems and
limitations of his psychosexual

schema; it is time now to turn to

a

personality he deduced from that schema and

critique of the female
a

critique of the process

by which he arrived at those normative conclusions.

theory of the resolution of phallic sexuality

is as

If indeed Freud's

tenuous as it

appears to be, and if we don't summon up male chauvinism or Victorianism
as explanation for his error, then perhaps the particular
picture of

female personal ity /character which he endeavors to justify through
his Oedipal

account may offer

a

clue to where he went wrong.

Female Personal i ty--Some Alternate Possibilities
Freud chose to build

theory of personal ity--and moral develop-

a

ment--which hinges on the asymmetry between male and female Oedipal
resolution.

Masculine morality is synonymous with male moral

superiority--it does not have

a

theoretical base separate from the

one which prescribes female moral and intellectual

inferiority.

(In

this regard, Freud was the first to blur the moral and conative aspects

of personality and character.

built in

)

That is, the asymmetry in morality is

to the process of attaining a sense of gender identity and

heterosexual orientation; all of those collapse if one does, as the

theory now stands.

If you dispute the fact that men are superior to

women, you no longer have

a

theory for how men and women learn about
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gender differences.

(This alone seems enough to
undermine the

plausibility and usefulness of the
theory.)
If indeed moral

traits and ego capacities are gender
linked,

must the relationship between
morality and gender be as Freud described
it?

Here it becomes important to bear
in mind that we are disputing

Freud from two separate vantage
points.

psychosexual development,

it

Given his account of early

is possible to draw different
conclusions

regarding personality formation, particularly
with regard to sex-linked
traits?

In addition,

and in the first place, to what extent can
we

accept his depiction of female psychosexual
development as correct?

Because

I

believe that the inconsistencies in his portrayal of
female

personality will shed some light on the flaws in his theory
of female
sexuality,
In

I

will

explore that area first.

keeping with the asymmetrical nature of Freud's formulation,

the problem with his assessment of personality is twofold:

an

idealization of male development alongside an underestimation of
female achievements.

Jahoda outlines the two for us:

Accepting Freud's construction of childhood events as
reasonable, and remaining on a Freudian basis, are there
not other, equally plausible deductions possible? Would
not men, overcompensating for their early castration
fears, develop excessive vanity with regard to their maleness?
If the little girl learns early in life that one can exist,
has to exist, without owning everything in sight, would
she not overcompensate this painful discovery by becoming
generous, making a virtue out of necessity?23
Kay Tooley, in one of

a

very few articles on male psychosexual

development, re-eval uates the idealized picture of the boy's Oedipal

struggles and possibilities, particularly with regard to the effects
of castration anxiety on ego development and superego formation.
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nn *0 fade in
a week
anyway; ne nas been 'castrated.
If another car cuts in
front of him on the expressway,
it is
i
not a fleeting, not
even a dangerous fleeting
annoyance;
nee; it's a major operation-a castration. 24
1

Roy Schafer concurs with her
speculations that castration anxiety may
have less beneficial effects on male
development than Freud supposed.

Whatever the castration anxiety of men
might have to do
with superego structural ization, typically
that anxiety
is so unresolved, so persistent,
and so intense that it
continuously incites men to violate conventional
morality.
When Freud cautioned against overestimating
the degree of
true superego formation of people in
general, he must have
meant men in particular. 25
And on the other side of this question,

a

number of these writers

have explored the possible positive effects of

a

girl's prolonged

26
preoedi pal experience and delayed onset of Oedipal
crisis.

If the little girl's Oedipal complex occurs
later than that
of the boy, as Freud plausibly suggests, that is at a stage
of greater cognitive and verbal ability, would she not be
more open to remaining in touch with her unconscious and
be more capable of empathy? Again, on the assumption of a
later oedipal experience would she not, more than a boy,
retain the marvellous childhood advantage of managing to
combine sexuality and tenderness and therefore be less
likely to develop sadistic brutality?27

Nancy Chodorow, exploring an alternate interpretation of the girl's
less thorough resolution of her Oedipal complex, suggests an enriched

internal

emotional life as one possible effect:
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rls
row U P W1 tb more ongoing
:„-. g i
preoccupations with
?
both internalized
object-relationships and with ex?ernll
relationships as well.
These ongoing preoccupations in a
r° W
SPeCiall yn0t ° f her early relati onship
to her
motL?
Th
mother.
They consist in an ambivalent
struggle for a sense
of separateness and independence
from her mother and
emotional, if not erotic, bisexual
oscillation between
mother and father--between preoccupation
with "mother-child"
issues and male-female" issues. 28
i

-

Chodorow goes on to speculate on the
possible effects of his
impoverished inner, emotional world, on the
boy's ego development and
superego formation.
Denial of sense of connectedness and isolation
of affect
may be more characteristic of masculine development
and may
produce a more rigid and punitive superego, whereas
female
development, in which internal and external object-relations
and affects connected to these are not so
repressed, may
lead to a superego more open to persuasion and the
judgments
of others, that is, not so independent of its
emotional
origins.
In this vein,

Tooley suggests we take another look at the traditional

way that men and women assess one another's moral values: "Women
have
always been mystified by male willingness to bloody each other over

incidents that seem trivial, while men have been incensed because

women do not seem to give
the thing'

a

('deficient superego

Roy Schafer offers us
in

comparable damn about 'the principle of

a

')

way to look at the apparent difference

male and female moral and ego development, insofar as it is linked

to the superego.

He reads Freud's account as implying that men have

"more" superego than women and takes issue with the

of psychoanalytic propositions, of such

a

il

logic, in terms

notion.

But, taken as a whole, differences between men and women
in ego functioning are qualitative, corresponding to
modes of functioning rather than amounts
Contrary to
.
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6U
here Can be no final authority
on the question
n£ "Whether
[!\i!;
of
one mode of functioning is
superior ?o another
e
UeStl ° n makeS S6nSe ° nly in
the conte xt of

^ues

3^

Schafer's point brings into focus
the fact that the relationship
between
superego formation, ego development,
and gender identity is in a more
general sense problematic.
Some of the difficulty comes down
to the

elusive distinction between
harsh.

To say that men are

a

strong superego and one that is overly

a_

priori more firm morally and more highly

developed intellectually because of
self-contradictory.

a

'stronger'

superego is almost

When you consider, as pointed out above,
the extent

to which anxiety enters

into the establishing

a

boy's superego, it is

difficult not to be suspicious of the supposed
'strength' in question.
The overly stringent superego

may be subversive of people's achievements, their
love
and even their moral codes, for like any harsh and
arbitrary authority, it continuously incites rebellion,
hatred, and self-destructiveness.
Whatever superego
does contribute toward eventual morality requires
considerable tempering before that morality can be
secured, and certainly superego cannot temper itself; it
cannot achieve its own independence of its emotional
origins.
.

.

.

It follows that Freud may have drawn exactly the wrong
conclusion from his theory. ... If, on account of her
different constellations of castration concerns, a girl
does not develop the implacable superego that a boy does,
then at least in this respect she might be better suited
than a boy to develop a moral code that is enlightened,
realistic, and consistently committed to some conventional
form of civilized interaction among people. 32

Since Freud's comments on the female superego are so sparse it
is

impossible to

know much of what he believed to be the motivation

of its genesis or the contents of its identifications.

In the

absence

166

of both the threat (castration
anxiety) and the bribery

(narcissistic

identification with father's genital
superiority) of the boy's Oedipus
complex, what motivates a woman to
develop a superego at all?
Clearly Freud's accounts of moral and
ego development are
tenuous in the same respects as his mapping
of phallic sexual development.

And yet, the Oedipal phenomenon serves
as the underpinning for

Freud's developmental paradigm; without
it we have no theoretical

explanation for attaining

a

sense of gender identity, sexual

orientation, moral code, or integrative ego capacities.
retain what is essential

in his account,

In

order to

and to more clearly demarcate

what an alternate, or amplified, account would have to
provide, let us
try to discern more concretely where he went wrong.

What are the

themes which thread through the apparently disparate inconsistencies
of his notion of female personality, and how do they reflect back
on
his theory of psychosexual development?

A Critical Appraisal
In all

the problems one encounters in Freud's theories on

women and men, perhaps most striking--for it is so uncharacteri stic-is

the inescapable impression that he has seriously oversimplified

human experience.

Certainly the idealization of male and devaluation

of female Oedipal resolution represents

a

restricted view of both

the possibilities and actualities of psychosexual development.

What

lies at the center of this reductionism is Freud's underestimation of

preoedipal experience--for boys as well as for girls.

s
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While most theorists, including
Freud in his last works 33
,
turn to preoedipal object
relations for solutions to
some of the
questions about the girl's Oedipal
struggles, none has consistently
applied this insight to male
development.
Dorothy Dinnerstein'
compelling evocation of childhood
in The Mermaid and the Minotaur
comes closest to exploring the
little boy's early ties to his
mother,
but her vantage point is only
intermittently psychoanalytic in any
strict sense. Given that female
inferiority is predicated on male
superiority, revision of the theory
of female personality hinges on
finding a set of constructs which more
adequately account for both

male and female development.
Furthermore, to the extent that preoedipal
factors are used to
round out the girl's early history, they
threaten to introduce an

oversimplification all their own.

To assign principal

in the resolution of female sexuality
to preoedipal

again to beg the question of

phallic

significance

factors is once

sexuality for the little girl.

If we trap her in unresolvable preoedipal

tangles,

(i.e., arrest her

development at that stage), then we do not have to account
for further
developments in her sexuality.

Freud, too, succumbs to this easy way

out, despite his insistence that, though early factors contribute
to the form of the Oedipus complex,

(i.e., envy of the breast or womb

as predeterminants of penis envy), the crisis in phallic sexuality
and

the entry into triangular object relations stand on their own to form
a

central developmental crisis,

life.

It is as

a

major turning point in the child's

if Freud's unwillingness to deal with the complexity and

intensity of the boy's attachment to his mother makes him willing to
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eternally abandon the little girl
to that matrix of feeling.
Freud's idealization of male
ego and superego development
rests on the thoroughness with
which the little boy is presumed
to
abandon his Oedipal passion for mother.
In this conflict, his passion

suddenly appears to put up not much
of

a

fight.

Freud, who fought a

lifelong battle for the recognition
of that passion, did not, in the
end, give it full weight.

That Freud was not prepared to think
about mothers very
ar is.
evident from how little he said directly about
them and about relationships with them,
and, correspondingly,
how little he said about how they appear
in the transference, the resistance
and the formation of the ego and
superego systems.
Consequently Freud dealt with the
feminine trends in men chiefly in terms of the two
factors
of castration and passive homosexuality. ...
It seems that
he knew the father and the castrate in himself
and other men
but not the mother and the woman. 34
.

.

.

.

.

Wollheim, in discussing similar issues, links this blind
spot in relation to women to "Freud's inability to accept in practice
what he

never tired of proclaiming in theory:

mankind's essential bisexuality. 35

And indeed, while Freud had difficulty accepting bisexuality in men,
he discounted it altogether in women.

In

"Analysis Terminable and

Interminable" he declares that treatment "is most difficult when trying
to persuade a woman to abandon her wish for a penis or convince

that passive attitudes are sometimes indispensable."^

a

man

That is,

women must, at all costs, be dissuaded from psychological bisexuality,

while men must be cajoled to embrace it.
Implicit in Freud's parallel, if asymmetrical, construction here
is

the notion that feminine is to be equated with passive and masculine

with active.

Now Freud had explicitly argued against this equation in
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the New Introductory Lecture
entitled "Femininity."

Once again,
however, it appears that Freud
was not able to maintain
ailegiance to
own, most difficult (i.e.,
ego alien) precepts.
On closer
scrutiny, in fact, it appears
that the distinction between
active and
Passive is at the heart of Freud's
account of Oedipal resolution,
and
that his distortion of their
meaning-his inability to hold to a

psychoanalytic conception of activity
and passivity-is at the
heart
of the failure in his account
of psychosexual development.
The

necessity of imputing to girls the
achievement of passive, vaginal
sexuality causes Freud to stretch the
logical limits of his theory
beyond what they can bear.

It is in service of the little
girl's

predestined (due to her procreative role)
route to passive sexuality
that Freud must ascribe to penis
envy the significance that he does,
and that he becomes willing to provide
a nonsexual account of how the

girl's sexuality develops through the phallic
period.

Furthermore, following Schafer,

I

would have to add that

a

truly psychoanalytic understanding of the terms
active and passive

seriously undermines their viability as descriptors
of mental events
at all; no psychic phenomenon is purely active
or passive.

In

the

first place, though instinctual aims may be passive, by
virtue of

attaining satisfaction through the subject being acted upon rather
than acting, instinctual drives themselves are by definition
active:
the overall

sexual

experience cannot be summed up as simply passive.

In the second place,

one must not forget the regularity with which

the instinctual drives undergo transformation back and forth between

active and passive, nor the universal unconscious identification which
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links the two.

The masochist is both beating
and being beaten.

In

the third place, one cannot
presume that a preponderance of
passive
aim results in a passive
ego-in relation to id, superego,
or

environment.

For the ego is, by definition,
actively synthesizing,

implementing instinctual drives
as well as warding them off.

(This

remains true whether the subjective
experience, i.e., the ego's

concept of itself, is one of passivity.)

In the fourth place,

it

follows that one cannot speak of
purely passive object relations, for
the ego, consciously and unconsciously,
actively structures relationships, even if the subject appears to
be weak, helpless, or dependent.

Schafer summarizes the way these problems
in definition may
affect the picture of female personality
which Freud sketched:
when Freud generalized about women's passivity,
he
neglected such factors as unconscious identification
with
the partner in a significant relationship.
These are
factors which he had been the very one to establish
through
his psychoanalytic method.
Freud repeatedly demonstrated how extraordinarily subtle and complex the interweaving of passive and active themes can be in any one
person's life, from which it follows that one-sided or
simple characterizations of any significant project as
active or passive hardly make sense, once one knows a
given person and situation well enough.
Yet Freud was
not deterred from generalizing on the basis of such simple
characterizations.
.

•

•

.

To hold active/passive as

a

.

.

central organizing concept will

inevitably

result in an oversimplified account of psychosexual development.

The

active/passive opposition undermines rather than enhances the concept
of bisexuality; limits rather than opens up the range of identifications,

projections, and introjections--in relation to both mother and father—
we would expect to encounter during the Oedipal period; and tends to

imply that sexual aim, and therefore gender identity, is determined by
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procreative role (which in turn determines
social role).
What does seem clear is that severing the

unconscious link

between active and passive is central to the
oversimplification in
Freud's account of sexual and ego development.

The experiencing of

active vs. passive instinctual aims in relation to
the parents is

component of the Oedipus complex.

a

key

The vicissitudes of sexual instinct

in relation to activity and passivity are
certainly tied to the

development of the ego and to the ego's concept of itself.

The

Freudian account, however, does not make full enough use of the
complex, bisexual

identifications, introjections, and projections

that accompany the turbulence of this developmental era.

And, to

come full circle, this failure is linked with Freud's general neglect
of the role of the mother in the Oedipal

resolution.

To complete the picture, it is necessary to point out that

Freud shortchanged mothers not only in his simplified description of
the child's dilemma, but also in his relative disinterest in their

own subjective experience.
for the little girl

In the developmental

account he provides

he inextricably links her eventual motherhood with

passive sexuality and passive personal ity--despite the fact that he
argues, again in the New Introductory Lectures, against circumscribing

maternal

responsibilities within

a

passive modality.

Penis envy seems

hardly adequate to convey the richness and complexity of the desire
for

a

child, though we hold to Freud's view that procreative impulses

are not inborn but acquired.

And penis envy is certainly not sufficient

to account for the acquisition in women of the psychological

capaci ty
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to mother.
It would appear
that Freud's assessment
of the role of .otherhood infl uenced his
understanding of the nature
of female sexuality;

once he had linked
women's sexuality with
passivity the notorious
depiction of female personality
and character was all
but inevitable
Now Freud did not by any
means invent this portrait
of female
personality. The female ego
does often have a concept
of itself as
passive; women do often adopt
passive modes of behavior and
relationship.
However, where we would have
expected Freud to explore the
pervasive conflicts both men
and women have around
active/passive
trends, suddenly he closes
off the discussion with the
presumption of
female passivity. Assuming
passivity as normatively tied to
female
sexuality and refusing to consider
its defensive properties, Freud
closes off the possibility of
tracing passive-or active-self-

concept as

a

secondary gain of pathological
defenses.

In the

world of adult relation there are
many circumstanrps
1C
n
a
c ntro1
nd a 9 ainst whi ch
cannot
?
prevail
prevail,
but the def°
definition of oneself in these circumstances as passive and helpless (or
as prevailing and in
control) is an individual choice based
on preferred forms
Se> se f" consolatl on
self-punishment, and so

/

'

f

th^

’

Freud fails to consider the role that
cultural advantage may play in
the male/female division of the
properties of activity and passivity,

despite his avowal that

we must beware in this of underestimating

the influence of social customs, which
similarly force women into

passive situations."
In this

distortion of the meaning of activity and passivity lies

the beginning of an amplified account of
psychosexual development— an

a
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amplified

F reudian

account.

For it cannot be stressed too strongly

that regardless of the negative interpretations
Freud put forth of
the female character, regardless of certain
limitations in his

developmental account, there is nothing inherently denigrating
to

women in his overall paradigm of psychosexual development

.

If we

interpret the rather strict division of activity/passivity along
sexlinked lines as defensive

— as

highly conflictual and unresolved

—

whole range of unexplored unconscious material opens up.
The modern analyst has to recognize [the woman's] role
not as passivity, but as a desperate form of activity-a drastic inhibition required to play this inactivated
part.
Yet although Freud the clinician was ever
alert to the many forms unconscious activity takes in the
lives of women, Freud the theoretician, when dealing with
the development of sexual identity, named this inhibition
passivity and made it the crux of femininity. 38
.

.

.

An open-ended perspective on active/passive instinctual trends

gives renewed life to the psychoanalytic concept of bisexuality; offers
the possibility of reinstating clitoral sexuality and reassessing the

properties of vaginal sexuality as they are developed from the phallic
through the genital phases; necessitates increased attention to the

integration of aggressive as well as sexual drives in accounting for
psychosexual development (and this last is perhaps the most seriously

neglected aspect of sex-linked differences in male and female

development, given the role that violence plays in men's and women's
lives).

This new vantage point would challenge our traditional under-

standing of both the external, role-related behaviors and internal

subjective experience of motherhood, and would also return the child's
psychical experience of mother to the center of Oedipal struggle,
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gender identity, and moral
development.

Paradoxically, disrupting

the equation between "mother"
and "passive" not only
gives renewed

importance to motherhood, it
also lends support to the
possibility
of women being less tied
to mothering than a
traditional account
would.

A less rigid perspective on
activity/passivity would also

generate

a

more complex understanding of
male development and

pathology than what we now have.

It

would provide

a

framework in

which to re-view the actualities
of male and female achievements
(moral

and intellectual) and it would
open up a far wider range of

accomplishments and sublimations to which
both men and women might

normatively aspire.
Most importantly, this shift in focus
is essentially compatible

with the fundamental principles and method
of psychoanalysis.

In

Wollheim's terms

... if this kind of account of feminine sexual development would presuppose much more working over
of the
constitutive elements than Freud himself proposes
in his
official account, it exhibits the same general
theoretical
eatures as the latter.
For it is still an account which
bases itself on no more than biological
considerations
and how they are internally represented, and which
is
at the same time strong enough to sustain
a theory of
ego development.

CHAPTER
CONCLUSION:

VI

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND FEMINIST SCHOLARSHIP

Thus far, the opportunities present in educating

counselor/activists have been lost.

young

Students have been encouraged to

believe in the miracles of increased quantity (whether of skills,
clients, humanism, or personal growth); or to espouse

a

therapy more

political than psychological and therefore not therapy at all; or to

disbelieve in therapy altogether and to engage in other forms of
social action.

Sisterhood can work insidiously in the classroom as well as in
the therapy session.
al

It is reflected in a preference for nonhierarchic-

structures, equalization of student-teacher relations, an emphasis

on sharing what is known rather than exploring what is unknown.

completes

a

This

circle, returning to the humanistic matrix which has

already proved to be of questionable value to an education leading to
critical thinking.
in

The humanistic style is lent further validity

marxist circles for its superficial amenability with socialist

forms—ownership of the means of production, demystification of "class"
relations, reappropriation of personal power.
Because of her particular vulnerability to the "impostor complex,"
the undergraduate woman may find counselor education built on humanistic

psychology, mechanistic marxism, or even feminist therapy to subvert
rather than enhance her development as
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a

feminist and as

a

mental health
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professional.

It is a shaky self-confidence which emerges from such

mutual admiration as may pass for education in the humanistic
mode.
Real or imagined failures may be the result of women graduating
without

having mastered the skills and discipline of scholarship, perhaps

unable to conceptualize clearly and argue persuasively on the issues
of their professional domain.
It is in Women's Studies that popular psychology can be shown

most clearly to undermine the goals of feminism.
as one critic has argued,

It may be the case,

that women are now drawn to psychology in

the first place because "socialization" has cultivated their feeling

capacities while stunting development of other competencies.
Women, in a sense, already are too expressive. Their
"innate" emotionalism and expressiveness lie at the core
of the very stereotypes they now wish to overturn.
So
the emphasis on feelings could backfire, locking women
even more completely into the circumscribed pattern from
which they seek escape.'
An education which underscores this imbalance perpetuates, rather than

elucidates, the roots of women's oppression.
Regardless of whether educators and students have thus far opted
for humanistic, laboratory, or feminist/radical

therapy

1) failure to underIn each case the failure is threefold:
and deintentions,
of
as
one
existing
system
stand the

structive intensions, rather than institutions, behavior
or styles; 2) failure to understand the full range of what
it means to be a person and thus the systematic destruction
of the person; and 3) failure to understand activity,
2
political work, the self, in terms of process.
Such understanding must begin with ourselves, as teachers and clinicians.

This will entail

a

willingness to view our own experiences in the

life,
world, in our practices, our training and especially in academic

with

a

more critical eye.
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This dissertation

represents

a

beginning of that re-examination—

an attempt to look at current educational
and psychological practices

and to see them in the context of the theories
on which they are built.

This exploration has, of necessity, gone far afield
from its original

starting point— counselor education— in its pursuit of the
theoretical
roots of a sound pedagogical strategy.

The search for

a

theory of

mind which could speak to the interface of feminism and
psychology led
to psychoanalysis.

Since Freudian theory has traditionally been

anathema to feminists, it then became necessary to demonstrate that
the theoretical

paradigm is not unsympathetic to women-- to critique

those specific content areas which indeed are biased and damaging.

In

the process, a number of areas were highlighted which contribute to
an understanding of the direction in which Women's Studies must move

with regards to counseling and psychology.
How then may it be possible to tie together the disparate
themes raised throughout?
of general

How may we bring a theoretical exploration

psychology and of psychosexual development back to bear on

the problems inherent in teaching counseling in a Women's Studies

program?

In

other words, what are the internal links between psycho-

analysis and social theory— in particular, feminism— which can be used
to structure a pedagogical
In

the Introduction

movement to produce

a

approach?
I

suggested that the failure of the women's

viable definition of feminism has undermined both

Women's Studies curriculum and feminist therapy.
a

I

also argued that

complex theory of subectivity was an essential requirement for an

adequate definition of feminism.

(Furthermore, given the particular
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angle of its social criticism, feminism must
focus more attention
than other political analyses might on
sexual identity as

aspect of subjectivity, and of our social
formations.)
in

a

central

It may be useful,

this light, to return to the five elements
set forth in the Intro-

duction as constituting the rudiments of

a

theory of human nature:

the nature of thought and the relation between
thought and action; a

concept of mind/body relationship; an assessment of human
needs; the
relation of individual to society; and the ethical
responsibilities

of psychological theorists and mental healers.

These themes have

implicitly threaded throughout the exposition of the previous
chapters.

At all points

I

have endeavored to demonstrate that the

psychoanalytic theory of subjectivity (including its basic notions of
psychosexual development), as seen through its address to these five

criteria, can offer to feminism

a

radical social analysis.

provides a mode of understanding and

a

Freud

critique of the internal

experience of men and women, the relations between the sexes, the transformation of personal relations to social structures, in turn the
influence of society on individual development, and finally, the trans-

mission and institutionalization of personal and social relations
across generations.
It is beyond the scope of this research to make a definitive

statement about the extent to which
as the basis for a political

which aims at

a

theory.

a

psychological theory can serve
Still,

a

notion of feminism

radical transformation of society requires this complex

depiction of human nature, with its internal links to political theory,
in order to project a reasonable and viable agenda for social

change.

179

Women's Studies represents one arm of that
endeavor, and

a

program in

counseling and psychology would confrontthe
problem on several fronts.
In my view,
a liberal

the purpose of a Women's Studies program
is to situate

arts education in a context which will enhance
the powers of

feminist political analysis in order to alter the quality
of students'
life experience and to prepare them to work more
effectively to trans-

form their social world.

problems in many ways.

An educational

program can address these

The most significant of these are:

To.redress the historical imbalance in women's education by re-

discovering neglected women artists and theorists and by focusing on
areas within the traditional academic disciplines that illumine the

problematic aspects of women's social existence.
2.

To begin to clarify the relationship between feminist theory and

action in order to prepare students for meaningful activity outside
the university.

"Action" in this context refers to both political

work and to career/employment; indeed, the possibility of overlap
between those two remains problematic and in need of clarification,
in

the field of counseling as elsewhere.

3.

To provide a setting in which women students can explore the issues

around working together as
4.

a

committed political group.

To examine the internal connections between academic disciplines in

order to make explicit the political content in seemingly "neutral"
areas of discourse.
5.

To work toward a definition of "research" which is more compatible

with feminist theory; to establish feminist scholarship, particularly
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feminist research and theory
development, as

a

priority within the

academy and within the women's
movement.
It is

perhaps the task of highlighting
a theory of moral and
ethical values which can serve
as a focus through which to
integrate
the variety of issues under
discussion here:

political theory,

pedagogical responsibility, psychological
theory, the role of the
healing professions, the personal
and social experience-or mere

endurance
is

of gender and all

that pertains to gender difference.

It

in fact the differing vantage
points of psychology and political

philosophy on the genesis of

a

theory of moral and ethical values

that is the heart of the contradiction
between political and psycho-

logical endeavors.
is

And the debate over which school of
psychology

most value-influenced or which school's
Weltanschauung is most

appropriate for

a

given political analysis, has been, until now,
the

basis of the choice of theory to be used for
program development,

political or pedagogical.
The question becomes then, what does the psychoanalytic
theory

of moral development, which in turn forms the ethical base of
its

treatment methodology, have to offer to feminism and feminist education?

In fact,

the ethical

stance which informs psychoanalysis is

the source of its great contribution to political

theory and at the

same time its most serious problematic for political activity.

psychoanalysis does not, in theory or practice, profess
This restraint

straddles the line between

responsibility and

a

a

a Wei

For

tanschauung

commitment to ethical

position of theoretical and practical amorality.

.

5

.
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I

would like here to juxtapose feminist
education with three

different and interrelated areas of
morality and ethics within psychoanalysis:

its theory of moral development, its
position vis-a-vis

society's valuation of abnormal vs. normal,
the ethics of its treat-

ment method.
Psychoanalysis holds that the genesis of morality
lies in the
early parent-child relationship.

"The origin of value then is the

need of the helpless met by the constant fulfillment
of the trustworthy.

As opposed to theories which believe persons to be
innately

moral, or conversely, believe person's morality to be controlled
solely
by social

institutions such as church or state, psychoanalysis sees

morality and ethics as inevitable but only developmental
ly acquired
achievements
In the light of psychoanalysis, moral valuation and
moral conduct are necessary attributes of "natural"
man. To have firmly established this, not only in the
form of apercus but through painstaking and systematic
observations and in the form of a well-reasoned theory
is perhaps the most important contribution Freud has
made to the study of moral behavior.

The nature of our psychic and biological apparatus requires and provides
the possibility for this achievement, yet it remains

a

process that

each individual must undergo to enter the human community and partake
of "culture."

As Erikson puts it:

The ethical core which is built into all of us phylogenetically must evolve in each of us ontogenetical ly-g
that is, through the mediation of the generational process."

Now clearly the origins of moral i ty--the genesis in each of us
of the concepts "good" and "bad," "ought" and "ought

important consideration for any political theory.

not"— is

an

Because the social
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arrangements between men and women are so
often cooperative, the

oppression of women so often denied by
members of both sexes, hypotheses regarding moral valuations and
moral conduct represent an

essential component of feminist theory.

differentially value men and women?

By what route do we come to

Psychoanalysis locates this

process within the universal, early instinctual
struggles of the child
and states that "the transmitting mechanism of
value is the child's

identification with the adult generation
affords

a

."

7

This dialectical hypothesis

perspective which may both explicate and at the same time

critique the development of cultural values, whereas
"intellectual

constructions of ethical systems which neglect the psychological
forces
that actually determine moral behavior are likely to impede both the

stability and the power of these systems

." 8

It is well

Freud believed the civilizing process exacted too high

form of instinctual renunciations

9
.

known that
a

price in the

Yet the Freudian theory of moral

development does not go nearly as far as it might in its critique of
society, and in certain ways

a

feminist analysis may serve as

a

corrective.
As set forth in Chapters

for the acquisition of moral

Oedipal

complex.

I

III, IV, and V, the primary period

standards is during the resolution of the

argued in Chapters IV and

of psychosexual development is built on

a

V

that Freud's theory

presumption of asymmetry

between men's and women's moral capacities.

As a result of this pre-

sumption, the theoretical constructs regarding both psychosexual and
moral development are highly flawed.

The presumption of male moral

superiority would appear to be traceable in the first place

to a de-

1
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fensive assessment of the "typical" masculine moral
sensibility as
highly evolved, when in fact there are persuasive
interpretations which
argue that it is arrested at the anal and phallic
developmental levels.^
This alternative viewpoint may contribute to our
understanding of

why the superego has remained such
literature.

a

confused concept in analytic

Does superego contribute to morality or undermine it?

Erikson suggests

distinction between morality and ethical values

a

which may clarify the problem:
The first requirement for a psychoanalytic study of
moral values and ethics, then, is the epigenetic point
of view.
Developmental!^ speaking, we must, then,
differentiate between an earlier, moral conscience and a
later ethical sense.
What psychoanalysis graphically calls
our super-ego.
is the ready recipient of prohibitions
driven into us in childhood by frowning faces and mortal
threats, if not beaten into us by physical puni shment--and
this even before we can possibly understand the meaning
of it all.
In later life this remains our most moralistic side.
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

Morality and ethics thus must evolve in each person in
a step-by-step development through ever differentiated and
insightful stages.
Even as each earlier stage lives on
in all the later ones, each later stage can represent a
re-integration of all earlier ones on a higher level. But
this also implies a continuing and inexorable dynamic
conflict between the earlier and most primitive, and the
later, more mature values in each person--and in all
communi ties

While

I

J

would quarrel strongly with his emphasis on external

influence over conflicted internal fantasy as the source of the
superego's harshness, Erikson's distinction between the moral and the
ethical remains provocative.

As

I

suggested above, it may well be that

the theory of psychosexual development which requires that unequal

moral

powers be attributed to men and women is what stands in the way

of psychoanalysis evolving not only

a

theory of moral values but also
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one of integrated ethical standards.

In this regard psychoanalysis

and feminism stand to make
important contributions to one another
in
further theoretical developments. An
ongoing attempt to clarify society's
mode of valuation stands as an
integral aspect of feminist scholarship
and therefore of Women's Studies.
In the specific context of
feminist counselor education, the

significance of this issue deepens.

For here we must scrutinize the

attitude which teachers adopt and encourage
in students regarding the
position of mental healers vis-a-vis culture and
its prevailing values.
One of Freud's great contributions to the science
of psychology— an

inevitable corollary of his theory of the unconscious mind
--was to

securely locate psychopathology on

a

continuum with "normality."

Erikson underscores this when he states that, "Patients, in
other
words, are those members of

a

given society who—for

a

variety of

etiological reasons— are most inactivated by inner conflicts shared
by all."

12

This 'dialectical' approach stands in contradistinction

to unidirectional

theories which see patients as inherently defective

(the conservative viewpoint), or as having suffered from extraordinary

social deprivations and

abuse— outside the range of what society

generally inflicts (the liberal viewpoint).
The Freudian perspective on normal i ty/abnormal ity represents the

second moral or ethical aspect of psychoanalysis which

I

would like to

consider.
It then appears that some of the dominant neuroses and
psychoses of any given period of history contain an
inverted revolt against the values of the existing order;
and that we, the mental healers, by taking the dominant
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symptoms seriously (rather than decrying, suppressing,
or punishing them)
accept some validity in that challenge.
In establishing diagnostic and
prognostic criteria.
and
in postulating an etiology and prescribing
a cure for
their symptoms, a new therapeutic style also
postulates
what seems normative and essential in human nature;
and
it helps to prescribe what men [sic] owe to each
other and
what they must avoid doing to each other. Whatever the
healing professions advocate, then, is always part of a
central struggle of their times and whether "avowed" or
not, become ethical intervention.^
,

.

.

Again, psychoanalysis and feminism have much to offer one another,
where
Freudian theory provides an ethical posture and feminist analysis adds
a

lens through which to shape diagnosis of women's suffering.

name but a few examples, this might include
painful

a

To

re-examination of the

inhibition that has been heretofore diagnosed as "normal"

female passivity;

a

serious and compassionate assessment of the some-

times spurious diagnosis of hysterical personality;

a

willingness to

recognize the paralyzing and destructive effects of the eating disorders, rapidly becoming the female symptom, though considered

a

legitimate diagnostic category only in extreme and "bizarre" cases.
Ethical

problems in psychological diagnosis and assessment

reflect back on the first set of issues raised, that is, the genesis
of moral values.
If we do not recognize, if we deny in ourselves, the psychological nature of moral valuation, not only distortions of
our authentic codes and directions will result, but also the
picture of the reality we evaluate will be often distorted-in our case the picture of what we empirically know about the
characteristics of what we call healthy and sick. 14

And for clarification of the psychological distortions of what is de-

signated healthy and sick in men and women, we must turn once again
to problems which have thus far been built into the theory of psycho-

sexual

development.
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If, as feminists and therapists,
we accept these ethical

bilities, then we also take on

a

responsi

range of responsibilities— and

problems --in the teaching of counseling.
For we cannot claim any more merely
to heal clients in
and climes, and to enlighten students
and readers,
thout directly intervening in the
process by which values
are formed and transmitted in society.
Rather than deny
this fact, we had better find the
proper frameworks for
teaching the tenets of psychoanalysis both
in the context
of clinical training and in that of
humanist enlightenment.
To search in each framework for a style
which
enlarges and trains ethical consciousness even
as it
reveals the workings of the unconscious.
.15
.

Students of the mind, particularly those who claim
to locate

psychology within

a

broader view of culture as

a

whole, must recognize

the commitment to, and develop the capacity for
an avowal of their

moral

valuations and an awareness of the route by which they came

to hold those values.

Weltanschauung

,

While psychoanalysis cannot provide

a

its ethos includes a rigorous examination of

and society's moral values and ability to live up to them.

individual

Perhaps

one of the major problems this research raises and cannot yet solve
is

the manner in which the tools of psychoanalytic insight can be

extrapolated from the treatment process and applied in the classroom
or within a political community. Chapter

I

critiques the place that

self-exploration has come to occupy in the academy.
knowledge is, by my own terms,

a

Though self-

crucial aspect of feminist education

in the healing arts, a definition of the role that it may productively

play in

a

university setting remains elusive.

And though consciousness

raising may indeed mean little without an adequate notion of the un-

conscious (as

I

argued in Chapters

II

and III), the introduction of
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techniques which touch on unconscious
phenomena iin
than a therapeutic setting remains

a

delicate and
d

a

political rather

highly problematic

a

project.
The subject of self-knowledge brings
me to the third and final

aspect of psychoanalysis and moral
values to be discussed here, and
that is the ethical principles
implicit in its approach to treatment.

Following on what has just been discussed,
this is

a

difficult topic

since a model for applying the method
outside of advanced clinical

training and the actual treatment setting hasn't
developed.

been

and may never be

Yet the principles in question are central to
the evolu-

tion, in individuals and in groups, of politically
and ethically

enlightened consciousness; though the application of method
remains
elusive, the application of principles cannot be abandoned.

Psychoanalysis aims at the enhanced autonomy of the individual,

achieved through expanded self-knowledge which is accompanied by
resolution of unconscious instinctual conflict.
Ego shall

be."

"Where Id was, there

However, there is no simple, clear cut link between

increased integration of the ego functions and enhanced moral stature.

Psychoanalysis has of course been criticized, and in many instances
(particularly since Freud's death and particularly in this country),
rightly so, for failing to live up to its own ethical fiat.

Its

inability and/or reluctance to arbitrate the relationship between
"health" and morality may pose an even more serious limitation on its

usefulness for political theory.
.it is obvious that there are many neurotics who are
"highly moral" and many, sometimes the same ones, who are
.

.
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socially useful, while there are many "healthy"
people
who are neither the one nor the other— contrary
to the
expectations of the representatives of a health

ethicsJ 6

Beyond the tension between "health" and morality,
it is also true
that conflict-free, "rational action can be used in
the service of

both morally positively and morally negatively valued
aims.
This presents another potential
social

theory.

"17

intersection of psychology and

Firstly, an application of feminist analysis may

clarify the notion of "health," where health and rationality appear
to coincide.

For instance, many theorists, in critiquing male ego

development, reflected

a

different picture of rationality in relation

to the other ego functions, particularly repressed or split off

aspects of the ego which might mediate "objective," "rational" considerations through other, perhaps affect-influenced psychic experiences.
And secondly,

a

historical analysis is bound to bring the entire

question of mental health into relativistic perspective.
Though we inevitably encounter limits as to the extent that

psychoanalytically achieved self-knowledge abuts on moral questions,
or the extent to which increased energies available to the ego will
be directed toward the community, still

these same limits protect the

possibility of the deep psychic changes which may make possible
order of social relations.

a

new

The psychoanalytic limits may be easier to

live with than at first seems possible; easier to live with, once

again, than the boundless but empty promise of liberal utopianism.
To say that it is a long way from the clarification of
ethical principles to moral conduct is to state the
But I should think that a clear and systematic
obvious.
awareness of actual moral motivations could affect moral
Furthermore, a truer insight into the
action, too.
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inner implications of an
action will often lead to a r*
mot1v ^°"S~even without
a change in the
balanrp^h°t

e
0 ^ necessity lead to
changes in the field of
?their application
to moral action. 18
.

If the specific techniques
of psychoanalysis-interpretation
of the

transference relationship as

a

route to resolution of infantile

instinctual confl ict-proves of
limited applicability, it may be
the

hemeneutic principle

in

itself that is to be profitably
extrapolated

from the psychoanalytic method.

The interpretive method and the
theory

of the unconscious mind are
inextricable.

The commitment to revealing

successive layers of meaning, to
demystification of life's surface
appearance, is tied to the analytic belief
that we have barely begun
to discover the workings of the mind,
barely begun to understand the

question of gender identity and the relations
between the sexes.

A

perspective informed by both psychoanalysis and
feminist social theory
can help to determine what is to be studied
now and how; that is, it
can help to establish the priorities for
continued research, and to

establish

a

mode of scholarship that is appropriate to the issues

under consideration.
Women's Studies presents the opportunity for interdisci pi inary

education in the highest sense, not merely multi- or parallel disciplinary, not remedial education for
a

a

neglected minority.

It can present

truly cohesive examination of our social formations and their

political underpinnings.

As such, it stands to mount

that cuts across lines of race, class, and sex.

a

radical critique

Feminist education

which takes seriously its ethical and political responsibilities is both

intensely personal and inherently social, an education which leads not
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only to knowledge and enlightenment
but also to reform and finally
to revolution.
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